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Abstract 
 
 
In my thesis I investigate the causes and the effects of the 
allocation of workers into occupations, sectors, and locations. My 
analysis is substantially aided by the availability of new data on 
workers’ talents (or skills). The first chapter of the thesis exploits 
the fact that workers choose occupations according to their talents 
in order to study the effects on wages of the declining demand for 
manufacturing and clerical occupations. This is done by relating the 
occupational choices and the wages associated with particular 
talents over two representative cohorts of young workers in the 
United States between the late 1980s and the late 2000s. The 
second chapter, which is conjoint work, analyses the effect of an 
inflow of talent on productivity and output in the academic sector. 
We exploit the countercyclical relative attractiveness of academia 
as an employer over the business cycle to study periods of high 
(recessions) and low (booms) inflow of talent into that sector. 
Finally, the third chapter shows that government policy in the 
form of commuting tax breaks has substantial effects on the 
allocation of workers into jobs and residences. In particular, I 
exploit two reductions of tax breaks for commuting in 2003/4 and 
2006/7 in Germany to estimate commuting costs’ eﬀects on 
workers’ decisions to change the location of their job and/or their 
house. 
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Has Job Polarization Squeezed the Middle Class?
Evidence from the Allocation of Talents
Michael J. Boehm ∗
April 2013
Abstract Over the last two decades, earnings in the United States increased at the
top and at the bottom of the wage distribution but not in the middle—the intensely
debated middle class squeeze. At the same time there was a substantial decline of
employment in middle-skill production and clerical occupations—so-called job po-
larization. I study whether job polarization has caused the middle class squeeze. So
far little evidence exists about this because the endogenous selection of skills into
occupations prevents credible identification of polarization’s effect on wages. I solve
the selection-bias problem by studying the changes in returns to occupation-specific
skills instead of the changes in occupational wages using data over the two cohorts
of the National Longitudinal Study of Youth (NLSY). This data features multidi-
mensional and pre-determined test scores, which predict occupational sorting and
thus measure relative occupation-specific skills. My estimation equations are derived
from the Roy (1951) model over two cross-sections with job polarization amounting
to a shift in the occupation-specific skill prices. In line with polarization, I find that
a one percentage point higher propensity to enter high- (low-) as opposed to middle-
skill occupations is associated with a .29 (.70) percent increase in expected wages
over time. I then compute a counterfactual wage distribution using my estimates of
the shifts in occupation-specific skill prices and show that it matches the increase
at the top of the wage distribution but fails to explain the increase at the bottom.
Thus, despite the strong association of job polarization with changes in the returns
to occupation-specific skills, there remains room for alternative (e.g. policy related)
explanations about the increase in the lower part of the wage distribution.
Keywords: Job Polarization; Wage Inequality; Talent Allocation; Roy Model
JEL Classification Numbers: J21, J23, J24, J31
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1.1 Introduction
Over the last two decades, wages of middle class workers in the United States have
been squeezed, in that earnings in the middle of the wage distribution have stag-
nated or even fallen while earnings at the top and at the bottom have increased. This
has coincided with a decrease of employment in middle-skill production and clerical
occupations, and an increase of employment in low-skill services and high-skill pro-
fessional and managerial occupations—so-called job polarization. Many economists
believe that job polarization and the middle class squeeze are two sides of the same
coin. In particular, they think that a negative demand shock for the middle-skill
occupations has simultaneously reduced middle-skill employment and middle-class
wages. If this is true, the middle class squeeze is a consequence of market forces,
and it will be difficult to design policies that reverse the trend and help the middle
class without hampering the efficiency of the economy.1
However, there is little evidence so far which establishes a direct link between
job polarization and the middle class squeeze. On the one hand, a large body of
research in labor economics and international trade has found a drop in the demand
for jobs that can be replaced by computers or off-shored and shown that many of
these jobs are in middle-skill occupations. On the other hand, there are plenty
of hypotheses about other factors which could have contributed to the U-shaped
change in wage inequality that characterizes the middle class squeeze—including
increases in the minimum wage, de-unionization, and the deregulation of financial
and related professions. If such policy-related or institutional factors have caused
the downward pressure on the middle of the wage distribution, policy makers may
be called to action in order to support the middle class.
The goal of my paper is thus to answer the question: does job polarization
explain the middle class squeeze? I do this by studying how the wages of workers
who would have chosen the high-, middle-, or low-skill occupations in the 1980s have
changed over time. To be exact, since the same workers cannot be observed both
before and after polarization has taken place, I study the returns to talents that
are associated with choosing the particular occupations over time. The Roy (1951)
1The struggles of the middle class are a major issue in the public and political debate. For
example, this editorial in the International Herald Tribune from August 30, 2012 takes the market-
based view: “The economic reality is that, thanks to smart machines and global trade, the well-
paying, middle-class jobs that were the backbone of Western democracies are vanishing. Neither
Mitt Romney’s smaller state nor Barack Obama’s larger one will bring them back.”(Freeland 2012)
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model of self-selection into sectors guides my empirics: in the model, workers’ skills
in occupations are made up of observable as well as unobservable components and
the returns to talents that I estimate only reflect the observable part. However,
using the sorting of- and the returns to observables, I can estimate the shifts in
occupation-specific prices per unit of skill, which also apply to the unobservables,
and examine how much of the middle class squeeze they explain. In addition, I
assess the role that heterogeneous gains from switching occupations may play for
the change of the wage distribution.
So far, the fundamental problem in linking job polarization to the wage distri-
bution has been that one could not estimate the effect of occupational demand on
workers’ wages. Job choices are naturally dependent on the price movements so
that the skill selection into occupations changes endogenously. Hence, a comparison
of wages in high-, middle-, and low-skill occupations over time would confound the
relative demand shifts with a changing composition of workers’ skills in each occupa-
tion.2 The problem is exemplified by the fact that average wages in the middle-skill
occupations have not declined compared to average wages in the low-skill occupa-
tions in several datasets and samples (for example, Goos and Manning 2007, and
the data used here).
The point of departure for my analysis is the regression equation formulation
of the Roy model as in Heckman and Sedlacek (1985):3 every worker possesses a
vector of talents which combine into skills in each occupation and which are only
partly observed in the data. The log wage offered to workers in a given occupation
is then the sum of an occupation-specific log skill price, which is the regression inter-
cept, an observable component of skill, which is the regressor, and an unobservable
component of skill, which is the orthogonal regression error. In this framework, the
relative demand shocks of polarization amount to a shift in the occupation-specific
skill prices. This has the effect that the relative returns to workers’ talents change,
but also that workers switch occupations depending on their observed and unob-
served skills. The switching due to the unobserved skills causes selection bias in
2To quote the well-known survey paper by Acemoglu and Autor (2010, p78): “[...] because
the allocation of workers to tasks is endogenous, the wages paid to a set of workers previously
performing a given task can fall even as the wages paid to the workers now performing that task
rise. [...] a regression of wages on tasks currently performed, or their change over time, would be
difficult to interpret.”
3The only difference is in labels: I call talents what Heckman and Sedlacek (1985) call skills
and I call skills what they call tasks.
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occupational wages, since we do not know whether rising wages in an occupation
are due to a rise in the price per unit of skill in this occupation or due to a better
selection of workers with respect to the unobserved component of skill.
My paper solves the selection bias problem, and it circumvents the structural
estimation of the Roy model, by shifting the analysis from occupational wages to
the returns to occupation-specific skills. I estimate the changes in returns to the
observable component of occupation-specific skills with a two-stage procedure. First,
using workers’ talents I predict their propensities to enter the high-, middle-, and
low-skill occupations in the period before polarization took place. Second, I estimate
the changes in the returns to these propensities.4
In order to implement this procedure, I need two cross-sections of data with con-
sistent measures of workers’ talents that predict occupational sorting but are not
influenced by occupational choice and thus not endogenous to polarization. Such
data has only recently become available in the form of the National Longitudinal
Survey of Youth (NLSY):5 the NLSY cohorts of 1979 and 1997 contain detailed and
multidimensional measures of talents which are hardly malleable and determined
well before a worker’s entry into the labor market. The measures include mathe-
matical, verbal, and mechanical test scores as well as risky behaviors and parental
education. In addition, the data are available for two representative cross-sections
of 27 year olds in the end of the 1980s and the end of the 2000s, and therefore
well-timed for studying polarization and the middle class squeeze.6
The estimation results on the returns to observable occupation-specific skills
indicate a strong impact of polarization on wages. I find that a one percentage
point higher propensity to enter the high- as opposed to the middle-skill occupation
is associated with a .29 percent increase in wages over time. A one percentage
point higher propensity to enter the low as opposed to the middle-skill occupation
is associated with a .70 percent increase in wages. Workers with a high propensity
to enter the middle-skill occupations in the 1980s actually suffer an absolute decline
4Acemoglu and Autor recommend a similar procedure but lack the data to implement it. In
their words: “[...] the approach here exploits the fact that task specialization in the cross section is
informative about the comparative advantage of various skill groups, and it marries this source of
information to a well-specified hypothesis about how the wages of skill groups that differ in their
comparative advantage should respond [...]” (Acemoglu and Autor 2010, p78)
5Until recently the 1997 cohort of the NLSY was too young to warrant a reliable analysis of
labor market outcomes.
6Moreover, the data from the NLSY79 and the NLSY97 were designed to be comparable to one
another.
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in their expected real wages. This finding is robust to controlling for absolute skill
measures such as educational attainment, which supports the idea that it is relative
occupational skills rather than absolute skills whose returns have changed over time.
The effect identified in these estimations is a combination of the direct demand
effect of polarization on talent returns as well as the potentially heterogeneous wage
gains for workers of different talents from reallocating out of the middle-skill oc-
cupations. Moreover, at age 27, the workers in the NLSY97 are young enough to
have chosen their occupations when most of polarization has already taken place.
Thus, the effect on their wages is likely to be largely due to ex ante different talent
endowments and not due to having acquired occupation-specific experience whose
value has changed ex post. This indicates a long-lasting effect of polarization on
relative wages that will not fade when the current generation of workers retires.7
The changing returns to propensities of entering high-, middle-, and low-skill
occupations may in fact be driven by alternative factors which are correlated with
occupations. I address this concern by exploiting the Roy model’s prediction about
specific talent returns under polarization: if only occupation-specific skill prices are
shifting, the Roy model implies that the change in the return to each talent solely
depends on how that talent is associated with occupational choice and how the
association changes over time.
I use this prediction to estimate the change in relative occupation-specific skill
prices and to test the null hypothesis that all changes in returns to talents—and
equivalently all changes in returns to occupational propensities—were driven by
polarization. In the data, I observe each talent’s initial and final association with
the three classes of occupations but not the adjustment path over time. I therefore
linearly interpolate the adjustment path, which gives relative price estimates that
are close to the actual prices and at the same time robust to different distributions
of unobserved skills. Since the NLSY provides more talents—three test scores plus
the risky behaviors and other demographics—than the two unknown relative prices,
I obtain over-identifying restrictions on talent returns from the model which I use
to test the polarization hypothesis and to estimate the relative occupation-specific
skill price changes.
The over-identifying restrictions test does not reject the polarization hypothesis
7It thus implies the need for long-term policy responses, e.g. long-term changes in education or
tax policy instead of income support for the current generation of workers.
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in the data. Moreover, the relative skill price increase in the high compared to
the middle-skill occupation is precisely estimated at 20 percent, while the relative
skill price increase in the low-skill occupation is imprecisely estimated with a point
estimate of 31 percent. The relative skill price estimates are crucial to assess the
overall impact of polarization on the wage distribution. This is because the returns to
observable talents or occupational propensities alone can only explain a small part of
the change in the wage distribution—just as they can only explain a small part of the
variation of wages in the cross-section. In contrast, the relative occupation-specific
skill price estimates change the return to the observable as well as the unobservable
components of skill in each occupation and thus allow me to assess the full effect of
polarization on the wage distribution.
Therefore, I compute a counterfactual wage distribution which is due to the
relative occupation-specific skill price effect of polarization and compare it to the
actual distribution. I do this by assigning the estimated relative skill price changes
to each worker in the NLSY79 according to his occupation. It turns out that the
counterfactual distribution closely matches the increase of wages at the top of the
actual distribution compared to the middle. However, it fails to match the increase of
wages at the bottom of the actual distribution compared to the middle. The reason
is that the wage rate estimates and the dispersion of wages within occupations is so
high that also many middle-earners’ wages are lifted by the price changes and that
some low-skill occupation workers become middle-earners themselves.
Finally, if polarization is to be the main driver of the middle class squeeze,
the remaining difference at the bottom between the counterfactual and the actual
change in the wage distribution must be due to the heterogeneous effect of optimal
occupational switching in response to polarization on different parts of the wage
distribution—a reallocation effect. Since there are no clear predictions from the Roy
model about this effect, I conduct rule-of-thumb experiments to assess whether the
reallocation effect may in principle explain the remainder: I assign the lowest earning
workers in the middle-skill occupation in the initial period gains that they could
obtain from switching to the low-skill occupation due to polarization and examine
the effect that this has on the change in the lower part of the wage distribution.
Experiments with a substantial gain from switching can relatively well match the
wage distribution in the bottom as well as average wages in occupations. However,
the assumptions that I need to make for this are strong and they are not supported
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by the reallocation (effect) of observable skills, which I can measure in the data.
It thus seems that, despite its strong effect on relative wages, polarization can
account well for only part of the evolution of the wage distribution over the past
two decades. The results therefore suggest that market-based forces may not be
responsible for all of the changes in the lower half of the wage distribution. This
opens the door for policy-related and institutional factors—such as de-unionization
and the minimum wage—that other studies have found to have an impact on earnings
at the bottom of the wage distribution over this period (Machin and Van Reenen
2008, Autor, Manning, and Smith 2010, Firpo, Fortin, and Lemieux 2011).
The findings in this study are qualitatively similar when implementing alterna-
tive definitions of occupations or tasks in occupations that have been used in the
literature on polarization. These include grouping occupations according to initial
median wages or average education, splitting up the large middle-skill group into
blue collar and white collar occupations, and employing continuous measures of
routine and nonroutine (analytical and manual) task content in occupations.
The paper continues as follows. The remainder of this section discusses the re-
lation to the existing literature. Section 2 demonstrates that job polarization and
wage inequality in the NLSY are similar to what is found in the commonly used
Current Population Survey (CPS), and it shows that workers sort themselves sys-
tematically into occupations according to the talent measures available in the NLSY.
The Roy model and its empirical predictions are analyzed in section 3. Section 4
presents the empirical results on the returns to occupation-specific skills. Section
5 estimates the occupation-specific skill prices and tests the model, while section
6 assesses whether the resulting counterfactual wage distribution may match the
actual. Section 7 concludes.
1.1.1 Related Literature
There are other studies that have tried to link job polarization to changes in the
wage distribution. The most explicit effort is a recent paper by Firpo, Fortin,
and Lemieux (2011) who use a Roy-style model to study the effect of shifts in the
demand for tasks on occupational wages. They also carry out a decomposition
to assess the effect of different factors such as occupational demands, skill supply,
unionization, and minimum wages on the change in the wage distribution. Neither
16
of these exercises control for the endogenous selection of workers with respect to
unobservable skills. This limitation of Firpo, Fortin, and Lemieux (2011)’s analysis is
noted by Acemoglu and Autor (2010), whose comparative advantage model predicts
a changing self-selection of workers into occupations due to movements in wages
rates across occupations or tasks. Exercises similar to Firpo, Fortin, and Lemieux
(2011)’s that feature as part of broader papers may thus be regarded as mostly
descriptive (e.g. Goos and Manning 2007, Autor, Katz, and Kearney 2008).
An alternative method to deal with endogenous selection is to employ panel data
and worker fixed effects. Cortes (2012) uses data from the Panel Study of Income
Dynamics to analyze the transition from middle- to high- and low-skill occupations
due to polarization and its associated wage changes. Liu and Trefler (2011) similarly
estimate the impact of trade in services with China and India on US workers using
matched data from the Current Population Survey (see also Ebenstein, Harrison,
McMillan, and Phillips 2011). Cortes finds a substantial impact of polarization on
workers’ wages while Liu and Trefler (2011) find a rather small impact of trade. A
general difficulty with the panel data approach is the need to make an appropriate
assumption about—or to control for—workers’ counterfactual experience profiles of
wages and occupations in the absence of polarization. Moreover, contrary to this
paper and the one by Firpo, Fortin, and Lemieux (2011), these studies do not link
their estimated earnings impacts of polarization to the change in the aggregate wage
distribution.
The large literature on the causes of job polarization provides the hypothesis
on occupational demands analyzed in my paper. During the last decade, many
studies in labor economics and international trade have examined rapidly changing
information and communication technology (ICT) and the off-shoring of goods and
services production as causes of polarization. For example, papers that consider
technological change include Autor, Levy, and Murnane (2003), Goos and Manning
(2007), Michaels, Natraj, and Van Reenen (2010), Acemoglu and Autor (2010), and
Autor and Dorn (2012). Papers that consider trade and offshoring include Blinder
(2009), Becker, Ekholm, and Muendler (2009), Crinò (2010), Ottaviano, Peri, and
Wright (2010), and Autor, Dorn, and Hanson (2012). Many of these studies find
that it is largely occupations in the middle of the skill distribution that are affected
by technology or trade.8
8Jaimovich and Siu (2012) find that job polarization and jobless recoveries after recessions are
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My approach to linking job polarization with changes in the wage distribution
relies critically on Roy (1951)’s model of occupational choice and the development
of his ideas by Gronau (1974) and Heckman (e.g. Heckman 1974, Heckman and
Sedlacek 1985). In particular, the mathematical specification of how occupational
skills are composed of observable and unobservable worker characteristics is iden-
tical to that of Heckman and Sedlacek (1985). Gould (2002) and Mulligan and
Rubinstein (2008) are the first papers to explicitly link the Roy model to increases
in wage inequality and skill-biased technological change (see also Yamaguchi 2012).
Compared to these papers I study the Roy model in relation to job polarization and
the U-shaped change of wage inequality.
Finally, there exists a large and diverse body of literature that analyzes hypothe-
ses about drivers of wage inequality other than polarization. The most important of
those is skill-biased technological change (SBTC), which is detached from demand for
specific occupations (e.g. Bound and Johnson 1992, Autor, Katz, and Krueger 1998).
Hypotheses complementing that of SBTC in the top of the wage distribution have
emphasized firm size and organization as well as pay increases in financial ser-
vices and other professions (e.g. Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg 2004, Gabaix and
Landier 2008, Tervio 2008, Philippon and Reshef 2009).9 In terms of the develop-
ments specific to the lower part of the wage distribution, changes in policy variables
and labor market institutions such as minimum wages and unionization have been
prominent in the discussion (see Machin and Van Reenen 2008, Autor, Manning,
and Smith 2010, Firpo, Fortin, and Lemieux 2011).
Both a falling and a rising supply of skills have been analyzed as different sets
of explanations for the change in inequality. Card and Lemieux (2001) and Goldin
and Katz (2008) consider a slowdown in the rate of supply of college graduates,
while Lemieux (2006, p461) argues that a large part of the changes in the wage
distribution that we observe is due to “composition effects linked to the secular
increase in experience and education”. My study is most closely related to the papers
that analyze the supply of, and returns to, ability test scores (e.g. Murnane, Willett,
and Levy 1995, Blau and Kahn 2005, Altonji, Bharadwaj, and Lange 2008). After
related to one another.
9For example, Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2004) show that improvements in communica-
tion technology lead to lower inequality at the bottom and higher inequality at the top of the
wage distribution, and thus a squeezed middle, in a hierarchy model of endogenous firm size and
organization.
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Altonji, Bharadwaj, and Lange (2012, ABL), this is also the first study to analyze
labor market outcomes across the two cohorts of the NLSY. While ABL examine the
effect of changes in overall skill supply on wage levels and inequality in the economy,
my paper analyzes the effect of shifts in skill demand across occupations.
1.2 Data and Empirical Facts
This section establishes the stylized facts of job polarization and the u-shape change
in wage inequality in my data. Median real wages for 27 year old males rise only very
little, so the other characteristic of the middle class squeeze—stagnating incomes—
is also present in my data. Moreover, the section shows how workers systematically
sort themselves into the occupations affected by polarization depending on their
talent endowments.
1.2.1 Job Polarization and the U-Curve of Wages
I use data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY) cohorts of 1979
and 1997, which contain detailed information on individuals’ fundamental talents
that is not available in other datasets. Moreover, the two cohorts are specifically
designed to to be comparable to one another. When possible, I compare my results
to the more standard Current Population Survey Merged Outgoing Rotation Groups
(CPS) over the same period.
The individuals in the NLSY surveys are born between 1956 and 1964 and be-
tween 1980 and 1984, respectively. I restrict my attention to 27 year olds, which
is the oldest age that I have enough data in the NLSY97 for to analyze, and to
males.10 The sample selection and attrition weighting is done closely in line with
a recent paper using both of the NLSY cohorts by Altonji, Bharadwaj, and Lange
(2008). Labor supply by hours worked and hourly wages are defined as in Lemieux
(2006). The details of the sample construction can be found in Appendix A.1. Table
1.1 accounts for how I end up with a sample of 3,054 and 1,207 individuals in the
NLSY79 and the NLSY97, respectively.
For the overall (male) labor force, the wage distribution change from the end
of the 1980s to the end of the 2000s is characterized by a U-shape, i.e. wages
10At the time of writing, NLSY97 data was available up to 2009. The periods that I compare
are thus 1983-1991 and 2007-2009.
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increase substantially at the top of the distribution and somewhat less at the bottom
but hardly at all in the middle (the middle class squeeze). Moreover, there is job
polarization in the sense that employment in the middle-skill occupations decreases
and employment in the high-skill and low-skill occupations increases. For the details
of these facts, see the survey paper by Acemoglu and Autor (2010).
I start with the stylized fact about the wage distribution in my data. Figure
1.1 graphs the empirical cumulative log wage distribution in the NLSY79 and the
NLSY97 in the top two sub-figures and the change in wages by distribution quantile
compared to the CPS in the bottom sub-figure. We see that the wage distribution
levels and, more importantly, the changes in the NLSY and the CPS align well for
both cohorts. This establishes the well-known U-shape in the wage distribution for
the NLSY.11
The second important fact is job polarization. The literature has measured
high-, middle-, and low-skill occupations in different ways and arrived at the same
results. It has ranked them by initial median wages or average education (e.g. Autor,
Katz, and Kearney 2006, Goos and Manning 2007). Alternatively, it has grouped
managerial, professional, and technical occupations as high-skill; sales, office and
administrative, production, and operator and laborer occupations as middle-skill;
and protective, food, cleaning and personal service occupations as low-skill (e.g.
Acemoglu and Autor 2010, Cortes 2012, Jaimovich and Siu 2012).
I use the latter approach of grouping occupations in figure 1.2 and in the pa-
per more generally for two reasons: it is becoming a standard in the literature and
it explicitly delineates occupations by the extent of abstract (high-skill), routine
(middle-skill), and manual (low-skill) tasks that they require (see Acemoglu and
Autor 2010, Jaimovich and Siu 2012). The upper two sub-figures graph the em-
ployment shares in the three occupation groups for the NLSY79 and NLSY97 and
compared to the CPS. The share of employment in the middle-skill occupations is
declining while the share of employment in the high- and the low-skill occupations is
rising. This can be seen more clearly in the lower sub-figure, which plots the changes
in employment shares. These facts establish job polarization in the NLSY, which
is very similar to what can be found for 27 year olds in the CPS. The findings are
11The increase at the top for 27 year olds is not as pronounced as previous papers have found for
prime age males (e.g. Acemoglu and Autor 2010). This is not surprising, since the wage trajectory
for high-skilled workers is steep around the age of 27 and thus the differences, and their changes,
are likely to be larger at older ages.
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the same if I use the alternative approaches of grouping occupations as low, middle,
and high-skilled.
Before moving on, figure 1.3 shows average 1979 real wages in high-, middle-, and
low-skill occupations and how they have changed over the two cohorts in the NLSY
and, for comparison again, the CPS. Unsurprisingly, average wages in high-skill oc-
cupations are higher than in middle-skill occupations, which in turn are higher than
average wages in low-skill occupations. The changes are more interesting. While
wages in high-skill occupations have increased robustly in levels and compared to
the other two occupations, wages in low-skill occupations have lost somewhat fur-
ther ground against wages in middle-skill occupations in the NLSY and also slightly
in the CPS.12 One might find this surprising under the demand side explanation
for job polarization, which should decrease employment and wages in the middle
at the same time. Yet, just as the size of occupations, the composition of skills in
occupations does not stay constant when relative demands change.13 Appropriately
adjusting for this effect is the main contribution of my paper.
1.2.2 Talent Sorting into Occupations
Workers do not choose to work in the high-, middle-, and low-skill occupations at
random. This section uses choice regressions to establish and quantify systematic
occupational sorting in the data.
Measures of Talent
The NLSY data provides a long array of characteristics of its respondents. Out of
these, I focus on variables that are early determined, that are relevant for occupa-
tional choice and wages, that may approximate different dimensions of skill, and
that can be compared over the two cohorts.14
12Note that the small differences between wages, occupational employment, and occupational
wages in the NLSY and the CPS are unlikely to stem from systematic sample attrition or non-
test-taking in the NLSY. This is because sample attrition or non-test-taking are much lower in the
NLSY79 than the NLSY97, while the differences between CPS and NLSY are equally large for the
two cohorts. Further, note again that the scope of the NLSY and the CPS are different. The CPS
is supposed to be representative of the resident population in the survey year while the NLSY is
supposed to be representative of those individuals in the survey year who were between 14 and 21
years old in 1979 and between 12 and 16 in 1997, respectively.
13Also other studies find a further decrease in low-skill compared to middle-skill wages (Goos
and Manning 2007). Autor and Dorn (2012) find that relative wages in clerical occupations rise
while quantities fall.
14Thus, the popular non-cognitive skill measures of locus of control and self-esteem have to be
left out of the analysis because they are not available in the NLSY97.
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Table 1.2 reports labor force averages of NLSY variables that fulfill the four
criteria (“early skill determinants”) and some demographic variables and contempo-
rary skill determinants that are available in more standard datasets. In terms of the
early skill determinants, I construct intuitive composite measures of mathematical,
verbal, and mechanical talent by combining test scores on mathematics knowledge,
paragraph comprehension and word knowledge, and mechanical comprehension and
auto- and shop information, respectively. In addition, I report the AFQT score,
which is commonly taken as a measure of general intelligence.15
The advantages of the early skill determinants—and in particular the composite
measures of mathematical, verbal, and mechanical talent—compared to the contem-
porary skill determinants—and in particular measures of education—for my study
are threefold: First, the early skill determinants are largely exogenous to an individ-
ual’s actual occupational choice as they are hardly malleable and determined before
entry into the labor market. Second, the test scores are finer measures of individual
differences in skill than education, which has a lot of bunching at points like high
school graduate (12 years of education) or college graduate (16 years of education).
This is a sizeable advantage when I want to use test scores to compare similarly
skilled individuals over the two cohorts. And finally, the test scores provide proxies
for multiple dimensions of individuals’ skills. Thus, they can be used to determine
comparative advantage as I show in the next subsection.
Before moving on, we see from table 1.2 that the level of AFQT, which is a
measure of IQ, does not change in the male labor force over the two cohorts. In
addition, table 1.3 reports that the cross-correlation of the composite test scores and
AFQT remained virtually the same. This supports my identification assumption in
the following that the tests measure similar dimensions of talent over the two cohorts
and that “within test score groups” individuals can be considered on average the
same across cohorts.
15All these measures are taken from the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery of tests
(ASVAB) which consists of ten components: arithmetic reasoning, word knowledge, paragraph
comprehension, mathematics knowledge, general science, numerical operations, coding speed, auto
and shop information, mechanical comprehension, and electronics information. The breakup into
mathematical, verbal, and mechanical talent is very similar to what a factor analysis of test scores
suggests. AFQT is essentially the average of arithmetic reasoning, word knowledge, paragraph
comprehension, and mathematics knowledge.
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Sorting into Occupations
Figure 1.4 depicts average mathematical, verbal, and mechanical talent in the three
occupation groups in both cohorts. We see that the levels of all three talents are
much higher in the high-skill occupation than in the middle-skill occupation which,
in turn, is higher than the low-skill occupation. Thus, there is a clear ordering
of absolute advantage in occupations independent of the talent considered. This
underlines the appropriates of the classification of high-, middle-, and low-skill oc-
cupations.
Yet, in the absence of restrictions to enter occupations, workers’ choice should not
be governed by their absolute but by their comparative advantage and thus depend
on their relative skills (for details, compare Sattinger 1993). We see in figure 1.4
that average mathematical talent in the high-skill occupation is higher than average
verbal or mechanical talent, while average mechanical talent is considerably higher
in the middle-skill occupation than mathematical or verbal talent. Verbal talent is
higher than mathematical and mechanical talent in the low-skill occupation.
This strongly suggests sorting according to comparative advantage as in the well-
known Roy model—with workers who have high math talent choosing the high-skill
occupation, workers who have relatively high mechanical talent choosing the middle-
skill occupation, and workers who have relatively high verbal talent choosing the
low-skill occupation. It is also intuitive, since high analytical skills are required
to pursue a career in managerial, professional, or technical jobs while individuals
who have relatively strong mechanical skills or a practical inclination may prefer
to work in production or clerical jobs. Verbal skills may be relatively helpful to
communicate in personal and protective service occupations. In this case, the uni-
form absolute ranking of occupations in the three talents should stem from the high
cross-correlations between them as seen in table 1.3.
To test the idea of sorting according to comparative advantage I run multinomial
choice regressions. Let {Kit} be a set of indicator variables that take the value of
1 when individual i works in occupation K{L,M,H} and zero otherwise. The
timing is such that t = 0 when the members of the NLSY79 are 27 years old and
t = 1 when the members of the NLSY97 are 27 years old. For now, I model the
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conditional choice probabilities as multinomial logit (MNL):16
p(Kit = 1|xit, pit) = exp(bK0t + bK1tx1it + ...+ bKJtxJit)∑
G=H,M,L exp(bG0t + bG1tx1it + ...+ bGJtxJit)
. (1.1)
Maximum likelihood estimation of equation (1.1) yields the coefficients of this
model and it provides conditional probabilities (“propensities”) to enter each oc-
cupation based on the observable talents. As I show in the next section, these
propensities can be interpreted as individuals’ predicted relative skills in an occu-
pation as opposed to the other two occupations. However, note that the descriptive
choice regressions do not in general identify any parameters of the economic model
that I introduce then.
Table 1.4 reports the results from the multinomial choice regressions. These
extract the marginal effect of another unit of each talent on occupational choice
when the respective other talents are held constant. For ease of discussion, focus
on the first column which gives the sorting into high- and low-skill occupations
relative to the omitted middle-skill occupation in the NLSY79. Conditional on
the other talents, a one unit higher math score is associated with an about 4.7
percent higher probability to enter the high-skill versus the middle- or the low-skill
occupation. A one unit higher mechanical score is associated with a 1.4 and 2.3
percent lower probability to enter the high- and the low-skill occupation as opposed
to the middle-skill occupation, respectively. On the other hand, a one unit higher
verbal score decreases the probability to enter the middle- as opposed to the high- or
the low-skill occupation by about two percent. Thus, the idea of sorting according
to comparative advantage is strongly supported by these regressions—with workers
who have (conditionally) high math skills moving into the high-skill occupation,
workers with conditionally high mechanical and low verbal skills moving into the
16This is a commonly made modeling decision because the MNL is convenient to work with. For
example, the relative risk of choosing occupation K rather than the base category M becomes
log
[
p(Kit = 1)
p(Mit = 1)
]
= (bK0t − bM0t) + (bK1t − bM1t)x1it + ...+ (bKJt − bMJt)xJit.
Using a multinomial probit (MNP) model with uncorrelated disturbances across options instead
of the MNL would have been a natural choice, too. Although more difficult to interpret, the MNP
has the attraction of being motivated by a latent normal random vector. Empirically, there is often
little difference between the predicted probabilities from probit and logit models (see Cameron and
Trivedi 2005, p489ff) and in particular my results are robust to using the MNP. Both, the MNL and
the MNP, invoke an Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) assumption (i.e. uncorrelated
errors) which is too restrictive if one wants to interpret the regression coefficients as structural
parameters of an economic model.
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middle, and those workers with low math and mechanical skills moving into the
low-skill occupations. Also, the results underscore the importance of measuring
multiple dimensions of skill for linking occupational demand to workers’ comparative
advantage in my data. They are the same when looking at the NLSY97 in figure
1.4 and in column three of table 1.4.
Finally, the regressions in columns two and four of table 1.4 are run for creating
the propensities to enter occupations based on observables that are used in the
following. The test scores are split into terciles in order to also allow for a U-
shape in the change in demand for skill levels. Moreover, normalized measures
of illicit activities and engagement in precocious sex are added. The regressions
omit parental education because is is not available for about a third of respondents.
However, the results below are qualitatively robust to adding parental education,
omitting the risky behavior measures, or using the regressions in columns one and
three for creating propensities.
1.3 Theory and Econometric Methods
On the one hand, as explained in the introduction, the large body of research on job
polarization indicates that the drop of employment in the middle-skill occupations
is due to a decrease in demand. On the other hand, the empirical analysis of
occupational choice shows that there is systematic sorting with respect to talents
in the NLSY data. This naturally motivates a Roy model of occupational choice in
order to analyze the effect of demand changes on the supply side.
In this model, a given worker i chooses the occupation that offers him the highest
log wage:
wit = max{wHit, wMit, wLit}, (1.2)
where {H,M,L} indexes the high-, middle-, and low-skill occupation, respectively.
The timing is such that t = 0 when the members of the NLSY79 are 27 years old
and t = 1 when the members of the NLSY97 are 27 years old. The wKits with
K{H,M,L} can more generally be utility levels in each occupation.
As seen above, the NLSY provides a multidimensional array of relevant talent
proxies for each respondent. Thus, the log occupational wages can be written as a
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sum of log prices and quantities of occupation-specific skills in the following way:
wKit = piKt + sKit = piKt + βK0 + βK1x1it + ...+ βKJxJit + uKit, (1.3)
where piKt is the price per unit of skill in occupation K, sKit individual i’s specific
skill in occupation K, xit = [x1it, ..., xjit, ..., xJit]′ are the observed talents, the βKjs
are the corresponding linear projection coefficients, and uKit is an orthogonal re-
gression error which represents the unobserved component of skill in occupation K.
This linear factor formulation is adopted from Heckman and Sedlacek (1985).17
The demand side hypothesis about job polarization in terms of this model is
therefore
4(piH − piM) > 0 and 4(piL − piM) > 0, (1.4)
i.e. the relative occupation-specific skill price in the middle falls compared to the
high- and the low-skill occupation. The polarization hypothesis examined in the
following has two components: first, that equation (1.4) is true, and second, that it
is the reason for the U-shape change in the wage distribution.
The assumption that it is the occupation-specific skill prices that are changing
under polarization is crucial. This is in fact the same as in much of the existing
literature on job polarization, which models the effect of shifting demand for tasks or
occupations on labor supply via changing wage rates. For example, the driving force
on the labor market in the original papers of Autor, Levy, and Murnane (2003) and
Autor, Katz, and Kearney (2006) is a drop in the relative wage rate for the routine
task due to computerization. In Acemoglu and Autor (2010), similar to this paper,
the authors analyze how technological change and offshoring alter wages and worker
sorting via the relative price of the tasks corresponding to low-, middle-, and high-
skill occupations.18
In the following I analyze whether the simple assumption of shifting occupation-
specific skill prices may get us all the way to explaining the change in the wage
distribution over the last decades. Since the theoretical argument and explanation of
empirical methods is rather involved and the general case requires complex notation,
17Contrary to Roy (1951) or Heckman and Sedlacek (1985) I will not make a distributional
assumption on the unobserved component of skill in the following. Moreover, the primary interest
is not in the sectoral distribution of skills and wages, but in changes in returns to occupation-specific
skills.
18Other papers that make essentially the same assumption include Cortes (2012) and Liu and
Trefler (2011).
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I use a maximally simplified version of the model for the rest of this section. The
results can be extended to the general case for the empirical analysis.
1.3.1 A Simplified Model
In order to strip the model of equations (1.2)-(1.4) to its essence, assume there are
only two occupations, middleM and nonmiddle N , with 4(piN−piM) > 0 according
to the polarization hypothesis. Moreover, there is only one observable talent xi with
mean zero (E(xi) = 0) and variance one (V ar(xi) = 1), and βK0 is zero. I indicate
the difference between N and M sector variables by a tilde, i.e. p˜it ≡ piNt − piMt,
β˜ ≡ βN − βM , and u˜i ≡ uNi − uMi. I suppress the index t for xi and uKi because
the only variables that change in the model are the prices piNt and piMt and their
functions. Wages in occupations K{N,M} become:
wKit = piKt + sKi = piKt + βKxi + uKi (1.5)
For intuition, we can think of xi as math talent where a high value is associated
with the non-middle occupation and higher wages in the initial period.
How do the workers who have a comparative advantage in the middle occupation
fare over time? Since I do not observe the same individual workers in both points
in time (the counter-factual), the prediction from the Roy model will have to be
in terms of conditional moments with respect to observable talents. Let Kit be an
indicator variable that takes the value of 1 when individual i works in occupation
K and zero otherwise and consider his expected wage conditional on his observable
xi:
E(wit|xi) = E(wMit|xi, Nit = 1)+pN(xi, p˜it) [E(wNit|xi, Nit = 1)− E(wMit|xi, Nit = 0)] ,
where the notation
pN(xi, p˜it) ≡ p(Nit = 1|xi) = Pr(u˜i > −(p˜it + β˜xi))
emphasizes the fact that the probability to enter occupation N is a function of
the differences in price per unit of skill between the two occupations. All of the
economics of the Roy model can be found in this equation because the probability
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pN(xi, p˜it) and the conditional wages
E(wKit|xi, Kit) = piKt + βKxi + E(uKi|xi, Kit = 1)
are determined by the worker’s optimal choice given his skills and the prices that
he faces. Note that β˜xi is the expected relative skill given xi and, for a given p˜it,
pN(xi, p˜it) is a monotone function of it. The propensity to enter occupation N for
worker i estimated from the data can thus be interpreted as a predictor of his relative
skill in occupation N .
Under the price change of polarization 4(piN − piM) > 0, the change in the
conditional expected wage from t = 0 to t = 1 can be approximated as a sum of
three components:
4E(wit|xi) = 4piM + pN(xi, p˜i0)4(piN − piM)+ (1.6)
+4pN(xi, p˜it) [E(wNi0|xi, Nit = 1)− E(wMi0|xi, Nit = 0)] +
+ pN(xi, p˜i0)4E(sNi|xi, Nit = 1) + pM(xi, p˜i0)4E(sMi|xi, Nit = 0)
The first component is the direct price effect, the second the effect of moving
out of occupation M (since workers react optimally to the relative price shifts
4pN(xi, p˜it) ≥ 0), and the third a composition effect of skills within occupations.
I call the first component the price or wage rate effect and subsume the second
and third components under the name reallocation effect. However, without an as-
sumption on the distribution of the unobserved skill vector ui, one cannot make a
prediction on the relative size of these two effects for workers with different observ-
able talents xi.19 One way to evaluate the average effect of polarization on workers
of different observable talents would thus be to assume the normal distribution and
structurally estimate the Roy model in the NLSY79 and the NLSY97 cross-section,
respectively. However, without convincing exclusion restrictions or instrumental
variables that affect only occupational choices but not wages, the identification of
the parameter estimates would solely rely on the potentially incorrect functional
19Even with a distributional assumption, say normality, E(wKit|xit, yKit = 1) and its change
remain hard to interpret economically as there is no simple expression for the expectation of the
maximum of correlated normal random variables. Results on the truncated normal provided for
example in Heckman and Sedlacek (1985) apply only to the bivariate case, so for my more general
three-occupation case things get very complicated. Hsieh, Hurst, Jones, and Klenow (2012) use
an extreme value distribution to solve the problem, but this comes at the cost of the very strong
assumption that individuals’ skills are uncorrelated across occupations.
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form assumption for the skill distribution.
For this reason, I take a different approach in my paper by starting out from a
clear prediction on relative wages for marginal shifts in the piKts and then applying
it beyond the margin. Consider the change in worker i’s wages for a marginal shift
in prices:
dwit =

dpiN if Nit = 1
dpiM if Nit = 0,
where d denotes a marginal change. Thus, due to the optimality of workers’ occu-
pational choice and the envelope theorem, the effect on wages of a marginal change
in piKts is only the direct price effect
dE(wit|xi) = dpiM + pN(xi, p˜it)d(piN − piM). (1.7)
According to prediction (1.7), under the polarization hypothesis, workers who are
ceteris paribus more likely to enter the nonmiddle occupation are expected to see
their relative wages increase. For example, randomly picking two workers from the
population, the worker with lower math talent (call him m¯ with xm¯ = m¯) will on
expectation have a lower wage increase under polarization than the worker with
higher math talent (call him m with xm = m) because pN(xm¯, p˜it) < pN(xm, p˜it)
and d(piN − piM) > 0. The nice feature about this result on the margin is that
it is solely in terms of variables that I can straightforwardly estimate from the
information on wages, occupational choice and my observables, i.e. E(wit|xi) and
pN(xi, p˜it), and parameters that I have hypotheses about or that I want to estimate,
i.e. d(piN − piM) = dp˜it.
Prediction (1.7) also holds qualitatively beyond the margin, i.e. the expected
overall wage gain from polarization rises with the initial probability to work in the
nonmiddle occupation. Note that the change in worker i’s expected wage is the sum
over his marginal expected wage changes along the adjustment path from pi0 to pi1.
Hence, we can integrate prediction (1.7) from t = 0 to t = 1 to obtain:
E(wi1|xi)− E(wi0|xi) = 4piM +
∫ p˜i1
p˜i0
pN(xi, p˜it)dp˜it, (1.8)
where the structure of pN(xi, p˜it) = Pr(u˜i > −(p˜it + β˜xi)) illustrates that on the
adjustment path of prices, the ranking of pN(xi, p˜it) with respect to xi remains
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unchanged. In terms of the example, if pN(xm¯, p˜i0) < pN(xm, p˜i0) then pN(xm¯, p˜it) ≤
pN(xm, p˜it) for all t(0, 1]. Therefore, we expect a higher increase in wages for worker
m than for worker m¯.20
In section 1.4 I estimate the change in wages associated with pN(xi, p˜i0) between
the NLSY79 and NLSY97. Because of prediction (1.7), I expect the return per unit
of pN(xi, p˜i0) to increase over time. Note, though, that this return change includes
the direct price effect and the reallocation effect discussed in equation (1.6). In terms
of the example, the expected wage increase for worker m versus worker m¯ between
t = 0 and t = 1 includes the initial difference in propensities pN(xm, p˜i0)−pN(xm¯, p˜i0)
and the change in this difference along the adjustment path. The identification
assumption in my data is that the distribution of unobservable skill components
conditional on xi is the same across the NLSY79 and the NLSY97, i.e. that a given
value of math talent measures on average the same person in both cohorts. Section
1.4 explains the details.
1.3.2 Identifying the Change in the Occupation-Specific Skill
Prices
The second and more difficult question is to identify the actual changes in relative
prices 4(piNt − piMt) = 4p˜it. One way or another I will have to make an additional
assumption for this and I argue that my approach of choice is particularly attractive
for several reasons.
The overall change in worker i’s expected wage is the sum over his marginal
expected wage changes along the adjustment path from pi0 to pi1 as shown in equation
20Another way of deriving equation (1.8) is illustrative: Concentrate on a specific worker i first
and note again that p˜it ≡ piNt − piMt, 4p˜it > 0, and Nit is an indicator for working in occupation
N such that wit = wMit +Nit(wNit − wMit). Defining the relative price that makes i indifferent
as p˜iit ≡ −s˜i = −(sNi − sMi), we get:
wi1 − wi0 = 4piM +Ni1(wNi1 − wMi1)−Ni0(wNi0 − wMi0)
= 4piM +

4piN −4piM = p˜i1 − p˜i0 if Ni0 = 1, Ni1 = 1
p˜i1 + s˜i = p˜i1 − p˜iit if Ni0 = 0, Ni1 = 1
0 if Ni0 = 0, Ni1 = 0
= 4piM +
∫ p˜i1
p˜i0
Nitdp˜it.
Taking expectations w.r.t. u˜i conditional on xi on the top left and bottom of this equation gives
result (1.8). Hence, since within occupations the wage gain is constant, the overall gain for a
specific worker depends solely on the “distance” of the adjustment that the worker is still in the
middle (piiN − piN0) and already in the nonmiddle (piN1 − piiN ) occupation. This principle is the
same for expected wages and probabilities of being in the nonmiddle occupation.
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(1.8). In this equation, I want to estimate 4p˜it and possibly 4piM . I know E(wt1|xi)
and pN(xi, p˜it) in points in time t = 0 and t = 1 in the sense that I can consistently
estimate them from my primary data. I do not know, however, pN(xi, p˜it) within the
interval t(0, 1) and I will need to make an assumption on it.
The estimation problem can be nicely illustrated in a graph. In figure 1.5, I want
to back out the distance on the x-axis between p˜i1 and p˜i0 while I know the starting
and the end point (the thick dots A1 and A2) of the function (the arch) over which
I need to integrate and the value of the integral (the shaded area). I thus need
to make an assumption about the shape of the curve connecting A1 and A2. This
curve has to be (weakly) monotonically increasing (as with higher p˜it the number of
workers in occupation N will increase) but it can be concave as in the picture or
convex.
The first assumption that comes to mind is to simply assume that it is a hori-
zontal line through the point A1, which implies no reallocation of workers due to the
price change and thus to plug pN(xi, p˜it) = pN(xi, p˜i0) into (1.8). In the figure, the
difference between E(wi1|xi) and E(wi0|xi) is then assumed to be only the rectangle
a. This results in the marginal prediction (1.7) holding exactly for the discrete price
change as well and the regression in section 1.4 on the propensity pN(xi, p˜i0) directly
identifying the price change. Of course, this is not a good assumption.
A more subtle version of it but essentially the same assumption is to recognize
that workers reallocate away from the middle occupation but to impose that the
extent of reallocation does not differ across observables xi. In terms of the example
it is to assume that the probability change for the high math workerm is the same as
for the low math worker m¯, i.e. 4pN(xm¯, p˜it) = 4pN(xm, p˜it). In this case, equation
(1.8) becomes
E(wi1|xi)− E(wi0|xi) = 4piM + const+ pN(xi, p˜i0)4p˜it.21
Again the regression on pN(xi, p˜i0) in section 1.4 directly identifies the price change.
This is also not a good assumption as it does not allow for a differential reallocation
21Suppose ∂pN (xi,p˜it)∂p˜it = F
′(p˜it) ≥ 0. Then pN (xi, p˜it) = pN (xi, p˜i0) + F (p˜it)− F (p˜i0) and
const =
∫ p˜i1
p˜i0
[F (p˜it)− F (p˜i0)]dp˜it.
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effect across worker groups, e.g. that the low math worker m¯ may be able to reallo-
cate out of the middle to a larger extent than the high math worker m because the
latter is more likely in the nonmiddle to start with. In figure 1.5 this means that the
arch connecting A1 and A2 is restricted to be the same no matter where we start off
on the y-axis (even if we start off high, i.e. close to probability one).
A seemingly attractive alternative would be to assume that u˜i is normally dis-
tributed (for simplicity assume σ˜ = 1), which modifies (1.8) to
E(wi1|xi)− E(wi0|xi) = 4piM +
∫ p˜i1
p˜i0
Φ(p˜it + β˜xi)dp˜it.
For this to be helpful, I need to know the structural parameter β˜ from the model.
I could in principle estimate it from a probit model or a Heckman two stage regres-
sion.22 But then I am estimating the price change by relying on a distributional
assumption in (1.8) and, in order to implement it, estimating the necessary parame-
ter β˜ relying on the distributional assumption in the first stage. This appears to be
no improvement to outright structurally estimating the Roy model with a normality
assumption in both cross-sections and comparing the estimated p˜i0 and p˜i1.
I therefore instead decide for an approach which makes full use of the empirical
evidence in t = 0 and t = 1. I linearly approximate
pN(xi, p˜it) ≈ pN(xi, p˜i0) + pN(xi, p˜i1)− pN(xi, p˜i0)
p˜i1 − p˜i0 (p˜it − p˜i0). (1.9)
In figure 1.5, this amounts to approximating pN(xi, p˜it) as the y-coordinate for the
point on the line A1A2 that corresponds to p˜it and by approximating E(wi1|xi) −
E(wi0|xi) as the trapezoid a + b. If the shape of pN(xi, p˜it) in p˜it(p˜i0, p˜i1) is not too
convex or concave, the approximation should be reasonably close. Whether it is
sufficiently accurate will be tested below.
Equation (1.8) now becomes
E(wi1|xi)− E(wi0|xi) = 4piM + pN(xi, p˜i1) + pN(xi, p˜i0)2 4(piN − piM). (1.10)
This is one equation in two unknowns. However, as it holds for all xi, I could for
example identify 4(piN − piM) and 4piM by imposing it for workers with high and
22In the case of three occupations, this would be multinomial probit with correlated errors or
structural estimation of the three-sector Roy model.
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low math talent m and m¯, respectively.
A more attractive way to estimate 4(piN − piM) is to multiply both sides of
equation (1.10) by xi and taking expectations. By the law of iterated expectations,
this results in
cov(wi1, xi)− cov(wi0, xi) = cov(Ni1, xi) + cov(Ni0, xi))2 4(piN − piM), (1.11)
where cov(wit, xi) is the coefficient from a linear wage regression of wit on xi and
cov(Nit, xi) the coefficient from a linear allocation regression of occupational dummy
Nit on xi.
If I had just one talent as in this simple example, I could exactly solve equation
(1.11). Yet, as I have J different talents in my empirical implementation, prediction
(1.11) has to hold for each single one of them so that I get J different moment
conditions
mj(4p˜it) = cov(wi1, xi)− cov(wi0, xi)− cov(Ni1, xi) + cov(Ni0, xi)2 4(piN − piM) = 0
from the model. I can stack those moment conditions in a column vector and apply
the minimum distance estimator for 4p˜it which minimizes the quadratic form:
m(4p˜it)′Wm(4p˜it), (1.12)
where the asymptotically optimal W takes into account the variance-covariance
matrix of the first-stage estimates of cov(wit, xi) and cov(Nit, xi). The objective
function (1.12) in optimum also provides a test statistic for the joint test of the
polarization hypothesis and my linear approximation of the reallocation adjustment
path. Section 1.5 details and implements this estimation and testing procedure in
the more general case of three occupations in my data.
Overall, the procedure of estimating the relative price changes described here
has two advantages over the standard approach of estimating the Roy model under
normality. It should give relative price estimates that are close to the actual prices
and at the same time be robust to different distributions of unobserved skills, and
it is transparent and easy to implement.
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1.4 Polarization’s Effect on Observable Skills
How do the workers who have a comparative advantage in the high-, middle-, and
low-skill occupation fare over time? This section analyzes the effect of polarization
on the returns to propensities to enter occupations and on absolute skill measures.
1.4.1 Prediction
Predictions (1.7) and (1.8) generalize to the three-occupation case (for detailed
derivation see Appendix A.2):
dE(wit|xit) = dpiMt + pH(xit, pit)d(piHt − piMt) + pL(xit, pit)d(piLt − piMt), (1.13)
and
E(wi1|xi1)− E(wi0|xi0) = 4piM +
∫ piH1−piM1
piH0−piM0
pH(xit, pit)d(piHt − piMt)+
+
∫ piL1−piM1
piL0−piM0
pL(xit, pit)d(piLt − piMt). (1.14)
where pK(xit, pit) is the probability of working in occupation K{H,M,L} under the
price vector pit. Moreover, I now give a time subscript to the observable character-
istics to indicate which dataset they are from.
Hence, under the polarization hypothesis (1.4), workers who are ceteris paribus
more likely to enter the high- and the low-skill occupation are expected to see their
relative wages increase. In order to evaluate this, I estimate ordinary least squares
(OLS) regressions for pooled data of the form
wit = α0 + α1pH(xit, pi0) + α2pL(xit, pi0) + α3 ×NLSY 97+ (1.15)
+ α4pH(xit, pi0)×NLSY 97 + α5pL(xit, pi0)×NLSY 97 + εit,
where NLSY97 is a dummy for whether a particular observation is from the NLSY97
and pH(xit, pi0) and pL(xit, pi0) are the probabilities to choose the high- and the low-
skill occupation in the NLSY79, i.e. under the old prices. Hence, the approach is to
hold groups of workers constant over time in terms of their predicted occupation-
specific skills (the probabilities) and study their average wages over time. According
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to prediction (1.13), I expect the parameter estimates for α4 and α5 to be positive.23
There are no predictions from the theory on α1, α1 and α3, although one would
think that a higher probability to enter the H and the L occupation is associated
with higher and lower wages, respectively.
Of course, the occupational choice probabilities are not directly available in the
data and they have to be estimated in a preceding step in the NLSY79. The param-
eter estimates are then used to predict pH(xit, pi0) and pL(xit, pi0) for each individual
in the NLSY79 and the NLSY97. This makes the estimation of (1.15) a two-step
procedure. In fact, I am using two-step estimation procedures throughout this paper
since my empirical strategy exploits measuring comparative advantage in occupa-
tions with respect to observable talents and then relating this comparative advantage
to changes in the returns to talents:
“[...] the approach here exploits the fact that task specialization in the
cross section is informative about the comparative advantage of various
skill groups, and it marries this source of information to a well-specified
hypothesis about how the wages of skill groups that differ in their com-
parative advantage should respond [...]”
These are the words of Acemoglu and Autor (2010, p78) who suggest the same pro-
cedure in their well-known survey paper but lack the data that I have to implement
it satisfactorily.
In terms of the two-step procedure used here, two clarifications are in order.
First, different functional form assumptions can be used to specify pK(xit, pi0). A
linear probability model, i.e. OLS regression, provides the best linear estimator for
the probabilities but some predicted values from it will be above one and below zero,
i.e. they are not probabilities themselves. Therefore, many researchers would prefer
a multinomial logit or probit model. I report the results from the multinomial logit
that I ran in table 1.4 in the following but my results do not change if I use the
other options to specify pK(xit, pi0).
Second, the standard errors in the second stage regression (1.15) have to reflect
the fact that pH(xit, pi0) and pL(xit, pi0) are estimates and thus possess sampling
23In general, regression (1.15) provides the best linear predictor of
4E (wit|pH(xit, pi0), pL(xit, pi0)) = α3 + α4pH(xit, pi0) + α5pL(xit, pi0).
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variation. Among others, Murphy and Topel (1985) provide a procedure to do this,
which is however somewhat tedious.24 Therefore I report bootstrapped standard
errors instead, which are also asymptotically consistent.
Note that, although they identify the average relative wage changes for workers
of different observables xit due to polarization, the parameter estimates for α4 and
α5 do not identify the structural relative price changes4(piH−piM) and4(piL−piM).
This is because, as we have seen in equation (1.6), the conditional wage changes for
different xit consist of a combination of the direct price effect and a reallocation
effect. As discussed at length in section 1.3.2, the latter may differ across worker
groups, while interpreting α4 and α5 as the relative price changes would impose that
it is the same across xit.
1.4.2 Results
Table 1.5 reports the results from wage regressions a la (1.15) on the propensities
to enter the high- and the low-skill occupation in the NLSY79 and the NLSY97.
As expected, in column one we see that a higher propensity to enter the high-skill
occupation compared to the omitted middle-skill occupation is associated with a
significantly higher wage. The reverse is true for the propensity to enter the low-
skill occupation.
The prediction from polarization in equation (1.13) is however about changes in
returns to propensities over time, which are indicated in the table by (x NLSY97).
We see that the coefficients change strongly and significantly in the expected direc-
tion. For the propensity to enter the high-skill occupation, the coefficient almost
doubles (from .31 to .60) while the coefficient for entering the low-skill occupation
rises by almost a third (from -1.65 to -.95). The level of the change in the low-skill
coefficient is twice that of the high-skill coefficient, which may come as a surprise.
However, note that it is also much less precisely estimated. Moreover, when scaling
the size of the effect by the respective standard deviations of the propensities, the
change in the effect of the propensity to enter the high-skill occupation is larger: a
one standard deviation increase in the high- and low-skill propensities, respectively,
is associated with a 11.3 percent higher and 5.2 percent lower wage in the NLSY97
24Two stage least squares or joint estimation (in ML or GMM) of step one and two in a standard
statistical package would be a convenient option to get the correct standard errors automatically.
However, this is not feasible here as for the individuals in the NLSY97 the regressors are estimated
in a different dataset.
36
compared to a 5.9 percent higher and 8.4 percent lower wage in the NLSY79.25
For illustration of the effect of different propensities to enter the three occupa-
tions, figure 1.6 plots the predictions from linear wage regressions on each propensity
at a time together with their probability densities.26 In the top left sub-figure we see
the positive effect of having a higher propensity to enter the high-skill occupation
in the NLSY79 indicated by the upward-sloping line. This effect increases further
in the NLSY97 as the dashed line is even steeper. In the top right sub-figure, we see
that there is a strong negative effect of the propensity to enter the low-skill occupa-
tion, which is however less severe in the NLSY97. Moreover, we see again that the
range of propensities to enter the low-skill occupation is very limited in the data.
Finally, for the propensity to enter the middle-skill occupation there is already a
negative effect in the NLSY79 but this becomes substantially more negative in the
NLSY97. For individuals with a very high propensity to enter the middle, which is
quite frequent in the data, expected real wages even decline during the two decades
between the NLSY79 and the NLSY97. This is indicated by the crossing of the two
lines.
The identification of changes in returns to propensities in regression (1.15) is
based on the assumption that for a given vector of talents xit workers are in expec-
tation the same in terms of their relative labor market productivities over the two
cohorts. Tables 1.2 and 1.3 provided support for this assumption as they showed
that the level and cross-correlation of observable early skill determinants is very sim-
ilar in the NLSY79 and NLSY97. Consequently, unreported descriptive statistics
show that the distribution of predicted propensities is very similar in the NLSY79
and NLSY97, i.e. that the distribution of relative occupational skills according to
my observable measures has not changed over the two cohorts. Combined, these
pieces of evidence lend substantial support to my identification assumption.27
Given this identification assumption, the changes of the propensity coefficients
provide the increase in average wages that is associated with relative advantage in
the high- or the low-skill occupation compared to the middle. The workers in the
25For the NLSY79 multiply the coefficients on the propensities to enter the high- and low-skill
occupations of 0.31% and -1.65% by the standard deviations of these propensities of 19.0 and
5.1. For the NLSY97 multiply the coefficients on the propensities to enter the high- and low-skill
occupations of 0.60% and -0.95% by the standard deviations of these propensities of 18.8 and 5.5.
26The coefficients and standard errors from these wage regressions on each propensity separately
are not reported in a table for saving space.
27The racial distribution does however change over the cohorts. Therefore, I control for race in
all my analyses.
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NLSY97 entered the labor market only recently when the bulk of the occupational
demand change had likely already taken place. Hence, polarization’s effect on their
relative wages mostly reflects returns changes to ex ante relative talent differences
and not to skills that they acquired in a specific occupation. Identifying that there
exists a substantial ex ante effect is relevant for policy makers as it implies that the
relative earnings effects of polarization will not fade over time and that temporary
policy responses are therefore not sufficient.
The result in column one of table 1.5 does not exclude the possible influence of
other factors than polarization on wages of workers with comparative advantage in
the high- or the low-skill occupation. In particular, skill-biased technological change
that is independent of occupational demand constitutes an alternative hypothesis to
polarization and may thus have an important effect on talent returns. According to
this view, comparative advantage in occupations is not important because returns to
skills change across the board. The SBTC amounts to dβKj = dβj in my framework
and it is easily incorporated in prediction (1.13) in addition to polarization:28
dE(wit|xit, pit) = dpiM + pH(xit, pit)d(piH − piM) + pL(xit, pit)d(piL − piM)+
+dβ0 + dβ1x1it + ...+ dβJxJit
When allowing for SBTC with all the talents included on top of polarization, the
identification will have to rely on the functional form of pH(xit, pit) and pL(xit, pit),
because the same variables that are used for estimating the propensities are directly
entered into the wage regression. This may potentially lead to near multicollinearity
of the explanatory variables in the regression and imprecise estimates. In additional
regressions, I thus use education indicators as absolute skill measures.
The remaining columns of table 1.5 assess the potential importance of the SBTC
hypothesis versus polarization. Column two adds a dummy of whether the individual
completed a four-year college or more to the regression. We see that the level of the
coefficient on the propensity to enter the high-skill occupation drops all the way to
zero but that the changes in both coefficients are remarkably stable. On the other
hand, the level of return to college is large and highly significant while its change does
not significantly increase once I control for the propensities. The result is similar
if I control for four different degree dummies (high school dropout and graduate,
28Actually, SBTC may predict that the return to pL(xit, pit) falls instead of rises.
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some college, and at least four year college) in column three.29 This indicates that
Mincerian returns to education are important to explain wages in the cross-section,
but that they have much less power than relative skills in occupations to explain
the change in wages that took place over the twenty years from the NLSY79 to the
NLSY97.
Finally, the regression reported in column four of the table adds the same spec-
ification of talents that I use to estimate the occupational propensities in the first
place. The parameter estimates on the propensities remain in the right direction
and become even stronger but they also become very imprecise and insignificant,
which is due to the high degree of multicollinearity between the regressors in this
specification. Therefore, the regression is not as informative as the preceding ones.
How much of the U-shape change in the wage distribution can the changing
returns to observable skills explain? Figure 1.7 plots the actual and the predicted
change in the wage distribution when the changing coefficient values from the regres-
sions reported in columns one and four of table 1.5 are assigned to workers’ wages in
the NLSY79. As we can see, the propensities to enter occupations with their func-
tional form restriction do not do a worse job in matching the wage distribution than
a very flexible specification of the same talents that are included in estimating the
propensities. However, both options do not explain are large share of the change in
the wage distribution. This is not surprising since the observables also only explain
a relatively small share of variation in wages in the cross-section. The remainder
should thus be explained by changes in returns to unobservable occupational skills
(uKit in the notation of the model).
To sum up, I conclude that the results reported in this section indicate a sub-
stantial longterm decline in relative wages of workers with comparative advantage
in the middle-skill occupation. Moreover, the driver of this decline is more likely to
be relative demand changes for occupations as implied by the polarization hypoth-
esis than increases in absolute returns to skills that are detached from comparative
advantage (SBTC). Nonetheless, the analysis so far remains unsatisfactory in two
dimensions: it does not formally exclude other drivers of skill returns than polariza-
tion and, because a substantial part of skill is unobserved, the changing returns to
observable talents can naturally only hope to match part of the wage distribution.
29The coefficient estimates on the degree dummies and the talents included in column three and
four of the table do not provide additional insight and are not reported in order to save space.
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The next sections tackle these two shortcomings.
1.5 Estimating the Change in Occupation-Specific
Skill Prices
The last section provided convincing evidence for polarization to have driven work-
ers’ skill returns over the past two decades. In this section, I formally test whether
the polarization model can explain the whole variation in observable skill returns in
the NLSY via a test of over-identifying restrictions. The procedure yields an esti-
mate of the implied change in occupation-specific skill prices. In the next section,
I use this estimate to explore how much of the U-shape change of wage inequality
can be explained by relative price changes across occupations and the potential role
of reallocation to explain the rest.
1.5.1 Methodology
A more detailed assessment of the effect of polarization looks at each talent in turn.
I use the fact that I observe xit = [x1it, ..., xJit]′ and that individuals have compar-
ative advantages in occupations varying with each xjit in order to over-identifying
restrictions from the polarization hypothesis. The intuition is that the return to a
talent should change depending on which occupational choice it predicts and how
that changes.
Linearly approximating the probabilities under the integral in prediction (1.14)
as discussed in relation to figure 1.5 (see also Appendix A.2), and writing in terms
of regression coefficients gives:
4γj = δHj0 + δHj12 4(piH − piM) +
δLj0 + δLj1
2 4(piL − piM), (1.16)
where δKjt = cov(Kit,xjit)var(xjit) with δHjt + δMjt + δLjt = 0, Kit is an indicator for working
in occupation K, and γjt = cov(wit,xjit)var(xjit) . These parameters can be recovered from
OLS allocation
Kit = δK0t + δK1tx1it + δK2tx2it + ...+ δKJtxJit + vKit (1.17)
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and wage regressions
wit = γ0t + γ1x1it + γ2x2it + ...+ γJxJit + uit.30 (1.18)
Therefore, result (1.16) provides a simple to implement procedure to assess polar-
ization’s effect on the returns to detailed talents. I have data on individuals’ talents,
their choices of entering high, middle, or low-skill occupations, and their wages in
the periods before (t = 0) and after (t = 1) polarization took place. First, I run four
allocation regressions (1.17) for K = H and K = L in t = 0 and t = 1, which recover
the partial correlations of the observed talents and occupational choices δKjt. Sec-
ond, I run two wage regressions (1.18) for t = 0 and t = 1, which recover the partial
correlations of the observed talents and wages γjt in each period. Then, according
to condition (1.16), the change of a talent’s effect on the wage equals its effect in
the allocation regressions times the change in relative prices.31
Condition (1.16) is in fact very intuitive. The return to a talent xjit should
change by the extent to which, conditional on the other talents, it increases the
probability to work in occupations H and L, i.e. δHj0 and δLj0, and the extent to
which this association changes, i.e. (δHj1-δHj0) and (δLj1-δLj0).
In order to assess the validity of the polarization hypothesis in the data, one
could thus simply check whether the returns changes to individual talents line up
with what their allocation coefficients imply. However, a more encompassing test
of the model recognizes that condition (1.16) has to hold for all J talents at the
same time. Thus, as long as there are more talents than the two unknown model
parameters 4(piH − piM) and4(piL− piM), I can use the over-identifying restrictions
implied in (1.16) to devise an overall test of the model.
The first step in such a test is to implement a minimum distance estimator for
the implied relative wage rate changes. Define δ¯Kj ≡ δKj0+δKj12 , and stack 4γj and
δ¯Kj into J×1 vectors. Then, using the first stage estimates 4ˆγ and ˆ¯δK and defining
the J × 1 vector m(4pi) = 4ˆγ − ˆ¯δH4(piH − piM) − ˆ¯δL4(piL − piM), this estimator
30To be exact, the allocation and wage regressions in fact recover the covariance of Kit and
wit with the residual of regressing xjit on the other observable talents. This is what I use in the
following.
31Note that the literature on SBTC has also run linear wage regressions on test scores (e.g.
Murnane, Willett, and Levy (1995)). The difference here is that the drivers of returns changes
are explicitly examined in the allocation regressions and that the results are interpreted within an
explicit model of sorting and occupational demand.
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minimizes
Q(4pi) = m(4pi)′Wm(4pi) (1.19)
with respect to4(piH−piM) and4(piL−piM). Depending on the weighting matrixW ,
the minimizing wage rate changes can be the Equally Weighted Minimum Distance
(EWMD) estimator if W = I, the Optimal Minimum Distance (OMD) estimator if
W = [V ar(m(4pi))]−1, and the Diagonally Weighted Minimum Distance (DWMD)
estimator if W = [diag(V ar(m(4pi)))]−1. The EWMD can be implemented by a
simple OLS regression of 4ˆγ on δˆHt and δˆLt, the OMD by a (feasible) GLS regression,
and the DWMD by weighted least squares.
Just as GLS the OMD is asymptotically optimal and it yields consistent esti-
mates of the relative price changes 4(piH − piM) and 4(piL − piM). Moreover, the
objective function (1.19) in optimum can be shown to be asymptotically chi-squared
distributed with J − 2 degrees of freedom:
Q(4ˆpi) = m(4ˆpi)′[V ar(m(4ˆpi))]−1m(4ˆpi) a∼ χ2(J − 2)
This provides me with an overall test of the cross-equation restrictions implied by
the model.
Finally, Altonji and Segal (1996) and Pischke (1995) present evidence for poten-
tial bias of the OMD in small samples and recommend using the EWMD and the
DWMD in addition, respectively. I thus report results for these two estimators as
well. For more details of how I implement the minimum distance estimation and
test, please refer to Appendix A.3.
Given optimal worker reallocation, the implied absolute wage change in the
middle-skill occupation piM can be bounded: under the initial prices, the initial
worker allocation has to (weakly) dominate the new allocation and vice versa under
the new prices. A natural approach is to impose this for average wages. Thus, 4piM
has to be such that
4E(wit) ≥ 4piM + pH(pi0)4(piH − piM) + pL(pi0)4(piL − piM)
since otherwise it would yield higher wages if workers had stayed in the old allocation
and
4E(wit) ≤ 4piM + pH(pi1)4(piH − piM) + pL(pi1)4(piL − piM)
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since otherwise it would have yielded higher average wages if workers had been in
the new allocation from the outset. The sample statistics corresponding to4E(wit),
pH(pit), and pL(pit) are the change in average wages and the fraction of workers in
the high- and the low-skill occupations, respectively. I take the midpoint between
the two bounds as my preferred point estimate for 4piM .
Finally, by assigning the estimated price changes to the workers in the NLSY79
and comparing the resulting change in the counterfactual wage distribution to the
actual one, I can assess what the contribution of changes in occupational prices is to
the overall change in the wage distribution. I also assess what share of the remainder
may be due to reallocation.32
1.5.2 Empirical Results
Table 1.6 reports the reduced form allocation and wage regressions according to
equations (1.17) and (1.18). In the first two columns, we see that math talent
is associated with the high-skill occupation, mechanical talent with the middle-
skill occupation, and verbal talent with the high-skill occupation to a lesser degree
than math. The illicit activities are associated with not working in the high-skill
occupation.
This is quite similar to the results from the MNL sorting regressions in table 1.4.
However, contrary to the MNL, the OLS coefficients for each occupation in table
1.6 are not interpreted with respect to an omitted base occupation but with respect
to the other two occupations taken together. Moreover, note that the R-squared for
the low-skill occupation allocation regressions is very low, i.e. little of the variation
in low-skill occupation choice is explained by the data. This will affect the precision
of my relative price change estimates for the low-skill occupation below.
The changes in returns to talents are reported in column three of table 1.6. The
returns to the highest math tercile increase significantly, the returns to mechanical
talents fall, and the returns to illicit activities fall as well. This is largely in line
with prediction (1.16). Thus, most of the returns changes to talents are in the
direction predicted by the model, apart from verbal talents whose returns decline.
Yet, with exception of the top math tercile and illicit activities, the changes are not
statistically significant by themselves.
32In fact, the model does allow for a change in the population supply of talents to play a part.
As we saw in table 1.2, this is however minuscule in the data.
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Overall, thus, the results from table 1.6 are neither clearly in favor of- nor against
the polarization hypothesis. The formal test of the restrictions implied by prediction
(1.16) across all talents may therefore be quite informative. Table 1.7 reports the
results from this test and the implied occupation-specific skill price change for the
asymptotically optimal minimum distance estimator and the two alternatives sug-
gested by Altonji and Segal (1996) and Pischke (1995). The EWMD, which amounts
to OLS estimation, is also the first step of the feasible GLS procedure to implement
the OMD.
In the OMD, the point estimates of 4(piH − piM) and 4(piL − piM) are of the
expected sign and of substantial magnitude: the wage rates in the high- and the low-
compared to the middle-skill occupation increase by 20.1 and 31.4 percent, respec-
tively. The implied absolute wage rate in the middle-skill occupation itself decreases
slightly at 2.4 percent. The p-value of the hypothesis test is at 10.7 percent and
thus the model is not rejected at conventional significance levels. Furthermore, the
estimates for 4(piH − piM) are precise and do not change in the two alternative im-
plementations of the minimum distance estimator. In contrast to that, at a standard
error of 35.2, 4(piL−piM) is imprecisely estimated and it actually drops to negative
point estimates in the EWMD and the DWMD.
With this caveat in mind, I use the price estimates from the OMD to evaluate
what share of the overall change in the wage distribution is due to the occupation-
specific skill prices in the next section.
1.6 Matching the Change in the Wage Distribu-
tion
In this last section, I assess whether the polarization model can in principle account
for the change in the overall wage distribution.
First, I use the price estimates from the OMD to evaluate what share of the
change in inequality is due to the occupation-specific skill prices. I obtain the
skill price effect by assigning the price changes to the workers in the initial period.
According to the model, the remaining differences between the actual and the coun-
terfactual wage distribution should then be due to the reallocation effect. I conduct
this exercise in the NLSY and in the CPS data from section 1.2.1. To use the
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CPS is now possible again because assigning the estimated skill prices only requires
knowledge of workers’ occupations and not their talents anymore.
Figure 1.8 displays the effect of the occupation-specific skill prices. We can see
that in both datasets the increase in wages at the top of the distribution is quite
well explained by the estimated price changes alone. The increase at the bottom is
however hardly explained at all, despite the high point estimate of 4(piL − piM) =
31.4%. This appears somewhat as a puzzle, since I would have expected that at
least part of the increase in the bottom of the wage distribution should be due to
higher relative prices in the low-skill occupation.
There are two interrelated reasons for the lack of an increase in the bottom of
the counterfactual wage distribution compared to the middle. First, the dispersion
of earnings within occupation groups is large, such that the respective occupational
wage distributions overlap substantially and that an increase in the price per unit
of skill in the low-skill occupation lifts wages of some middle-earners as well. Sec-
ond, the estimated price changes are large enough such that an “overtaking effect”
becomes empirically relevant, whereby some low-wage earners in the low-skill occu-
pations become middle-wage earners and vice versa for some middle-wage earners
in middle-skill occupations.33 Together, these two factors prevent a strong increase
of relative wages in the bottom of the counterfactual wage distribution despite the
high point estimate for the relative price changes.
The results about the difference between actual and counterfactual wages are
similar when I use the alternative definitions of occupation groups that have been
used in the literature. These include grouping occupations according to initial me-
dian wages or average education, splitting up the large middle-skill group into blue
collar and white collar occupations, and employing continuous measures of routine
and nonroutine (analytical and manual) task content in occupations. As above, all
these groupings share the feature that the wage dispersion within them is substan-
tial.34 However, in the case of tasks, one should note that measurement is far from
perfect. This is because tasks that workers carry out are assigned on the three-digit
occupation level (for details see the survey paper by Acemoglu and Autor 2010),
which may capture only a relatively small share of the overall variation in workers’
actual tasks. Therefore, job groupings or task measures that correspond more closely
33The corresponding statistics are not reported for the sake of brevity.
34Again, the results on alternative occupational groupings are not reported in detail in order to
save space but available from the author upon request.
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to the tasks that technology and trade have replaced may help to better match the
wage distribution, since the dispersion of wages conditional on them may also be
lower.35
In addition to the change in the overall wage distribution, figure 1.9 depicts the
change in average wages in high-, middle-, and low-skill occupations for the NLSY
and CPS. The counterfactual wage increase in the low-skill occupation is much
higher than the actual in both datasets, while the increase in middle- and high-
skill occupations is lower. Again, this is similar when I use alternative occupational
groupings. Overall, hence, it seems that the estimated relative price changes across
occupations alone cannot match the empirical facts about wages in the data.
What remains as an explanation, according to the model, is therefore the effect
of reallocation on different parts of the wage distribution. In the data, there is a
net outflow from the middle- to the low-skill and to the high-skill occupation of
three and 3.5 percent of the overall workforce, respectively. I assume that the lowest
earners in the middle who make up three percent of the workforce switch into the
low-skill occupation and assign them a fifteen percent wage increase, i.e. about half
of the maximum wage increase that they could possibly obtain (31.4% − 2.4%).36
Figure 1.10 plots the resulting counterfactual wage distribution which fits the actual
quite well, especially in the CPS. Moreover, figure 1.11 displays the corresponding
changes of average wages in occupations, which are now also closer to the actual
than without reallocation.37
Qualitatively, the reallocation effect at the bottom seems plausible. It not only
matches better the unconditional wage distribution, but in addition brings occu-
pational wages in the actual and the counterfactual closer together. Moreover, the
low-earners in the middle-skill occupations may really have a strong incentive to
switch jobs once the relative demand shock hits and it is also conceivable that they
could to so gainfully: for example, given probably not too different skill require-
35The occupation groups and task measures that are used here explain only around five to ten
percent of the variation in wages in the cross-section. Hence, if it were available for my application,
individual-level data on tasks as employed by Autor and Handel (2012) or by Spitz-Oener (2006) for
Germany might improve the precision of measurement and the variation in wages that it captures
substantially.
36An additional one percent of low earners is assumed to move to the high-skill occupation with
the same wage gain.
37In fact, the fit may be even better than in figures 1.10 and 1.11 if the remaining difference
between actual and counterfactual is due to small-sample variation for 27 year olds. For example,
I have tried out assigning the same relative price estimates and making similar assumptions about
reallocation to the larger group of 25-29 year olds in the CPS. This matches the actual changes
almost perfectly. The same is the case if I do the exercise for prime age males aged 25-55.
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ments, someone who would have been a low-earning worker in a factory in the 1980s
may instead relatively easily become a janitor today.
While qualitatively plausible, the assumptions made about reallocation in order
to match the wage distribution in figure 1.10 are quite strong. Firstly, the con-
centrated switching of low-earners in the middle-skill occupation requires that the
population distribution of skills in the low-skill occupation be very condensed so
that the low-earners are the first to find it profitable to “switch down”. This is hard
to reconcile with the fact that the empirical wage distributions of the low- and the
middle-skill occupation overlap substantially in both cross-sections. Secondly, the
gains from switching that I need to assume seem high.
Moreover, the assumptions are not strictly testable. This is so because I do not
know individual workers’ unobserved skills in the occupations that they have not
chosen and thus I cannot estimate their overall gains from reallocation. The only
assessment I can make is about the gains from reallocation for the observable com-
ponents of skill. It turns out that according to observable skills there is no clear
evidence in favor of the idea that the low earners have the highest gains from real-
location. To see this crudely, compare figure 1.4 again: contrary to what one would
expect in the case of strong switching of low-earners out of the middle-skill occu-
pation, the average talent measures in the middle-skill occupation do not improve
visibly and they do not deteriorate in the low-skill occupation. Moreover, unre-
ported regressions of the gains from reallocation for observables on workers’ wages
in the 1980s yield no clear relationship. Finally, I obtain essentially the same results
about reallocation when I use the alternative definitions of occupation groups or
task measures discussed above.
Therefore, I conclude that, as it is currently implemented in the literature, po-
larization seems to explain much but not all of the changes in the wage distribution
that have occurred over the last decades. Within the polarization story, the most
promising avenues for matching the whole wage distribution are to provide evidence
for a large reallocation effect at the bottom and to search for more precise empirical
measurements of the jobs or the tasks for which demand has declined.38 However,
38The strong role for reallocation, if it was substantiated in further research, would be concep-
tually and economically important. First, workers in fact gain from switching down into an on
average lower-paying occupation because they find a better match there. This is a conceptually
important point that only models of relative—rather than absolute—advantage can make. It would
thus emphasize the fact that there is no one mapping from occupations to the wage distribution.
Second, contrary to some existing studies which find strong wage losses from workers switching
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simply having some more occupation groups or tasks alone will not help much unless
the increase in the variation in wages that these finer groups explain is large.
1.7 Conclusion
This article is the first to study the effect of job polarization on the wage distribution
accounting for the endogenous sorting of skills. I do this by employing newly avail-
able data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY) which provides
detailed, multidimensional, and pre-determined measures of workers’ talents (i.e.
test scores) in order to hold different kinds of workers fixed and analyze the returns
to occupation-specific skills over time. The estimation equations are derived from
a Roy model over two cross-sections with job polarization amounting to a change
in the occupation-specific skill prices. In this case, I show that predictions about
wage changes depend exclusively on relative occupation-specific skills, which can be
measured via the allocation of talents.
My results indicate that a one percentage point higher propensity to work in high-
(low-) as opposed to the middle-skill occupations in the base period is associated
with a .29 (.70) percent increase in wages over time, and therefore workers with
comparative advantage in the middle-skill occupations lose out substantially over
time. Furthermore, the effect of job polarization on workers’ wages does well to
match the changes at the top of the wage distribution but appears unable to wholly
explain the changes at the bottom. Thus, occupational demand seems to have
been the driving force of a substantial part but not all of the changes in the wage
distribution over the past two decades.
These findings suggest that the dismal trend in middle class wages over the last
couple of decades may not be fully explained by the changes in technology and
globalization that coincided with it. In particular, (relative) incomes in the bottom
and the middle of the distribution could have been affected by policy variables and
labor market institutions such as the minimum wage and de-unionization. Thus,
policies that encourage union formation or other measures that increase workers’
bargaining power may be effective in raising middle class wages.
In future research it will be important to examine whether the result that the
down in panel data (e.g. Cortes 2012, Ebenstein, Harrison, McMillan, and Phillips 2011, Liu and
Trefler 2011), it would suggest that switching may be an important channel to cushion the negative
impact of polarization on the lowest earners.
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wage distribution at the bottom cannot be fully explained by demand shocks is
robust in other datasets that may become available and for a more precise measure-
ment of the jobs and tasks that may have declined. In addition, similar analyses
for European countries, with their different labor market institutions, would help to
disentangle the effect of policy instruments on the change in the wage distribution
and their interaction with the undoubtedly existent demand shocks.
Finally, the methods developed in this paper can be applied more generally to
study the effect of other important demand shocks on the labor market. For example,
there are ongoing debates about a long-term increase in the demand for talent in
the financial- and related sectors, and about the effect of the Great Recession on
the wage distribution. These debates may be vitally informed by the “allocation of
talents” perspective.
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Figure 1.1: The Distribution of Log Wages and its Change
Notes: The subfigure on the top left depicts the empirical cumulative distribution of log real wages
for 27 year olds in the NLSY79 cohort and for the comparable years and age group in the CPS. The
subfigure on the top right does the same for the NLSY97. The subfigure at the bottom compares
the changes in log real wages along the quantiles of the wage distribution over the two cohorts.
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Figure 1.2: Employment Shares by Broad Occupation Group and their Changes
Notes: The subfigure on the top left depicts the employment shares of low-, middle-, and high-
skilled occupations for the NLSY79 cohort and the comparable years and age group in the CPS.
The subfigure on the top right does the same for the NLSY97. The subfigure at the bottom de-
picts the percentage point change in employment in the three occupation groups and again the
CPS in comparison. The high skill occupation group contains managerial, professional services,
and technical occupations. The middle skill occupation group contains sales, office / administra-
tive, production, and operator and laborer occupations. The low skill occupation group contains
protective, food, cleaning and personal service occupations.
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Figure 1.3: Real (1979) Wages by Broad Occupation Group and their Changes
Notes: The subfigure on the top left depicts the average real wages of low-, middle-, and high-
skilled occupations for the NLSY79 cohort and the comparable years and age group in the CPS.
The subfigure on the top right does the same for the NLSY97. The subfigure at the bottom depicts
the change in real wages in the three occupation groups and again the CPS in comparison. The
high skill occupation group contains managerial, professional services, and technical occupations.
The middle skill occupation group contains sales, office / administrative, production, and operator
and laborer occupations. The low skill occupation group contains protective, food, cleaning and
personal service occupations.
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Figure 1.4: Average Talents in Occupation Groups, NLSY 1979 and 1997
Notes: The figures display the average math, verbal, and mechanical test scores in the three
occupation groups for the NLSY79 and the NLSY97.
Figure 1.5: The Estimation Problem
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Figure 1.6: Predicted Relative Skill Returns and their Changes
(a) Propensity High Occupation (b) Propensity Low Occupation
(c) Propensity Middle Occupation
Notes: The figures plot the returns to propensities of entering the respective occupation in the
NLSY79 and the NLSY97 together with the empirical density of these propensities in the NLSY79.
The returns are estimated in regressions of log wages on a constant and the respective propensity
together with an interaction term for the NLSY97.
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Figure 1.7: Actual and Predicted Wage Distribution Change
(a) Returns to Propensities (b) Returns to All Talents
Notes: The figures plot the actual and the predicted change in the wage distribution when workers
in the NLSY79 are assigned the change in the returns to their observable characteristics between
the two cohorts estimated in columns one and four of table 1.5.
Figure 1.8: Actual and Counterfactual Wage Distribution Change, NLSY and CPS
(a) NLSY (b) CPS
Notes: The figure plots the actual and the counterfactual change in the wage distribution when
workers in the initial period are assigned the estimated price changes in their occupations from the
optimal minimum distance estimator in table 1.7.
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Figure 1.9: Actual and Counterfactual Occupational Wage Changes, NLSY and CPS
(a) NLSY (b) CPS
Notes: The figures plot the actual and the counterfactual change in occupational wages in the
NLSY and CPS when workers in the initial period are assigned the estimated price changes in
their occupations from the optimal minimum distance estimator in table 1.7.
Figure 1.10: Actual and Counterfactual Wage Distribution Change with Realloca-
tion, NLSY and CPS
(a) NLSY (b) CPS
Notes: The figures plot the actual and the counterfactual change in occupational wages in the
NLSY and CPS when workers in the initial period are assigned the estimated price changes in
their occupations plus a reallocation effect: the lowest-earning three percent are assumed to move
out of the middle- to the low-skill occupation with a 15 percent relative wage increase and the next
low-earning one percent is assumed to move to the high-skill occupation with the same relative
wage gain.
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Figure 1.11: Actual and Counterfactual Occupational Wage Change with Realloca-
tion, NLSY and CPS
(a) NLSY (b) CPS
Notes: The figures plot the actual and the counterfactual change in occupational wages in the
NLSY and CPS when workers in the initial period are assigned the estimated price changes in
their occupations plus a reallocation effect: the lowest-earning three percent are assumed to move
out of the middle- to the low-skill occupation with a 15 percent relative wage increase and the next
low-earning one percent is assumed to move to the high-skill occupation with the same relative
wage gain.
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Table 1.1: From the full NLSY to the analysis sample
NLSY79 NLSY97
(Birthyears 1956-1964) (Birthyears 1980-1984)
Reason for exclusion
Total males 6,403 4,599
Excluded oversampled white and
older arrivers in US than age 16 4,585 4,599
Birthyear > 1982 4,585 2,754
Type of attrition
Ought to be present with ASVAB
at age 27 4,585 2,754
No ASVAB excluded 4,299 2,081
% 94 76
Not present at age 27 excluded 3,939 1,737
% 86 63
Conditioned on working
Excluded who report no or
farm occupation, self-employed,
and those with no wage income 3,054 1,207
Note: The table reports how I get from the full NLSY 1979 and 1997 to my analysis sample
and where observations are lost or need to be dropped.
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Table 1.2: Labor Supply with Respect to Average Demographics, Early, and Con-
temporary Skill Determinants
NLSY79 NLSY97
Nbr of observations 3051 1210
Percentage of observations 71.60 28.40
Demographics
Age 27.00 27.00
White 0.80 0.72
Black 0.13 0.14
Hispanic 0.06 0.14
Early skill determinants
AFQT 167.31 167.65
Low AFQT Tercile 0.34 0.33
Middle AFQT Tercile 0.33 0.34
High AFQT Tercile 0.33 0.32
Math Score (NCE) 50.45 50.73
Verbal Score (NCE) 50.26 50.49
Mechanical Score (NCE) 50.41 50.69
Illicit Activities (NCE, Measured 1980) 49.98 50.01
Precocious Sex (NCE, Measured 1983) 49.91 50.24
Mother’s Education (Years) 11.86 13.11
Father’s Education (Years) 10.83 13.09
Contemporary skill determinants
High School Dropout (HSD) 0.12 0.07
High School Graduate (HSG) 0.43 0.58
Some College (SC) 0.20 0.06
College Graduate (CG) 0.19 0.24
Advanced Degree (AD) 0.06 0.04
North East 0.22 0.17
North Central 0.29 0.25
South 0.32 0.35
West 0.17 0.21
Note: The table shows average demographics and skill proxies
in the NLSY79 and NLSY97 for all individuals weighted by
hours worked. NCE indicates variables in the population (in-
cluding non-workers) are standardized to “normal curve equiv-
alents” with mean 50 and standard deviation 21.06. This is
done when absolute values of these variables cannot confi-
dently compared over the two cohorts.
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Table 1.3: Pairwise Correlations between Composite Test Scores
NLSY79 NLSY97
AFQT Math Verbal AFQT Math Verbal
AFQT (NCE) 1 1
Math Score (NCE) 0.82 1 0.83 1
Verbal Score (NCE) 0.93 0.71 1 0.92 0.75 1
Mechanical Score (NCE) 0.63 0.53 0.61 0.63 0.54 0.63
Nbr Observations 2936 1210
Note: The table shows the pairwise correlations between composite test scores after
standardizing to normal curve equivalents with mean 50 and standard deviation 21.06.
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Table 1.4: Sorting into Occupation Groups, Multinomial Logit Regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
NLSY79 NLSY79 NLSY97 NLSY97
High
Constant -4.024*** -1.710*** -3.176*** -1.384***
Black 0.235 0.159 -0.152 -0.106
Hispanic 0.03 -0.031 -0.472* -0.456*
Math (NCE) 0.047*** 0.034***
Verbal (NCE) 0.023*** 0.032***
Mechanic (NCE) -0.014*** -0.019***
Middle Math Tercile 1.144*** 0.441*
High Math Tercile 2.315*** 1.426***
Middle Verbal Tercile 0.207 0.670**
High Verbal Tercile 0.750*** 1.445***
Middle Mechanic Tercile -0.269 -0.258
High Mechanic Tercile -0.552*** -0.618**
Illicit Activities (NCE) -0.009*** -0.003
Precocious Sex (NCE) -0.004 -0.006
Low
Constant -1.689*** -1.608*** -1.339*** -2.053***
Black 0.636*** 0.762*** 0.473* 0.658**
Hispanic 0.201 0.243 -0.216 -0.114
Math (NCE) -0.002 -0.009
Verbal (NCE) 0.018*** 0.021**
Mechanic (NCE) -0.023*** -0.017**
Middle Math Tercile -0.381** -0.07
High Math Tercile 0.128 -0.395
Middle Verbal Tercile 0.342 0.27
High Verbal Tercile 0.471* 0.790**
Middle Mechanic Tercile -0.319 -0.281
High Mechanic Tercile -0.908*** -0.608*
Illicit Activities (NCE) -0.002 0.013*
Precocious Sex (NCE) -0.003 -0.003
Pseudo R-Squared 0.132 0.123 0.114 0.112
N 2936 2936 1210 1210
Note: Each columns presents the results from a multinomial logit regression of occupational
choice on demographics and talent proxies. The omitted group is the middle occupation.
The first column uses only linear test scores in the NLSY79. The second column, which is
the specification to estimate occupational propensities in the following, uses terciles of test
scores and adds measures of risky behavior. The last two columns repeat these estimations
for the NLSY97. In order to save space, standard errors are not reported but statistical
significance is indicated: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table 1.5: Returns to Occupational Propensities over the Two Cohorts
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log Wage Log Wage Log Wage Log Wage
Constant 181.15*** 185.17*** 176.66*** 183.21***
(3.10) (3.11) (3.76) (21.61)
Const x NLSY97 -7.90 -10.27 -12.59 -43.37
(6.74) (6.57) (8.16) (41.62)
Prop High Occup 0.31*** 0.03 -0.06 0.13
(0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.57)
Prop H Occ x NLSY97 0.29*** 0.25** 0.30** 1.41
(0.11) (0.13) (0.13) (1.03)
Prop Low Occup -1.65*** -1.80*** -1.75*** -2.19**
(0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.97)
Prop L Occ x NLSY97 0.70* 0.86** 0.91** 2.26
(0.39) (0.38) (0.38) (1.92)
College 19.23***
(2.92)
Coll x NLSY97 4.04
(5.20)
Observations 4154 4149 4149 4154
R2 0.09 0.11 0.12 0.10
Degree dummies No No Yes No
Talents directly No No No Yes
Note: The table reports OLS wage regressions of 100 times the deflated
log wage on propensities to enter occupation groups (predicted relative
occupation-specific skills) and the change in the coefficient between the
NLSY79 and the NLSY97. The propensities are from the NLSY79 only and
they are from multinomial logit regressions of occupational choice including
mathematical, verbal, and mechanical talent terciles, illicit activities, preco-
cious sex and dummies for respondents’ race. The specifications in columns
two to four add dummies for college degree, detailed education (HS drop out,
HS graduate, Some college, College and above), and the talents that were
used in the estimation of the propensities directly. “x NLSY97” stands for
the interaction between the variable and an NLSY97 dummy, i.e. the change
in the coefficient between the NLSY79 and the NLSY97. Standard errors are
from bootstrapping the first (estimating the propensities) and second stage
regressions together 500 times and they are reported below the coefficients.
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table 1.6: Talent Allocation and Returns Changes
High Skill Low Skill Log Wage
Occup Occup x NLSY97
Constant 18.71*** 11.87*** 14.37**
(6.21) (5.51) (2.08)
Black -0.762 9.292*** 0.647
(-0.43) (4.77) (0.14)
Hispanic -2.632 1.708 -1.586
(-1.34) (1.12) (-0.36)
Middle Math Tercile 10.83*** -4.466*** -2.615
(6.05) (-2.85) (-0.56)
High Math Tercile 34.90*** -5.997*** 10.44*
(13.48) (-3.10) (1.68)
Middle Mechanic Tercile -2.505 -2.332 -5.767
(-1.19) (-1.52) (-1.20)
High Mechanic Tercile -7.043*** -4.827*** -1.740
(-2.81) (-2.97) (-0.30)
Middle Verbal Tercile 3.505* 2.429 -0.282
(1.84) (1.48) (-0.06)
High Verbal Tercile 15.34*** 2.805 -4.535
(5.67) (1.45) (-0.65)
Illicit Activities (NCE) -0.129*** 0.0388 -0.183*
(-3.33) (1.36) (-1.89)
Precocious Sex (NCE) -0.0612 -0.0120 0.0527
(-1.64) (-0.41) (0.62)
R-squared 0.182 0.0281 0.0933
N 4146 4146 4146
Note: The first two columns present the coefficients from OLS al-
location regressions of working in the low and high skill occupation
with pooled NLSY79 and NLSY97 data. The third colum presents the
change in the parameters between the two cohorts in an OLS wage re-
gression. Coefficients represent 100 times the average partial increase
in the probability of entering the occupation group and the log wage,
respectively, for an additional unit of the regressor. “x NLSY97” stands
for the interaction between the variable and an NLSY97 dummy, i.e.
the change in the coefficient between the NLSY79 and the NLSY97.
T-statistics below the coefficients. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table 1.7: Implied Wage Rate Changes and Cross-Equation Restriction Test
Estim. 4(piH − piM ) Estim. 4(piL − piM ) Implied 4piM Test Statistic
in % (s.e.) in % (s.e.) in % (p-value in %)
OMD / Full GLS 20.1 31.4 -2.4 13.1
(9.7) (35.2) (10.7)
EWMD / OLS 19.4 -4.4 1.7 13.2
(10.8) (32.0) (10.5)
DWMD / WLS 22.0 -7.5 1.3 11.2
(9.7) (35.1) (19.1)
Note: The table presents estimated relative wage rate changes in the high and the low skill occupation compared
to the middle skill occupation, a point estimate for the absolute wage rate change in the middle, and the cross-
equation restriction test of the polarization hypothesis. The characteristics used in the underlying allocation
and wage regressions are my prefered specification, i.e. mathematical, verbal, and practical talent terciles, illicit
activities, precocious sex, and dummies for respondents’ race. There are 8 degrees of freedom for the test (10
coefficients minus 2 parameters estimated on them). Implied prices and the test statistics are reported for
the Optimal Minimum Distance (Full feasable GLS) estimation and as alternatives for the Equally Weighted
Minimum Distance (OLS regression of change in wage regression coefficients on allocation regression coefficients),
and Diagonally Weighted Minimum Distance (WLS).
64
Chapter 2
The Allocation of Talent over the
Business Cycle and its Long-Term
Effect on Sectoral Productivity
65
The Allocation of Talent over the Business Cycle and its
Long-Term Effect on Sectoral Productivity
Michael Boehm and Martin Watzinger∗
February 2013
Abstract
It is well documented that graduates enter different occupations in recessions than
in booms. In our article, we examine the impact of this reallocation for long-term
productivity and output in a sector. We develop a model in which talent flows to
stable sectors in recessions and to cyclical sectors in booms. We find evidence for
the predicted change in productivity caused by the business cycle in a setting where
output can be readily measured: economists starting or graduating from their PhD
in a recession are significantly more productive over the long term than economists
starting or graduating in a boom.
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2.1 Introduction
An extensive recent literature has documented a strong and persistent impact of
initial labor market conditions on individuals’ earnings.1 Many of these studies
have identified a change in first jobs or occupations as the main cause for this effect.
For example, graduating MBAs are less likely to get a job in investment banking
if there is a shock to financial markets (Oyer 2008). Since starting on Wall Street
upon graduation makes a person more likely to work there later, temporary shocks
can have large impacts on MBAs’ lifetime earnings. The effects on initial jobs are
not limited to the very top of the earnings distribution: for example Oreopoulos,
von Wachter, and Heisz (2012) find that college graduates entering the labor market
during recessions take up jobs with lower paying employers and then gradually—but
not fully—recover by switching to higher paying employers over time.2
Despite showing that temporary shocks change workers’ initial jobs and in princi-
ple recognizing that this “can lead to persistent changes in the allocation of workers”
(Oreopoulos, von Wachter, and Heisz 2012), none of these studies has analysed the
aggregate implications of such a reallocation. More concretely, because of the above
findings, the business cycle can affect the size and the composition of the work-
force across sectors and thus have long-term effects on sectoral productivity and
output. This is particularly important if sectors benefiting from an inflow of talent
during recessions have a higher (or lower) social value than the sectors where the
talent is drawn from. For example, if in a recession talented individuals choose to
work in entrepreneurship or research instead of rent-seeking sectors, this may have
some social benefits that subtract from the immense adverse effects of downturns.
And, even if this is not the case, the observation that hiring in a downturn is a
cost-effective way to attract and retain talent may be a compelling rationale for
anti-cyclical recruitment policies of businesses and the public sector alike.
This is the first study to explore the impact of the business cycle on long-term
productivity and output in a sector via the allocation of talent. To do this, we focus
on the productivity of new hires over the business cycle in an occupation where
1See, for example, Oreopoulos, von Wachter, and Heisz (2012), Devereux (2002a), Raaum and
Røed (2006), Sullivan and von Wachter (2009), Kahn (2010), Genda, Kondo, and Ohta (2010),
Oyer (2006), Oyer (2008).
2Other studies have shown that college enrolment rates rise during recessions (e.g. Gustman
and Steinmeier 1981, Black and Sufi 2002). This suggests that at least part of the effect on initial
occupations is a deliberate choice by the affected individuals.
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output is well measurable. We proceed in two steps: first, we develop a Roy-style
model of occupational choice that speaks to our empirical setting below. Yet it
makes two general points, informing us about the expected composition of talent if
all individuals can freely choose their occupation and if only a certain number of jobs
are available. In the first case workers are allocated according to relative advantage,
while in the second case individuals must have an absolute advantage to be able to
enter the restricted sector. Second, we collect data from an empirical setting that is
well suited for our study of the reallocation of talent and sectoral productivity: the
career choices and publication records of economics PhDs who graduated from the
top 30 US universities.
We are examining this particular occupation because academic publication records
provide us with a direct measure of productivity that does not suffer from two fun-
damental flaws: endogeneity to the business cycle and imprecision. First, wages or
firm output are not only affected by the productivity of workers but also by product
market demand, which falls in recession. Therefore it is hard to learn from such
measures about a change in worker productivity caused by recessions. Second, since
a firm’s production is normally the result of a collaborative effort of many individu-
als, it is difficult to infer from a change in output the value of a specific worker’s or
cohort’s contribution. Contrary to that, academic publications can be attributed to
particular individuals, we can quite well assess their quality, and journals’ demand
for articles does not vary over the business cycle.3 In addition, the education of
PhD economists provides two different and well-defined career decision points, the
application to and the graduation from graduate school, which conform relatively
well to the absolute and the comparative advantage cases mentioned above.
For our empirical analysis we construct a new dataset of economists’ career
choices and publication output from publicly available sources. The dataset consists
of graduation years and the degree granting universities of 13,624 PhDs from 1955
to 1994 from the top 30 American institutions. We match each person with all their
publications in JStor during the first ten years after graduation and with an indicator
for becoming a faculty member or a member of the American Economic Association
(AEA) after the PhD. Thus, we can calculate the propensity to stay in academia
and the long-term publication output for each economist. Finally, we aggregate each
3While there may be fiercer competition for fixed journal spaces, this should be the same for
recession and boom cohorts.
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cohort according to university and graduation year, and match different business
cycle indicators (recession dummies, GDP growth, and unemployment rates and
their changes) at time of application to and at time of graduation from a PhD
program. We quantify the influence of the business cycle indicators at both points
in time on economists’ propensity to decide in favor of academic employment and
on their productivity.
Our empirical results support the predictions of the Roy Model and the more
general idea that the business cycle influences sectoral productivity and output via
a reallocation of talent. The model predicts that a recession during the application
period makes entry into graduate school more competitive, because application rates
rise and the number of available spaces is more or less fixed. Consequently, the
ability of admitted PhD students should increase during recessions. Indeed, in our
data, cohorts who entered during a recession publish more on average, i.e. are
more productive, than boom cohorts. The model also predicts that at graduation
from the PhD, when top-jobs in academia are hard to get but there is potentially
some flexibility in the number of lower-ranked academic jobs, the number and /
or the quality of individuals staying in academia rises during recessions. In our
data, we find that individuals who graduated during a recession are more likely to
become academics and those who do, publish more on average. Overall output in
the academic sector thus rises. Finally, the model predicts that individuals who
entered a PhD program during recession are less likely to stay in academia after
graduation. The reason is that some of them have relatively strong non-academic
skills and find it profitable to leave academia after the economy recovered. We also
find empirical evidence in support of this idea.
We quantify the long-term effects of the business cycle on productivity and out-
put because our measure takes into account all publications authored in the first
ten years after graduation. The effects accumulate during this time span indicating
a persistent difference between boom and recession cohorts. Moreover, they are of
economically substantial magnitude: we expect assistant professors from a cohort
who applied to the PhD during a typical recession (a rise in unemployment rates
by 2.5 percentage points) to be 17 percent more productive than assistant profes-
sors who applied in an average year (0 percentage points unemployment change).
Furthermore, three percent more PhD graduates stay in academia in a typical re-
cession and they produce on average 14 percent more publications than economists
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graduating in an average year.
Our results are robust over a wide variety of alternative measures of output and
occupational choice, different control variables as well as in different subsamples. For
example, the change in productivity is most pronounced for the graduates of the top
Tier 1 universities but also holds over the entire skill distribution. Unemployment
change is our preferred measure of the business cycle, but NBER recession indicators
or GDP Growth as explanatory variables deliver similar results. The number of
publications in the top 5 journals as a measure of productivity works almost as
well as impact weighted-publications. Controlling for a time trend or academic
subfields does not change our results. It does not matter qualitatively if we use listing
in a faculty database, the propensity to publish, or membership in the American
Economic Association as indicator for being a member of the academic sector.
This paper informs at least three ongoing debates. Foremost, in the literature
on long-term effects of recessions, it identifies and demonstrates the quantitative
importance of a hitherto ignored implication of its findings—that recessions change
the composition of talent across sectors and thus their long-term productivity and
output. Prior literature recognized that initial jobs shape long-term careers of in-
dividuals and that they differ for recession and boom cohorts (e.g. Oreopoulos, von
Wachter, and Heisz 2012, Devereux 2002a, Kahn 2010, Oyer 2006, Oyer 2008).4
Furthermore, it documents that less advantaged workers seem to be most affected
(in particular Oreopoulos, von Wachter, and Heisz 2012), although Oyer (2008) also
finds large effects for MBAs. Our study adds to these findings that the recession-
induced reallocation of workers changes the long-term productivity and output of
a sector and that these effects are quantitatively important for the top of the skill
distribution. A concurrent paper corroborates our results by showing that MIT
students who graduate during recessions are producing more patents over the long
term and that this is likely to stem from initial occupational affiliations (Shu 2012).
Our findings also add to the literature on the cyclical upgrading of labor (e.g.
Okun 1973, Vroman and Wachter 1977, McLaughlin and Bils 2001, Devereux 2002b).
This literature shows that workers move to higher paying employers or occupations
during booms and to lower paying ones during recession. The reason is that the
labor demand of high-wage employers increases in upturns, reducing competition
4These studies also discuss the sources of long-term effects, considering hypotheses about human
capital accumulation, employer learning, stigma, search, and others.
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for their jobs. In recession, when competition is correspondingly higher, the average
education level for new hires increases (Devereux 2002b). Naturally, this indicates a
reallocation of talent over the business cycle. In particular, it appears that in booms
workers with a lower skill endowment are able to enter jobs which they would not
enter in a recession. Our findings quantify the resulting effect on productivity and
output for one particular occupation.
Another debate that our paper contributes to is concerned with the impact of
science funding on research productivity. Funding increases, like recessions in our
context, raise the attractiveness of the academic sector compared to the private
sector. Goolsbee (1998) shows that up to 50% of a government spending increase
goes into higher salaries for scientists and engineers. Suggesting that the supply
of such knowledge workers is relatively inelastic, he argues that a large fraction of
governmental research funding may in fact be ineffective and may only constitute
a windfall gain for scientists. To the contrary, our results imply that the quantity
and / or quality of scientists should strongly and persistently increase with more
funding.5
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. We derive our theoretical
predictions from a modified version of the Roy Model in the next section. Then we
describe how we assembled our novel dataset of PhD economists’ career choice and
publication success. Section 3.4 presents and interprets the empirical results, while
the conclusion discusses to what extent our results may generalize to other segments
of the labor market. The appendices contain robustness checks that seem important
to us but would disturb the flow of the argument in the main text.
2.2 Theory
We are interested in how the selection of skills into academia and business varies with
the state of the business cycle. This section modifies a standard Roy (1951) model for
the problem at hand. The Roy Model analyzes the self-selection of individuals with
heterogeneous skills into sectors according to their highest expected earnings. In the
following, we model two sectors—academia and business—into which individuals
can self-select. Every individual has distinct skills (and therefore different wages)
5Along these lines, Freeman and van Reenen (2009) assert that, at least in the long run, not
only the number of scientists but also the selection of talent into science will increase due to higher
salaries.
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in each sector but can choose only one occupation. The main departure from the
original Roy framework is that compensation in business and academia vary with
the business cycle and that the number of open positions in academia is assumed to
be fixed.
2.2.1 Assumptions
Suppose that individuals are endowed with two skills, an academic skill α and a
business skill β. There are two sectors, academia (A) and business (B), which pro-
duce outputs utilizing the respective skills. Individuals maximize their expected
lifetime compensation by applying for jobs in academia or business. This compen-
sation implicitly consists of a pecuniary and a non-pecuniary component, where the
non-pecuniary component might be particularly important in the academic sector
(see Stern 2004).
The business sector is assumed to hire anyone offering a compensation wt. The
compensation depends linearly on the skill level β of the employee and the state of
business cycle y˜t:
wB(β) = β + y˜t.
An employee’s lifetime compensation in the business sector is higher in a boom (high
y˜t) and lower in a recession (low y˜t). In academia, total compensation also varies
with the business cycle but is less cyclical than in the business sector:
wA(α) = α + ay˜t
with a < 1.
Two sources may contribute to the variability of compensation over the business
cycle: First, in a recession, lower immediate wages can lead to a lower lifetime
compensation in both sectors. Second, during recessions employees enter inferior
career paths in business or start at a lower ranked institution in academia, which
could hurt lifetime income and non-pecuniary benefits. This is consistent with recent
findings (e.g. Oyer 2008, Oreopoulos, von Wachter, and Heisz 2012). Importantly,
we assume that the academic sector is less cyclical than the business sector and we
provide empirical evidence supporting this assumption in appendix B.2, where we
show that academic job offers for economists are less cyclical than non-academic
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ones and we argue that the non-pecuniary benefits from academia should make its
even less cyclical.
In order to become an academic, an individual must decide for academia twice:
first by applying to a PhD program (at time of application t = app) and a second
time by pursuing an assistant professorship after the PhD (at graduation t = grad).
At time of application, we assume that PhD programs admit the best N applicants
according to academic skill and that there are always more applicants than available
spaces.6 Thus, the entry into the doctoral program is competitive.7
At graduation, we do not know if only a fixed number of academic jobs are avail-
able or if graduates can freely choose to stay in academia: Obtaining an assistant
professorship at a ranked university is very competitive, indicating that only a lim-
ited number of spaces are offered. However, conditioned on graduating from one of
the top 30 US economics departments, it also seems unlikely that a student cannot
secure an academic job at a lower ranked institution, a teaching college, a university
outside the United States, or a postdoc position even in times of recession. Probably,
the truth lies somewhere in between these two extremes, so we derive predictions
for both cases.
When taking his decision to apply for a PhD program, the applicant should also
take into account the option value of having another choice about his career path
after graduation. To simplify our problem, we assume that this option value is a
constant, i.e. that it does not vary with the state of the macroeconomy at the time
of application.8 Thus, we can subsume this constant in the individual’s non-varying
compensation component, the academic skill level α.
Given these assumptions, an individual compares the expected compensation
from academia α+ay˜t and business β+ y˜t at time of application and at graduation.
He decides to apply for the academic sector (the PhD program or the assistant
6PhD entry cohort sizes as measured by the number of full-time, first-time graduate students,
are not related to the business cycle in our data (see Appendix B.3).
7The allocation is therefore governed by absolute advantage for those individuals who prefer
academia (see Sattinger 1993).
8In effect, this assumption amounts to imposing that the business cycle at time of application
has no predictive power for the business cycle at graduation. We think that this is defendable as
it takes on average six years to complete a PhD and we show in Appendix B.3 that there is no
correlation between the business cycle at time of application and graduation in our data. In general,
we expect that our results should also hold in all of the cases where there is a reversal in the business
cycle during that time frame, i.e., Pr(y˜Boomgrad |y˜Recapp ) > Pr(y˜Boomgrad |y˜Boomapp ) and Pr(y˜Recgrad|y˜Boomapp ) >
Pr(y˜Recgrad|y˜Recapp ), and in a lot of cases where there is sufficiently strong mean reversion.
73
professorship) whenever
α > β + yt. (2.1)
where t ∈ {app, grad} and yt ≡ (1 − a)y˜t. yt is the relative attractiveness of the
business sector that is due to the business cycle.9
2.2.2 Predictions
We are interested in how the selection of skills into academia and business varies
with the state of the business cycle. To ease the exposition, we compare a generic
boom cohort versus a generic recession cohort, i.e. yBoom > yRec. All proofs are
relegated to Appendix B.1.
Proposition 2.2.1 For PhD applicants, the joint distribution of academic and busi-
ness skills selected into the academic sector during a recession first order stochasti-
cally dominates (FSD) the corresponding boom distribution.10
Figure 2.1 illustrates Proposition 2.2.1 when academic and business skills are
distributed uniformly in the unit interval. Given our assumptions, an individual’s
career choice is governed by a “one-shot” decision, with those individuals for whom
α > β + yapp preferring academia. During a boom (a high yBoomapp ), fewer individuals
apply for academia than during a recession (a low yRecapp ), which is depicted by a
higher cutoff line for the former than for the latter. Academic employers always
hire a fixed number, N , of graduates (PhDs & “only in boom” in boom, PhDs
& “only in recession” in recessions) and therefore the distribution of skills for the
recession cohort lies to the “North-East” of the corresponding distribution for the
boom cohort.
However, Proposition 2.2.2 shows that fewer of the PhDs who were admitted in
a recession remain in academia and become assistant professors after the PhD.
9We could have added to the model that a PhD constitutes an investment into academic (and
business) skills. This is clearly an important feature of obtaining a graduate education and we did
this in an earlier version of this section. However, as long as the skill update and the uncertainty
about it can be assumed to be independent of the state of business cycle, it does not change the
predictions of the model other than by adding noise. Hence, we refrain from defining different
(updated) αs, βs, and yts at PhD application and graduation.
10On the flipside, this implies that the joint distribution of skills selected into business during a
boom first order stochastically dominates its recession counterpart. Note that in contrast to the
well known result of the general Roy model (e.g. see Heckman and Honore 1990), we can make a
definitive statement about the stochastic dominance for a general distribution of skills here. This
is due to the assumption of binding quantity constraints and the resulting competitiveness of the
admission into the academic sector.
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Figure 2.1: Selection with a U(0,1) distribution of both skills at application
Proposition 2.2.2 For every realization of the state of the economy at graduation
ygrad, a (weakly) higher fraction of the members of a “recession at time of application”
cohort do not remain in academia after the PhD.
The proposition implies that, on average, cohorts of PhD graduates more often
leave academia if they experienced a recession at the time of application. Figure 2.2
provides some intuition for the proposition. The academic skill cutoff, above which
individuals will prefer academic employment after the PhD, “on average” moves
down to the dashed line in the figure for a boom cohort and up for a recession cohort.
Thus, in the figure, some individuals of the recession cohort exit academia and enter
business after the PhD when the economy is out of recession, while everyone in the
boom cohort stays in academia. The recession graduates who leave academia here
are the marginal ones who applied for the PhD “because of” the recession in the
first place.
Proposition 2.2.3 For any given realization of the business cycle at graduation
ygrad, the (partial) distribution of academic skills of the members of a “recession at
application” cohort who remain in academia after the PhD first order stochastically
dominates the distribution of skills of the corresponding members of the “boom at
application” cohort.11
Proposition 2.2.3 implies that, no matter how many more recession students than
boom students leave academia after the PhD, the recession students who remain in
11However, the stochastic dominance of the joint distribution of business and academic skills
does not feed through in general.
75
Figure 2.2: Selection with a U(0,1) distribution of both skills at graduation
academia are still better in each quantile of their (academic) skill distribution. In
our specific example in Figure 2.2 we see that, although some mass of the recession
cohort is cut off, the recession distribution of skills in academia still lies to the
“North-East” of the boom distribution.
We now turn to the effect of the business cycle at graduation (ygrad). In a
recession, relatively more graduates want to take up academic employment than
in a boom. If all of these graduates can take up an academic occupation, more
academics come out of a recession-at-graduation cohort than out of a boom-at-
graduation cohort. Depending on the underlying skill distribution, these additional
academics might be less or more able than the ones always staying in academia. If
only a fixed number can take up an academic position (independently whether there
is a boom or bust), a recession leads to (on average) better academics. Proposition
2.2.4 states this observation and its implications. Figure 2.3 provides a graphical
representation in the special case of PhD graduates with academic and business
skills distributed uniformly in the unit square.
Proposition 2.2.4 A higher fraction of PhD economists wants to stay in the aca-
demic sector if they experience a recession at graduation. Depending on whether a
fixed number of academic positions are available or not, the quality and / or the
quantity of academics from recession cohorts increases.
As mentioned above, the number of spaces in academia at graduation is probably
neither completely flexible nor completely fixed, therefore we expect a combination
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Figure 2.3: Selection at graduation
(a) with a flexible number of spaces. (b) with a fixed number of spaces.
of these two effects. In addition, this proposition implies that the average PhD
cohort who graduated during a recession publishes weakly more, because weakly
more PhDs choose to enter academia (if spaces at graduation are flexible) or better
PhDs enter academia (if the number of jobs are fixed).
Finally, we can reformulate the four propositions of the model into empirical
predictions for our data:
1. Fewer of the economists who experienced a recession at the time of application
to the PhD end up in academia (from Proposition 2.2.2).
2. However, those who remain in academia are better researchers, both on average
and in each quantile of their publication distribution (from Proposition 2.2.3).
3. More and / or better economists who experienced a recession at graduation
stay in academia, increasing the publication output for the full sample of PhD
graduates (from Proposition 2.2.4).
2.3 Data
We have collected a new dataset of career choices and individual productivity for a
large sample of economists in the United States from 1955 to 2004. We aggregate
the individuals into university year cohorts and match these with measures of the
business cycle in the year of application and the year of graduation. The data
sources are described in Table 2.1.12
12All further details of the data collection procedure and the employed programs are available
from the authors on request.
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Table 2.1: Data Sources
Variable Description Source
Personal information
of graduates
Name, university and graduation year AEA “List of Doctoral Dissertations in Eco-
nomics” from 1955 to 1994
Faculty membership Faculty directory of (mainly American) Eco-
nomics, Business and Finance departments
by James R. Hasselback
“Faculty Directories,” James R. Has-
selback, accessed 2011-02-07, http:
//www.facultydirectories.com/
Membership in the
AEA
Membership data of the American Economic
Association in 1970, 1974, 1981, 1985, 1989,
1993, 1997, 2003 and 2007
Supplement to the Papers and Proceedings Is-
sue in the respective year digitalized by JS-
TOR
University ranking Tier of a university according to the National
Research Council
“The American Economic Association Grad-
uate Study in Economics Web Pages,” ac-
cessed 2011-02-08, http://www.vanderbilt.
edu/AEA/gradstudents/
Publication records Publications in 74 journals listed in the JS-
TOR online repository, from 1955 to 2004
“JSTOR Data for Research,” last accessed
2011-02-07, http://dfr.jstor.org/.
Journal rankings Citation ranking of journals in Economics,
Business and Finance from 1950 to 2000
Laband and Piette (1994), Kalaitzidakis, Ma-
muneas, and Stengos (2003), Kim, Morse, and
Zingales (2006) and “IDEAS/RePEc Recur-
sive Discounted Impact Factors for Journals,”
last accessed 2011-02-07, ideas.repec.org/
Measure of the busi-
ness cycle
Seasonally adjusted change in unemploy-
ment, unemployment levels and GDP growth
from 1949 to 1994
Thomson Reuters Datastream
Recession Indicators NBER recesssion indicators from 1949 to
1994
“The NBER’s Business Cycle Dating Com-
mittee,” last accessed 2011-08-09 http://www.
nber.org/cycles/recessions.html
Duration of the PhD Median years between registration and grad-
uation from the PhD for 1977, 1986, 1996,
1997, 2001
National Science Foundation, Stock and
Siegfried (2006), Hansen (1991)
Number of Graduates
(NSF list)
Number and graduating PhDs according
to the “NSF Survey of Earned Doctor-
ates/Doctorate Records File”
“WebCASPAR Integrated Science and Engi-
neering Resource Data System”, last accessed
2012-03-16, https://webcaspar.nsf.gov/
Number of First-Time,
Full-Time Graduate
Students
Number of full-time, first-time graduate stu-
dents according “NSF-NIH Survey of Gradu-
ate Students & Postdoctorates in Science and
Engineering”
“WebCASPAR Integrated Science and Engi-
neering Resource Data System”, last accessed
2012-03-16, https://webcaspar.nsf.gov/
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Table 2.2: The National Research Council Ranking of 1993
Tier Universities
Tier 1 (ranked 1–6): Chicago, Harvard, MIT, Princeton, Stanford, and Yale
Tier 2 (ranked 7–15): Columbia, Michigan, Minnesota, Northwestern, Penn-
sylvania, Rochester, California-Berkeley, California-Los
Angeles, and Wisconsin-Madison
Tier 3 (ranked 16–30): Illinois-Urbana, Boston University, Brown, Cornell,
Duke, Iowa, Maryland, Michigan State, New York
University, North Carolina, Texas-Austin, Virginia,
California-San Diego, University of Washington, and
Washington University-St. Louis
Source: “The American Economic Association Graduate Study in Economics Web Pages”,
accessed 2011-02-08, http://www.vanderbilt.edu/AEA/gradstudents/
2.3.1 Economist Sample Selection
The bases of our dataset are the names, graduation years and PhD granting institu-
tions of 13,624 economists who graduated from the top 30 US universities from 1955
to 1994. This data is obtained from the American Economic Association’s (AEA)
yearly “List of Doctoral Dissertations in Economics”, which was published in the
Papers and Proceedings issue of the “American Economic Review” until 1986 and
in the “Journal of Economic Literature” thereafter. We supplement this informa-
tion with the tier of the degree granting university according to the ranking of the
National Research Council.
2.3.2 Career Choice and Productivity Measures
We add an “academic” indicator which takes the value one if the economist was a
faculty member of a US economics, business or finance department in 2001 or listed
as a member of the American Economic Association, and zero otherwise.
The US faculty directories are compiled by James R. Hasselback and made avail-
able on his webpage.13 AEA Membership data is obtained from the American Eco-
nomic Association Directory of Members in 1970, 1974, 1981, 1985, 1989, 1993,
1997, 2003 or 2007.14 AEA membership serves as a proxy for faculty membership
13We only have access to the faculty listing of 2001. Therefore it is unlikely that graduates
from before 1965 are included because they are retired by 2001. This biases our estimates if the
retirement age is systematically higher or lower for recession cohorts compared to boom cohorts,
which seems unlikely.
14An individual is classified as a member of the AEA if he appears in any of the membership lists
from the year of his PhD graduation onward. It was pointed out to us that many PhD candidates
become AEA members when they go on the job market although they eventually do not enter the
academic sector and never renew their membership. Our results are robust to this concern. For
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Table 2.3: Ranking of Journals in Different Decades.
Rank Journal (ordered by 2000 rank) 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
1 The Quarterly Journal of Economics 65.6 16.2 41.6 58.1 100
2 Econometrica 46.6 31.6 78.4 96.8 68.7
3 Journal of Economic Literature - 100 100 18.8 63.5
4 The Review of Economic Studies 100 30.7 40.7 45.2 54.3
5 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity - 96.9 15.9 0.7 51.5
6 The Journal of Political Economy 63.5 59.1 63 65.2 49.8
7 Economic Policy - - - - 45.7
8 Journal of Labor Economics - - 15.4 12.8 45.5
9 The American Economic Review 93.3 34.5 40.2 100 39.9
10 The Journal of Economic Perspectives - - 23.3 34.3 39.8
11 The Review of Financial Studies - - - - 39.2
12 Journal of the European Economic Association - - - - 38.6
13 The RAND Journal of Economics (Bell Journal of Economics) - 39.5 40.2 11.4 38.2
14 The Journal of Finance 37.8 14.6 34.1 34.1 31.1
15 The Review of Economics and Statistics 59.8 12.4 6.5 28 21.7
16 Journal of Business & Economic Statistics - - 7.9 38.4 20.8
17 The Economic Journal 47.5 28 23.9 20.7 20.5
18 Journal of Applied Econometrics - - - 16.6 19.1
19 Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 18.5 22.1 18.6 18.6
20 The World Bank Economic Review - - - 5.7 18.5
21 International Economic Review 35.1 19 12.3 23 18.4
22 IMF Staff Papers - - - 5.1 18.3
23 Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization - - - 4.1 16.1
24 Journal of Law and Economics 51.8 43.3 33.1 3.9 14.1
25 The Journal of Human Resources - 13.6 4.6 21.3 13.4
26 Journal of Population Economics - - - 2.41 10.6
27 The Scandinavian Journal of Economics 2.5 7.1 2.1 10.7 9.2
28 The Journal of Business 18.5 37.4 8.7 8.7
29 The Journal of Industrial Economics 14.9 16.4 16 3.85 8.7
30 The World Bank Research Observer - - - 0.9 8.5
Note.—These are the first 30 out of 74 journals. The rankings for the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s
are taken from Laband and Piette (1994) and the ranking for the 1990s is from Kalaitzidakis,
Mamuneas, and Stengos (2003). For the 2000s, we normalize the current discounted recursive
impact factors ranking from the IDEAS RePEc website
(http://ideas.repec.org/top/top.journals.rdiscount.html, last accessed 2011-02-07) to
make it comparable to the other rankings.
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outside of the United States, because Hasselback’s faculty directories strongly focus
on US colleges and feature only very few foreign institutions.
In order to compare the oeuvres of different economists over time we calculate a
consistent measure of publication productivity. For all economists in our sample, we
collect the publication records in the first ten years after their graduation, multiply
each publication of an author by its weight (“publication points”) according to a
dynamic journal ranking, and divide it by the number of coauthors of the paper. We
then sum up all these contributions within the ten years after graduation to obtain
a productivity measure for every individual in our sample.
More specifically, we match the PhD graduates with their publications (includ-
ing journal title, number of pages and the number and identity of co-authors) in 74
journals listed in JSTOR, a leading online archive of academic journals. We select
all journals contained in JSTOR for which a ranking was available. Thus we include
all major publications in economics and finance except the journals published by
Elsevier, most notably the “Journal of Monetary Economics” and the “Journal of
Econometrics”.15 To ensure comparability among researchers, we restrict our at-
tention to the first ten years after graduation. JSTOR currently only provides full
publication data up to the year 2004. With the ten year requirement we can thus
rightfully analyze the sample from 1955 to 1994 without placing younger researchers
at a disadvantage.
Comparing the value of the collected publication records for different researchers
over the decades is difficult because the relative impact of economics journals has
changed substantially over time (Kim, Morse, and Zingales 2006). Therefore, we
construct a dynamic journal ranking with decade specific publication points for
each journal from 1950 onwards. For the period from 1960 to the 1989, we use
the ranking from Laband and Piette (1994), for the 1990s the equivalent ranking
published in Kalaitzidakis, Mamuneas, and Stengos (2003), and for the 2000s the
recursive discounted ranking available on the “ideas” webpage. For the 1950s we
were not able to find a journal ranking and thus decided to extrapolate a ranking
for articles published in the 1950s from our 1960s ranking. Table 2.3 lists 30 out of
the total 72 journals with their associated publication points over time.
In Appendix B.4.1, we show that our results are robust to the use of various
example, they are very similar if we measure AEA membership from three years after the PhD.
15Because we do not believe that either recession or boom cohorts systematically prefer or dislike
Elsevier journals, this should be of no consequence.
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other productivity measures.
2.3.3 Macro Data and PhD Entry Date
The main aim of our study is to relate the career decisions and the publication
success of economists to a proxy for the state of the macroeconomy at the times of
application to and graduation from their PhD program. As our data contains only
person-specific graduation dates, we infer the application date by subtracting the
median duration of a PhD of 6 years from the graduation date.16
Using a fixed duration of the PhD—both in boom and in recession—to infer the
application date, implies that students do not systematically time their graduation
depending on the business cycle. This is the same assumption as in Oyer (2006)
and we find (in line with his results) that the number of graduating PhDs is not
correlated with the business cycle in publicly available NSF data. We discuss what
would happen to our results if this assumption is violated in Appendix B.3.17
Our preferred proxy for the state of the business cycle is the change in the rate of
unemployment from June of the preceding year to June of the considered year. The
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) recession indicators are arguably
the most convincing measures of recessions. However, binary indicators cannot
carry information about the state of the economy as fine as continuous measures.
Unemployment change is such a continuous measure and—out of several candidate
variables that are available for the entire sample period—it is the most strongly
correlated with the NBER recession indicators. For example, Figure 2.4 shows that
recessions go hand in hand with a large change in unemployment. Unemployment
levels are high only after a recession. To demonstrate the robustness of our conclu-
sions, we also estimate all our specifications using unemployment levels and GDP
growth as explanatory variables.18
16The median duration of a PhD stayed almost constant at from five to six years since the 1970s
(see Table B.7 in Appendix B.4.3).
17Furthermore using six years for graduates is a potential problem for the precision of our
estimates because the variation in completion times across PhDs is substantial. Section B.4.3 in
the appendix reruns our main regressions using the distribution of completion times for the 1997
graduating cohort. The results become stronger, which suggests that measurement error in the
business cycle at application potentially biases our estimates.
18We refrain from using some more business sector- or economist-specific measures of the state of
the business cycle because they are generally not available for the entire study period. For example,
Job Openings for Economists (JOE), a listing of open positions for economists published by the
American Economic Assocation, is only available from 1976 onwards. Since our study period ends
in 1994, using the JOE listings would reduce the length of our time series to 18 data points (minus
six if we used job openings at application to the PhD as well).
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Figure 2.4: Unemployment change
2.3.4 Aggregation to University-Year Level
Finally, we group our graduates’ publication performances and the indicator for be-
ing an academic or not into university-graduation year averages. Thus, we reduce
the number of our observations from 13,624 individuals who graduated from insti-
tutions in tiers one, two, and three between 1955 and 1994, to 1068 cohort means.
Because we do not use any explanatory or control variables that vary below the
university-year level, this grouping entails no loss of information.
2.3.5 Descriptive Statistics
Table 2.4 provides summary statistics for the PhD cohorts’ average productivity,
the average probability to become an academic, and the macroeconomic variation.
The average ten-year productivity of a university-year cohort is about 31.49
publication points. The average probability to become an academic is about 60%
and is slightly falling over time as we can see in Figure 2.5a. Conditioned on being an
academic, the average ten-year cohort productivity totals 48.14 publication points.
This is about 50% of an article in the AER in the 1990s.19
Figure 2.5b depicts the average productivity of the PhD cohorts for every year
19In order to translate these publication points in terms of articles in a certain journal, one has
to take into account that the importance of journals changes over time. For example, an article in
the American Economic Review (AER) in the 1990s was worth 100 publication points while it was
“only” worth 40.2 points in the 1980s (see Table 2.3). Therefore, the average ten-year productivity
of a member of a university-year cohort in the full sample is about the equivalent of one-third of
an AER article in the 1990s.
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in our analysis, distinguishing between the average productivity of all graduates
and graduates that became an academic. As expected, we see that the performance
measures move together to a substantial degree.
The change in the unemployment rate, our preferred independent variable, has a
mean value of approximately zero. The 10% quantile is -0.9 percentage points and
the 90% quantile is 1.5 percentage points for the change in the rate of unemployment.
The average unemployment level is 6.1% and the average GDP growth is 3.4%.
From 1955 to 1994 the US was in recession 17% of all years. As an example, Figure
2.5c plots the change in the unemployment rate and in GDP growth together with
indicators for recessions from 1955 to 1994.
Table 2.4: Summary Statistics
mean sd min max p10 p90
Productivity 31.41 84.78 0.00 1738.10 0.00 93.60
Productivity (Academic) 47.96 103.66 0.00 1738.10 0.00 144.70
Academic 0.60 0.49 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00
Unempl Change 0.02 1.03 -2.10 2.90 -0.90 1.50
Unemployment 6.11 1.50 3.50 9.70 3.80 7.70
GDP Growth 3.37 2.29 -1.94 7.20 -0.23 6.42
Recession 0.17 0.37 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00
Observations 13651
2.4 Results
In this section we examine the empirical predictions derived from the modified Roy
model. To do this, we estimate the following model in three different specifications:
qi,t = β · yapp,t + γ · ygrad,t + δ · controls + i,t (2.2)
In the first specification, the outcome variable qi,t is the average publication output
of a cohort of graduates from university i in year t. In the second specification, it
is the average propensity to decide in favor of an academic career after the PhD,
and in the third specification, qi,t is the average productivity of those who stayed
in academia after the PhD. The unit of observation in all three cases is the average
of a given university in a given year, weighted by the number of underlying indi-
vidual observations. Moreover, the standard errors are clustered on the graduation
year level, in order to allow for contemporaneous correlation between the outcome
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Figure 2.5: Dependent and independent variables over time
(a) Probability of becoming an academic (b) Research productivity
(c) Unemployment change and GDP growth
variables in the presence of regressors that do not vary within a given year.
The regressors yapp,t and ygrad,t are a measure of the business cycle at application
and at graduation for each cohort. Our preferred regressor is the change in the
unemployment rate. To show the robustness of our results we also estimate all spec-
ifications with unemployment levels, GDP growth and NBER recession indicators
as measures of the business cycle. For conciseness, we focus our interpretation on
the effect of unemployment change on our dependent variables and only highlight
if differences arise from using one of the other measures. As control variables, we
include dummies for the full set of interactions of university and graduation decade.
These dummies pick up the (changing) quality differences of PhD education among
universities over time and they control for the higher standards of publication in
recent decades (e.g. Ellison 2002a, Ellison 2002b). Additionally, we report regres-
sions controlling for a time trend in Appendix B.4.5 and controlling for academic
subfields in Appendix B.4.6.
We estimate Equation (3.2) using linear regressions. To identify the average
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treatment effect of the business cycle measure on the respective outcome variable,
we assume that the productivity and the career decisions of a cohort of (potential)
PhD economists do not contemporaneously affect the business cycle in a given year.
This assumption excludes potential reverse causality. Furthermore, no third factor
is allowed to directly influence the business cycle and the career decisions as well as
productivity. This means that our parameters are identified by the arguably exoge-
neous variation of the business cycle.20 To be able to interpret β and γ exclusively as
the causal parameters of the selection effect discussed in the theory section, we need
an additional exclusion restriction to be satisfied: we assume that unemployment
change affects a cohort’s career decisions and publications only in terms of changing
their choice of the sector to apply to (the selection effect).
The last assumption might not be strictly true for the business cycle at gradu-
ation, because the state of economy affects an economist’s first job placement and
the first placement in turn influences productivity (Oyer 2006).21 Therefore our
estimate of γ is a combination of the selection effect and the placement effect. In
contrast β, the estimated influence of the business cycle at application, measures
cleanly the selection effect as we control in all regressions for the degree-granting
university, i.e. for the placement to different PhD programs.
Table 2.5 summarizes the main regression results of the three specifications, each
in one column. Every column contains four independent regressions using alterna-
tive business cycle measures for the two explanatory variables. The estimated coef-
ficients of the different regressions are reported one below the other. The following
subsections explain the results for the three outcome variables in turn.
2.4.1 Effect on the Publications of all PhDs
The first column of Table 2.5 shows the effect of the business cycle on the publication
output of an average PhD graduate in the sample. Unemployment change, both at
time of application and at graduation, has a significantly positive effect on research
productivity at the five and one percent level, respectively. These two results are also
economically substantial: a cohort on the 90% quantile of unemployment change at
time of application is expected to achieve 3.7 publication points more than a cohort
20Consequently, we do not need any control variables to consistently estimate the coefficients.
We nevertheless include them to increase the precision of our estimates.
21We explain in Section 2.4.3 that given Oyer’s result we might actually underestimate the causal
effect of selection in our regressions.
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Table 2.5: The Main Regression Results
Productivity Academic Productivity
Unempl Change (Application) 1.50∗∗ -0.89 3.23∗∗∗
(0.67) (0.58) (0.96)
Unempl Change (Graduation) 2.31∗∗∗ 1.36∗∗ 2.72∗∗
(0.65) (0.61) (1.20)
Unemployment (Application) 1.54∗∗ -0.75 2.94∗∗
(0.65) (0.79) (1.11)
Unemployment (Graduation) 1.78∗∗ -0.24 3.04∗∗
(0.74) (0.59) (1.26)
GDP Growth (Application) -0.65∗∗ 0.47∗ -1.45∗∗∗
(0.29) (0.24) (0.43)
GDP Growth (Graduation) -0.70∗∗ -0.41 -0.74
(0.33) (0.27) (0.56)
Recession (Application) 2.08 -3.25∗∗ 5.28∗
(2.11) (1.55) (2.95)
Recession (Graduation) 4.49∗∗ 2.16 4.96
(2.15) (1.28) (3.58)
Subsample All All Academic
University-Decade Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1068 1068 1047
Note.—Standard errors clustered on the graduation year in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
on the 10% quantile. This is approximately 12% of the mean. Similarly, if we do
the same calculation for the graduation cohort, the difference is 5.5 points, which is
17.6% of the mean.22
Using the alternative measures of the business cycle as regressors deliver qual-
itatively similar results as unemployment change. A higher unemployment rate
is associated with higher productivity at application and at exit. Positive GDP
growth leads to a lower publication productivity and NBER recessions go hand in
hand with more publication success. All coefficients are statistically different from
zero at the five percent level. The only exception is the estimated coefficient for
NBER recessions at application which is not significant at conventional levels.
Therefore, the effect of the business cycle at graduation is in line with empirical
prediction 3: PhDs who graduate during a recession publish more on average. As
22Referring to Table 2.4 above, the difference between the 10% and the 90% quantiles of unem-
ployment change at time of application is 2.4. Multiplying this by the parameter estimate of 1.54
gives a difference in average productivity between “boom” and “recession” cohorts of 3.7 publica-
tion points. Referring to Table 2.3, this is about the number of publication points one gets assigned
for an article in “Economica’ ’ during the 1990s. From Table 2.4, we also find that the “average”
PhD graduate achieves 31.49 publication points. Similarly, multiplying the difference between the
90% and 10% quantile of unemployment change with the paramter estimate of 2.31 at graduation
yields 5.549 publication points. This is about 17.6% of the mean of 31.49.
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noted above, the measured overall effect might be a combination of three effects:
an “extensive margin” effect whereby more PhDs stay in academia, an “intensive
margin effect” whereby a better selection of PhDs stay in academia and a “placement
effect”.
The theory does not make a prediction which overall effect the business cycle
at time of application should have on the publication output of an average PhD
graduate. On the one hand, according to Proposition 2.2.1, graduates who experi-
enced a recession at time of application constitute a better selection of individuals.
On the other hand, according to Proposition 2.2.2, fewer of these individuals are
expected to stay in academia and publish after the PhD. Empirically, it seems that
the former effect dominates the latter, as a worse business cycle (measured by a
large positive change in the unemployment rate, a higher unemployment rate or
lower GDP growth) at time of application is associated with a higher publication
output of an average PhD.
2.4.2 Effect on Career Decisions
The second column of Table 2.5 reports how the business cycle is related to economists’
career decisions after the PhD. Individuals are more likely to stay in academia when
the economy is ailing according to our preferred business cycle measure of unem-
ployment change at graduation. The estimated coefficient is significant at the five
percent level. The mean estimates point in the same direction for two of the three al-
ternative measures, but they are not significantly different from zero on conventional
levels.
These findings give qualified support for empirical Prediction 3 from the theory
section: PhD graduates are more likely to stay in academia if there is a recession
at graduation. At least part of the increased average output of a recession cohort
could therefore come from this “extensive margin” effect. Taking the mean estimates
for unemployment change literally, a member of the cohort on the 90% quantile of
unemployment change at graduation (+1.5%) has a 3.24 percentage points higher
probability to become an academic compared to a PhD student graduating on the
10% quantile (-0.9%). The average propensity to become an academic is 60%.
The theory also predicts that economists who experience a recession at applica-
tion to the PhD are less likely to stay in academia afterwards because some of them
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will enter only because of the recession (Prediction 1). The evidence in Table 2.5
suggests the existence of this effect. The estimated coefficient for unemployment
change is of the predicted sign but not statistically different from zero. Also the pa-
rameter estimates of all other measures are of the predicted sign. For GDP growth
and recession indicators they are significantly different from zero at the ten and the
five percent level, respectively.
More generally, we are not sure how to measure the decision between academia
and business correctly. We think three different concepts of someone being an “aca-
demic” are conceivable: First, one could only consider faculty members of higher
learning institutions as academics. This definition leaves out staff at international
organizations, central banks and other research-focused (governmental) institutions.
Second, one could argue that the relevant distinguishing characteristic of an aca-
demic is producing novel and original research. And finally, one could more generally
consider anyone an academic who works on research-related topics and upholds a
relationship with the academic community.
The evidence reported in Table 2.5 is based on the third notion of an academic
by classifying anyone as such who is either a faculty member or a member of the
American Economic Association (AEA) after the PhD. Table 2.6 additionally reports
the measures of being an academic according to the first two notions.
Column two in this table shows the propensity to become an academic measured
by whether graduates end up as members of faculty at an economics, business or
finance department of a college or university in the United States according to the
listings published by Hasselback (2001). The direction of the effect is the same as in
column one and in the main results table except for unemployment levels. However,
the resulting coefficients are mostly not statistically significant for either point in
time. This might be the case because the employed faculty listings are US focused
and not exhaustive.23
Column three defines an academic as an individual who, according to our data,
publishes at least one article in a ranked scientific journal after his or her PhD.
The estimated effect for the business cycle at application points in the predicted
direction for three out of four measures. The estimated coefficients are significantly
23For example, faculty on leave are not included and we do not have faculty directories for other
departments, such as law and agriculture. Furthermore, our faculty listings are strongly focused
on US institutions. Thus, they miss many foreign graduates who become professors in their home
countries and are members of the American Economic Association.
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Table 2.6: Different Measures for Being Classified as an Academic
Academic Faculty Publish Academic
Unempl Change (Application) -0.89 -0.43 -0.91∗ -1.72∗∗∗
(0.58) (0.47) (0.48) (0.58)
Unempl Change (Graduation) 1.36∗∗ 0.53 0.45 2.87∗∗∗
(0.61) (0.41) (0.40) (0.94)
Unemployment (Application) -0.75 0.08 0.09 -1.23
(0.79) (0.38) (0.40) (1.03)
Unemployment (Graduation) -0.24 0.60 -0.00 -0.07
(0.59) (0.36) (0.40) (0.92)
GDP Growth (Application) 0.47∗ 0.25 0.42∗∗ 0.75∗∗
(0.24) (0.19) (0.19) (0.29)
GDP Growth (Graduation) -0.41 -0.04 0.03 -1.25∗∗∗
(0.27) (0.19) (0.23) (0.36)
Recession (Application) -3.25∗∗ -1.43 -1.65 -5.73∗∗∗
(1.55) (1.06) (1.23) (1.73)
Recession (Graduation) 2.16 1.82∗∗ 1.26 3.95∗∗
(1.28) (0.76) (0.87) (1.67)
Subsample All All All Tier 1
University-Decade Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1068 1068 1068 234
Note.—Standard errors clustered on the graduation year in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
different from zero on the five percent level for unemployment change and for GDP
growth. The business cycle at graduation is weak and not significant for any of the
independent variables.
Column four in Table 2.6 also shows regressions for the propensity to become
an academic (according to our preferred academic measure) for a subsample of
graduates from the six top-ranked universities, i.e. the tier one schools. The effect
here is significant at least on the five percent level and in the predicted direction for
three out of the four business cycle measures. We interpret this as evidence that it
is actually the individuals at the very top of the skill distribution which are most
able to successfully switch back and forth between academia and business and who
thus possess what one could call general skills.
Overall, we conclude that the results lend support to the predictions made by
our theory about the career decisions of PhD graduates.24
24There might be concern about the behavior of foreign students over the business cycle. We
discuss this issue in Appendix B.4.4
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2.4.3 Effect on the Publications of Academics
The last column of Table 2.5 shows the results of regressing the publication output
of individuals classified as academics on our four business cycle measures. The
results here are largely robust to the sample selection according to any of the three
definitions of an academic that were discussed above.
For all the different measures, the productivity of academics who experienced
a recession at time of application is significantly higher than that of academics
who applied during a boom. The coefficient is significant at the one percent level
for unemployment change and of economically relevant magnitude: comparing the
average member of the cohort on the 90% quantile of unemployment change at time
of application to a cohort member on the 10% quantile, the former is on average
10.47 publication points better than the latter. This is about 16% of the mean.25
Column three in Table 2.5 reports the regression coefficients of our measures of
the business cycle on PhD cohorts’ cumulative publication success of an academic
over the first ten years after graduation. In order to obtain a more dynamic picture
of the business cycle’s effect, Figure 2.6 plots the coefficients for unemployment
change at application that we would have obtained if our cumulative publication
measure had been defined for each out of 1 up to 15 years after the PhD instead of
just year 10. According to this figure, the effect of the business cycle at application
on productivity is truly long term: the publication gap between academic cohorts
who experienced a recession versus a boom at application widens monotonously over
time—although the slope seems to slightly flatten after year five or seven.
These findings are in line with Prediction 2 which states that the selection of PhD
entrants is better during economically difficult times and that this better selection
persists to the PhD graduates who stay in academia. In fact, Prediction 2 states
that a generic recession at time of application cohort should first order stochastically
dominate a generic boom at time of application cohort with respect to academic skill.
Therefore, not only the mean but the whole distribution of academic skills should
shift to the right if the economy worsens. Table 2.7 shows the effect of the business
cycle on the distribution of publication output within each cohort using quantile
regressions. The unit of observation is now an individual academic’s publication
25The 10% quantile of unemployment change at time of application is -0.9 percentage points,
the 90% quantile is 1.5 percentage points and the difference is therefore 2.4 percentage points.
Multiplying this difference with the mean estimate of 3.27 yields 7.86. The mean productivity for
an academic is 48.14 publication points.
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Figure 2.6: Long-term effect of the unemployment change at graduation on the
cummulative publication output of the average academic
Note.—The figure shows coefficients from regressing the (cumulative) publication productivity
of an academic for different time-spans on the change in unemployment rate at application,
controlling for the change in unemployment rate at graduation and university-graduation decade
fixed-effects. Since we only observe 15 years of publication history for cohorts graduating before
1990, we use correspondingly shorter publications histories for academics graduating after that.
output.26 Among those PhDs who are considered academics according to our “aca-
demic” measure, 45 percent do not publish at all. We therefore restrict Table 2.7
to the effect of the business cycle on the median of the publication distribution and
above.
The estimates are in the predicted direction and significant for the upper quan-
tiles of the publication distribution, but they become less significant for the lower
quantiles. The reason for this is probably that the “academic” measure is not perfect
at separating academics who do not publish from individuals who have left academia
after the PhD. We know that there are more such individuals among the recession
at application cohort, some of which are thus mistaken as low-skill academics. This
downward-biases the difference between the publication distributions, most strongly
so at the lower quantiles.27
26We only control for university tier–graduation decade fixed effects and their interactions here,
because the quantile estimation becomes much less reliable with a large number of dummy controls.
The standard errors are not clustered on the graduation year level as this is not straightforward
to implement with quantile regressions.
27If we define an academic according to whether he publishes in a ranked journal instead of AEA
membership or appearance in a faculty listing, and thus condition on non-zero publications, our
quantile regressions yield positive and significant effects of unemployment change in line with the
theory over the entire publication distribution.
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Table 2.7: Quantile Regression for the Academic Subsamples
50% 65% 80% 95%
Unempl Change (Application) 0.00 0.31 3.66∗ 9.48∗
(0.49) (1.01) (2.06) (5.70)
Unempl Change (Graduation) -0.00 1.24 3.73∗ 0.70
(0.51) (1.05) (2.14) (5.93)
Unemployment (Application) -0.00 0.69 4.02∗ 11.56∗
(0.53) (1.16) (2.25) (6.14)
Unemployment (Graduation) -0.00 2.71∗∗ 5.09∗∗ 12.13∗∗
(0.49) (1.06) (2.06) (5.61)
GDP Growth (Application) 0.00 -0.32 -1.55∗ -4.80∗
(0.22) (0.46) (0.93) (2.61)
GDP Growth (Graduation) 0.00 -0.06 -1.05 1.65
(0.23) (0.48) (0.97) (2.75)
Recession (Application) 0.00 1.03 6.90 17.12
(1.39) (2.92) (5.90) (16.03)
Recession (Graduation) 0.00 4.87∗ 7.55 -0.93
(1.37) (2.87) (5.80) (15.77)
Subsample Academic Academic Academic Academic
Tier-Decade Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 8248 8248 8248 8248
Note.—Standard errors in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Table 2.5 also reports the effect of the business cycle at graduation on the research
productivity of academics. According to the evidence in section 2.4.2 somewhat
more PhDs enter an academic career if there is a recession at graduation. Without
a specific assumption on the distribution of skills of PhD economists, our theory does
not make a prediction whether the additional academics who enter at the “extensive
margin” are of higher or lower academic skill than the average of those graduates who
always decide to stay in academia after the PhD. However, as discussed in the theory
section, if the number of spaces in academia is not completely flexible at graduation,
there is also an “intensive margin” effect which stems from a higher competitiveness
to enter academia. This improves the composition of talent in academia for cohorts
who faced a recession at graduation.
The empirical results in Table 2.5 are consistent with this idea. The estimated
coefficients are significant at the five percent level for unemployment changes and
levels. They are not significant but in the right direction for GDP growth and the
recession indicators. According to our estimates, an academic graduating on the
90% quantile of unemployment change is on average 6.67 publication points better
than an academic graduating on the 10% quantile. This is about 13% of the mean
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of 48.14. Moreover, if there is an “intensive margin” effect at graduation, it should
be weaker for the elite tier one universities whose students may virtually always be
able to get an academic job if they want to. Indeed, table B.6 in the appendix shows
that the allocation response over the business cycle is stronger for the tier one group
and the productivity effect on tier one academics is insignificant.28
Yet the size of the estimated coefficient for the business cycle at graduation (in
contrast to the coefficient for the business cycle at application) should be interpreted
with caution. As noted above, we are measuring at graduation only the composite
effect of the selection effect and a placement effect within academia. According to
Oyer (2006), students who graduate in a recession receive a worse placement, which
in turn results in fewer publications. This suggests that our estimated coefficient
at graduation is biased towards zero and we are underestimating the quantitative
importance of the selection effect of the business cycle at graduation.29
2.5 Conclusion
Recent studies have shown that aggregate labor market conditions can have strong
and persistent effects on individuals’ careers via the choice of initial jobs. Our article
investigates the implications of this result on the composition of talent and thus on
productivity in a sector. To guide our empirical study, we build a Roy-style model
of occupation choice over the business cycle if the number of workers is fixed in one
occupation and if it is flexible: In the first case, the quality of talent in a relatively
more stable industry increases in recession while in the latter case its size rises and
a quality change depends on the distribution of talent. In the market for economists
we find that recessions indeed increase the publication output of the academic sector
for the long term by altering the allocation of talent between academia and business.
Depending on whether human capital is drawn to sectors with low or high social
value during recessions, this reallocation effect might reinforce or cushion the massive
harm done by a downturn. Moreover, our results indicate that it is easier for the
28The results at graduation could also be driven by graduation timing: if bad students system-
atically delay their graduation, it might result in a positive effect of recessions on publications.
In that case, however, the estimated effect of the business cycle at application is underestimated
and the true effect is even larger. Nevertheless, there is systematic evidence that by and large
no graduation timing takes place: Oyer (2006) finds that there is no correlation of the business
cycle and the size of the graduating cohort. Similarly we find no correlation between graduation
numbers and our business cycle indicators. This result is reported and discussed in Appendix B.3.
29In Appendix B.4.7 we provide empirical evidence for the direction of this bias.
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public sector to attract talented workers during recessions.
A contribution of our article is the theoretical model about talent selection for
absolute and comparative advantage, which gives predictions about talent flows and
the resulting sectoral productivity under both regimes. Comparative advantage has
been dominant in the literature on the Roy model, but absolute advantage, when the
number of jobs is fixed, seems equally relevant: for example, Groes, Kircher, and
Manovskii (2010) show that the dynamics of occupational mobility are explained
better by absolute than relative advantage. Borjas and Doran (2012) find that the
number of faculty positions in mathematics are limited such that a supply shock can
push less talented mathematicians into lower-ranked departments or out of the re-
search community. In his survey of assignment models, Sattinger (1993) argues that
absolute advantage selection often occurs when the resources that workers utilize
for production are scarce and thus have an opportunity cost.
The empirical part of our study provides direct evidence for the impact of the
business cycle on output and productivity due to the reallocation of talent. This
is possible by considering the particular labor market for PhD economists, which
provides a measure of productivity with two important advantages: first, publica-
tions are largely exogenous to the business cycle while wages and output are directly
affected by recessions. Second, publications are easy to attribute to specific individ-
uals and we can assess their quality quite well. In contrast, output in most other
sectors is the result of a collaborative process and therefore it is hard to disentangle
the individual (cohort’s) contribution. The other specific feature of our setting is
its two step selection process with competitive admission and the academic versus
non-academic career choice six years later. At first glance this seems quite unique.
However, early careers in other knowledge-intensive industries are not completely
dissimilar: for example, starting positions in law or consulting firms feature an in-
formal training phase of several years with a performance appraisal and promotion
decision at the end.
If our findings generalize to the labor market as a whole—in this study we are
only looking at a particular labor market at the top of the skill distribution—is left
for future research. An encouraging step in this direction is the recent paper by Shu
(2012), which finds that MIT graduates produce more patents if they graduate dur-
ing a recession. Her paper also uses a Roy-style model of occupational choice. This
points to a broader applicability of our ideas beyond the market of PhD economist.
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However, sensible measures of productivity are much harder to come by in sectors
that are not as transparent and individualized as science.
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Abstract
Using administrative employer-employee data from Germany, I exploit two reduc-
tions of tax breaks for commuting in 2003/4 and 2006/7 to estimate commuting
costs’ effect on the decision to switch job and move house. Standard theory predicts
that higher commuting costs should lead to increased concentration in urban centers.
However, I find that re-matching of existing jobs and houses to reduce commuting
distances is much more prevalent in the data. With these estimates I calculate the
effect of a complete abolition of the tax breaks on overall travel distance, fuel usage,
greenhouse gas emissions, the tax base, and the de-population of the countryside.
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3.1 Introduction
There is an ongoing debate about what are the factors that shape our cities and
determine the use of the land. While theorists in urban economics and economic
geography have developed many interesting models and predictions, causal empirical
evidence is relatively scarce. More specifically, many theories are concerned with
the effect of transport costs on the concentration of individuals and firms within and
between cities, but much of the existing empirics is either descriptive or anecdotal.1
In this paper I provide causal evidence on the effect of an increase in a particular
component of transport costs - commuting costs - on individuals’ location decisions.
I estimate the effect of two reductions in per kilometer tax breaks for commuting
in Germany on employees’ decisions to move house and to switch jobs. Further, I
analyze whether these moves or switches leave employees with a shorter commute
and whether they make them locate their residences or jobs in concentrated loca-
tions, i.e. cities. Theoretical models in urban economics and economic geography are
unanimous in their prediction that higher transport or commuting costs will lead to
increased concentration of economic activity and population. However, these mod-
els are concerned with the long run general equilibrium, while from a public policy
point of view we are also interested in the effect that occurs within a couple of years.
A convincing alternative hypothesis to concentration predicts that higher com-
muting costs will lead to a substantial amount of “re-matching”, which is the process
of occupying existing residential units and jobs differently but not changing their
relative supply or utilization. Assume that some individuals live in location A and
work in B while others work in A and live in B. If commuting costs rise, it becomes
more attractive to live and work in either A or B and some (pairs of) individuals
may now find it optimal to re-match in order to reduce their commuting distance.
A precondition for this hypothesis is that individuals are heterogeneous in their res-
idential preferences and in their productivity in different jobs. I investigate in how
much the response to the tax break changes fits the concentration and in how much
it fits the re-matching hypothesis.
I find that individuals strongly react to higher commuting costs by switching
jobs and moving residence. In my preferred regressions, a 1000 euros reduction
1For a descriptive study, see Bento, Cropper, Mobarak, and Vinha (2005). It has also been
argued that low fuel prices are the main reason for the spread-out shape and the lack of viable
public transport of American cities compared to European ones (Krugman 2008).
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in commuter tax breaks per year, which amounts to about a 300 euro increase in
taxes paid for the average tax payer, leads to a 2.7 percent increased probability to
change job location on average and it leads to a 1.7 percent increased probability
to change residential location. The probability to change job or residence such that
the commuting distance becomes shorter even rises by 8.9 percent.
In addition, there is evidence for both of the theoretical hypotheses in the data.
Individuals become equally more likely to switch jobs from rural to urban locations
as from urban to rural locations. However, they become more likely to move house
from rural to urban locations but they do not become more likely to move house from
urban to rural locations. Thus, on the one hand, there is no further concentration
of jobs in cities due to the tax break changes. On the other hand, individuals’ resi-
dential moves clearly show signs of an increased population concentration in cities,
much as the standard theory predicts. Yet, the concentration effect for residential
moves is substantially smaller than the re-matching effect.
I also do not find an increase of residential property prices in urban areas, which
suggests that it is not inelastic housing supply or occupation rates that prevent
stronger population concentration, but that the tax break changes’ effect on demand
for urban property is weak in the first place. In addition, a more detailed look at
the dynamics of the adjustment shows that the bulk of the effect happens within
two years after the change in commuting costs. This suggests that the short run
effects considered in this paper may not be too different from the long run effects
that the standard theory is concerned with.
Finally, I calculate the effect of the commuting tax breaks on outcomes that are
directly relevant for policy. Assuming that they only have an effect on journeys
via commuting and abstracting from general equilibrium effects (on fuel prices and
congestion, for example), the tax breaks’ hypothetical complete abolition in 2003/04
would have led to about a four percent reduction in the overall number of kilometers
traveled in Germany within a year. Due to this, fuel usage would have declined by
5.2 percent and emissions by 3.4 percent while the effect on the movement from rural
locations to cities would have been negligible. Despite the behavioral response of
switching to job-residence combinations that feature a shorter commute, the increase
in the tax base would have been substantial.2 These results are also informative
2I refrain from comparing the environmental gains to the welfare losses for workers who lose
part of their commuting subsidies as this would require strong assumptions about the distribution
function of alternative work-residence combinations.
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about the potential effects of reductions in similar commuting subsidies that exist
in several other advanced countries such as the Nordic- and the Low Countries,
Austria, Switzerland, Italy, France, and Japan.
My results contribute to several discussions in policy and academia. First, they
show that an increase in commuting costs leads to increased concentration of popula-
tion in cities, but not of jobs. This relates to the debate about the effect of transport
costs and commuting costs in economic geography and in urban economics, respec-
tively. The results also show that the bulk of the adjustment is re-matching, which
requires substantial individual heterogeneity. This relates to the thriving literature
on local labor markets, an important assumption of which is heterogeneity. More-
over, I estimate the effect of the commuting tax break change on overall tax revenues,
fuel usage, greenhouse gas emissions, commuting distance, and the depopulation of
the countryside. This relates to the policy debate about the benefits and costs of the
abolition of this subsidy to commuting. Finally, I show that German employees are
on average more mobile in terms of their jobs than in terms of their residences, which
can be interpreted as that they value their private lives more than their careers.
For my analysis I use a representative two percent sample of all German employ-
ees provided by the Federal Employment Agency. This quarterly updated panel fea-
tures locational information on residence and employment at the municipality level.
I supplement the information with geocodes for all of the ca 12,500 municipalities in
order to calculate commuting distances for each individual in the sample. I exploit
the fact that tax breaks of commuting were reduced substantially at the turn of
2003/4 and again in 2006/7 to estimate the effect of an increase in commuting costs
on individuals’ likeliness to switch job location, move residence location, switch such
that the new combination features a shorter commute, and the commuting distance
itself. Moreover, I estimate in how far the switches constitute relocations toward
one of the 80 cities of more than 100,000 inhabitants in the country.
The paper is related to several strands of literature. First, I contribute to the
ongoing debate about the determinants of land use and urban shape. The standard
monocentric urban model (for example, see Brueckner 1987, Fujita 1989) predicts
that higher commuting costs lead to an increased population concentration near
the urban center and to a steeper rent gradient. Classic economic geography shifts
the focus from locational decisions within cities to between cities (for a survey, see
Moretti 2011), while the new economic geography literature has started to explicitly
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model transport costs and firms’ locational decisions (e.g. Helpman 1998, Redding
and Sturm 2008). In general, all of these models predict that higher transport or
commuting costs should lead to more concentration in terms of population and of
economic activity (i.e. firms). I provide causal evidence for the existence of this
concentration effect for individuals’ residences, but don’t find evidence for it in
terms of jobs.
Second, the more important component of the adjustment to the tax break
changes is what I call re-matching. This constitutes evidence for substantial in-
dividual heterogeneity in terms of productivity in different jobs and in terms of
preferences for residential locations. Heterogeneity of workers is an important as-
sumption of the thriving literature on local labor markets (for example, see the model
in Moretti 2011), but it was considered an important feature of realistic theoretical
models even much earlier (e.g. Michel, Perrot, and Thisse 1996).
Third, there is a policy debate about the effect of gasoline, carbon, and public
transport prices on travel demand, CO2 emissions, household location, commuting
choice and economic activity.3 I show that travel distance, CO2 emissions, and
locational decisions are strongly affected by commuting tax breaks. In general, the
tax break change experiment seems more suited to analyzing the locational impact of
a change in transport or commuting costs than many other experiments: the decline
in the value of a job-residence combination is independent of the chosen transport
mode or of intensive margin responses, such as driving more fuel-efficiently. This
lets me focus on the extensive margin response of moving house or switching job.
Moreover, the tax break changes are arguably fully exogenous to the effect analyzed
- they were decided as part of an across-the-board cut in subsidies due to a dire fiscal
situation - while fuel prices or most public transport investments are endogenous to
travel demand.
Fourth, there is a domestic German debate about the reasons for and against
the abolition of the commuter tax breaks. The claims that such a policy change
would have no effect or only long run effects on peoples’ locational decision (e.g.
Distelkamp, Lutz, Petschow, and Zimmermann 2008, Schulze 2009, Graeb and
3For example, see Ahlfeldt and Feddersen (2010), Bento, Goulder, Jacobsen, and von Haefen
(2009), Knittel and Sandler (2010), Busse, Knittel, and Zettelmeyer (2009), and Li, von Haefen,
and Timmins (2008). A paper that is methodologically related to mine is by Molloy and Shan
(2010), who study the effect of gasoline prices on household location via commuting costs. They
find that construction activity reacts strongly to changes in locations’ relative attractiveness due
to increased transport costs but, just as this paper, find no significant effect on house prices.
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Vorgrimler 2005) are closest related to my analysis. I show that individuals do
react to the decreases in commuting tax breaks and that they do it swiftly - to a
substantial degree even before the changes are implemented. Moreover, I estimate
their effect on the overall reduction in gasoline consumption, emissions, travel dis-
tance, and the tax base. Nonetheless, I make the theoretical argument that the
tax breaks, when they are set at the right level, support efficient matching in the
housing and in the labor market. Environmental and fiscal goals should be pursued
using different policy tools, such as gasoline taxes.4
The fifth group of literature this paper deals with is concerned with job mobility
and the migration decision (most notably, consider Topel and Ward 1992, Bartel
1979). I show that there is a causal effect of pecuniary (i.e. wage) changes for the
current job-residence combination on mobility. Moreover, by observing the strength
of the reaction in terms of moving and in terms of switching jobs, I provide evidence
that the average employee values her residence (and thus her private life) more than
her job.5
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. I explain the data in the next
section. Then I present the theoretical hypotheses about the effect of a reduction
in commuting tax breaks on an individual and an aggregate level as well as the
empirical strategy. Section 3.4 reports and interprets the main results, and section
3.5 estimates effects on variables that are of immediate concern for policy makers.
Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 Data
3.2.1 German Employment Records
The data that I use are a two percent representative sample of the quarterly up-
dated administrative records of all German employees, the so-called “BA employ-
ment panel”, collected by the Federal Employment Agency.6 Employers have to
4Knittel and Sandler (2013) estimate empirically the welfare losses of taxing a variable (com-
muting in our case) that is imperfectly correlated with an externality and find that they are
substantial.
5Again, pinning down the rents from existing work places and residences over alternatives that
might feature a shorter commute would require putting a lot of structure on the distribution of
these combinations in the population and I refrain from it in this paper.
6The weighting of observations as in survey data is not necessary as the sample is representative
of the population of German employees and there is no panel attrition in the sense that workers
only disappear when they cease to be employed in actuality.
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provide quarterly notices about their employees in order for the public administra-
tion to determine entitlements to unemployment insurance and the accumulation of
retirement benefits. The information provided should therefore be highly accurate
and up to date.
The data range from 1999 to 2007 with about 500,000 to 600,000 individuals
per year. They include information on each individual’s age, gender, education,
income, and municipality of work and residence. They also include job and employer
characteristics, such as industry sector and size of the employer and the worker’s
position (e.g. in training, regular worker, or foreman). Unfortunately, there is
no information on home ownership, marital status, children, and place of birth
provided. I also don’t know which individuals are occupying a second home near
their workplace from where they travel to work during the week.
Table 3.1 reports important descriptive statistics on the individuals in the data.
A person stays about seven out of nine years in the dataset on average (so the panel is
quite balanced), she switches job location about 0.9 times and house location about
0.7 times during that period.7 Underlying these averages is substantial heterogeneity
in all the characteristics across individuals as indicated by the reported distribution
quantiles of the variables. Tables 3.3 and 3.2 show that there are about 12,500
municipalities of residence and 10,500 municipalities of workplace in the dataset. Of
course, the size distribution between municipalities is very dispersed with the biggest
municipalities being many times larger than the smallest ones. Moreover the tables
report the number of connections per work or residence municipality, i.e. the number
of different municipalities from- or to which workers commute, respectively.
I supplement the data by adding detailed geographic coordinates (geocodes) for
each municipality, which I retrieved using Google Maps.8 I use this information to
estimate the commuting distance by car (termed cardistance in the following) for
every individual in the dataset.9 The cardistance is the relevant distance between
residence and workplace because the actual tax breaks are calculated according to
7Throughout the paper, I use the female form to refer to females and males alike unless I
specifically make clear that I’m referring to a female only.
8The geocodes were downloaded on 5 May 2010 from http://www.gpsvisualizer.com/
geocoder/ (last accessed 2013-03-11).
9The cardistance estimate was calculated following Einig and Puetz (2007) who use the crow
fly distance between the midpoints of two municipalities and multiply the result by 1.3. The
latter is the average ratio between car- and crow fly distance. Idiosyncratic mistakes in this
approximation method should not matter given the large number of municipality combinations in
the dataset. However, one may imagine a bias for municipalities of large (area) size and the under-
or overestimation of the commuting distance for some of their residents or workers.
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the fastest car distance, although they are granted independent of the actual means
of transport used. Tables 3.4, 3.5, and 3.6 document the distribution of cardistance
in the years 2002, 2004, and 2007. We see that the average cardistance has mostly
been increasing over time, which is also documented in Grau (2009). Therefore,
the identification strategy below will use year fixed effects to control for overall
differences in switching behavior across years.
3.2.2 Commuter Tax Breaks
Tax breaks for commuting apply in most European countries including Germany.10
As early as 1920, the actual costs of traveling to the workplace were acknowledged
in Germany as income-related expenses and thus could be deducted from the income
tax bill. Initially, only the cost of public transport was accepted, but in 1955 the
federal constitutional court allowed each kilometer traveled by car to be deducted
with 0.50 Deutschmark. From the year 2001 onward, a flat rate irrespective of the
means of transport of 0.36 euros for the first ten kilometers and 0.40 euros thereafter
applied.
Over the years, the reduction (or even the full abolition) of these tax breaks
became a constant matter of political debate. The critics, often from the political
left or liberals, argued that the tax breaks are environmentally- and fiscally damag-
ing. The supporters, often politically conservative or with a mandate from a rural
constituency, countered that the tax breaks support rural- and family life, and that
they are enhancing mobility in the labor market because they allow individuals to
travel longer distances to their workplace.
Real change on commuter tax break had to come for another reason—the dire
fiscal situation that the country faced throughout the early 2000s. In September
2003, two powerful state premiers from the big political parties, the conservative
Roland Koch from Hesse and the social democrat Per Steinbrueck from North-Rine
Westphalia, published a joint proposal to cut subsidies across the board in order to
free resources for the government’s budget. The commuter tax breaks were herein
considered as a subsidy and in December an arbitration commission in parliament
10The following historical review for Germany is based on http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Entfernungspauschale#cite_note-21, http://www.pendlerrechner.de/geschichte.shtml,
and the database of parliamentary events http://dipbt.bundestag.de/dip21.web/bt (last ac-
cessed 2013-03-11). For international comparisons see Borck and Wrede (2009) and the references
therein.
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decided to reduce them to 0.30 euros per kilometer from the first of January 2004
onward. The second, and larger, reduction of the subsidies came during 2006 when
the two big parties had formed a formal coalition and the government decided to
abolish the tax breaks starting in 2007 for commutes below 20km. However, on 9
December 2008, the federal constitutional court ruled that this new regulation was
an unequal and inconsistent treatment of citizens before the law and that it was
against the constitution. Hence, the pre-2007 situation was reinstated, but this is
beyond the reach of my dataset, which ends in 2007.
In practice, there have thus been two reductions in the value of a given commute
during my sample period. For individuals who live very close to their workplace this
generally matters less than for individuals who commute long distances, since the
tax break that an individual receives is the oneway cardistance between residence
and workplace times
• 0.36 euros for the first ten kilometers and 0.40 euros thereafter from 1999 to
2003,
• 0.30 euros per kilometer during 2004 to 2006, and
• 0.30 euros per kilometer from kilometer 20 onwards for 2007.
In order to estimate the yearly tax-deductible amount for each worker, I multiply
the resulting amount by 220 workdays per year (Schulze 2009) and divide by 1000
in order to report the tax breaks in thousands of euros.11
Figure 3.1 displays the tax breaks enjoyed by the median, the average, the 90,
and the 95 percentile commuter in terms of cardistance over the years. We see
that the tax breaks follow an upward trend in years where there is no policy change,
which reflects the fact that cardistances generally have been increasing as mentioned
above. However, in the years of policy changes, the tax breaks drop, and they drop
more the longer is the cardistance. The strongest and most equally impacting drop
happens in 2007 when tax breaks are only granted above 20km cardistance. For the
11There is a complication about the tax breaks for the years from 1999 to 2001 because these
were determined as a flat rate only for car commuters while commuters on public transport had to
prove the actual incurred cost. For simplicity, I ignore this issue in my calculations. It should not
distort my results too much, since, according to Grau (2009), the majority of commuters are still
using their cars to travel to the workplace and more than three quarters of commuters of distances
above 25km are using their cars—the group that is most affected by the tax break (changes). I
also ignore slightly lower commuter tax breaks before 2001, when the rate for commutes beyond
10km was 0.36 instead of 0.40 euros.
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longer distance commuters, the overall drop is substantial: the individual at the 95
percentile experiences an overall reduction in tax breaks of almost 1,500 euros per
year.
3.2.3 Strength of the Experiment
Before moving on to the specific empirical predictions, it is helpful to develop a better
understanding of how important the tax break changes are for different individuals
in the sample and thus the strength of the effects that one could reasonably expect.
This discussion and the analysis in the following will be done in euros of tax break
changes rather than the net income gain that they imply. The reason is that marginal
tax rates depend on workers’ marital status as well as other income components and
deductibles, which are not reported in the data. These problems in determining the
marginal tax rate - in addition to the fact that high-earners may react differently
to the same (relative) change in the net euro value of a job-residence combination
than low-earners - also prevents me from using the difference in the net value of tax
break changes for different earnings groups as additional identifying variation in the
estimation below.
For the determination of the strength of the experiment, I start with the net
effect of a 1000 euros tax break change on an average individual.12 If this person
earns 25,000 euros a year and thus faces a marginal tax rate of 30 percent, the tax
break change reduces her net yearly income by 300 euros or by about 2.5 percent. If
she has a planning horizon of 15 years and discounts the future by five percent, this
amounts to a net present value of the change of about minus 3,300 euros. Thus, the
extents of some very common tax break reductions seem already non-negligible.
In further calculations I consider the extent of the tax break changes in relation
to estimated overall costs of commuting, including the time use, and compared
to the variation in annual fuel costs of commuting. I find that the commuter tax
break changes make up about one ninth of overall commuting costs, while the yearly
variation in gasoline costs is generally a fraction of the net value of the tax break
reduction, in particular for the 2006/07 change.13
Another more important consideration is what fraction of my sample actually
12Note that 1000 euros is not excessively high, since all individuals who live more than 20km
away from their workplace in 2006 face a tax breaks reduction of about 1,400 euros.
13For conciseness, I do not report the details of these calculations but they are available upon
request.
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benefits from the tax breaks. In general, any individual who files a tax return can
claim the tax breaks. This should be a very high portion among the individuals
covered by the social security system and thus in the data.14
However, there may be individuals who benefit from the tax breaks but are
systematically not identified in my data as such and vice versa. The former group
could be commuters who live in the same (large) municipality as they work but still
travel a substantial distance to work. In this case, my estimator of the average effect
of a tax break change would be upward biased because I attribute a given overall
effect to a too small treated group. The latter group may be individuals who work
part time, who have a second home near their workplace from which they commute,
who do not earn enough to pay taxes at all, or who do not exceed a general annual
allowance of income related expenses of currently 920 euros.15 The existence of
these groups downward-biases my estimate of the average treatment effect of the
tax break change.
3.3 Theoretical Hypotheses and Empirical Strat-
egy
In this section, I first derive individual-level predictions and then aggregate impli-
cations. The third part presents the empirical strategy.
3.3.1 Micro-Level Predictions
Consider an individual i who currently works at job (location) w and lives at resi-
dence (location) r but who is aware of all the other latent jobs and residences that
are available to her. Assume her utility to be additively separable in money, more
exactly, tax break euros. I can then write
ui(r, w) = vi(r, w) + TB(rw), (3.1)
14According to the Federal Statistics Office, out of 35.7million employees, 30.3million considered
themselves commuters in 2004.
15http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Werbungskostenpauschbetrag (last accessed 2013-03-11).
Kloas and Kuhfeld (2003) from the German Institute for Economic Research (DIW) provide a
more complete list of such cases and estimate that they constitute about 0.5 percent of total
employment. Also, there is a maximum annual claimable amount of commuter tax breaks (4,500
euros in December 2010).
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where vi(r, w) is the non-tax break component of utility including the disutility
of commuting and the gross tax break TB(wr) is an increasing function of the
commuting distance and the tax break rate per kilometer. Clearly, when the tax
break rate per kilometer falls or when tax breaks are abolished for the first 20
kilometers, latent combinations of work and residence that feature shorter commutes
than w and r will become relatively more attractive.
Note that the components of equation (3.1) should be interpreted as flows for
a correct utility maximization via choosing the highest ui(r, w): the tax breaks
TB(rw) occur every year that the person lives and works in the work-residence
combination r, w) and accordingly vi(r, w) is the flow utility per year in this combi-
nation.
Figure 3.2 illustrates how the relative attractiveness of combinations changes
with the commuting distance for the specific policy changes of 2003/4 and 2006/7.
In the case of 2003/4, the relative change in tax breaks is higher the larger is the
difference between the two commuting distances. A proportional relationship also
holds for the combinations within 20 kilometers for the 2006/7 change, but thereafter
the relative attractiveness doesn’t change any further. This is because, for example,
a commute of 30 kilometers has lost the same money value as a commute of 50
kilometers.
The valuations of the currently chosen and the latent job-residence combinations
fluctuate all the time for every individual,16 but from figure 3.2 I would expect them
to fluctuate more when changes in commuting tax breaks occur. The reason is that
these changes add to the “normal” variation in relative valuations by making short
cardistance combinations relatively more attractive compared to long cardistance
combinations. I would thus expect that individuals are more likely to switch jobs
and/or residence in years where commuting tax breaks fall. Moreover, they are more
likely to switch in a way such that the new cardistance is shorter.
It is also interesting to understand whether individuals are more likely to react
to tax break changes by changing job or by changing residence. On the one hand,
it provides evidence on the causal effect of pecuniary changes for the current job or
residence location on the likeliness to switch job or to move house. This is of interest
in relation to the job mobility and migration literature (see, for example, Bartel
1979, Topel and Ward 1992) and location-based policies, which have a rationale if
16This is the reason for the turnover in jobs and residences that we observe in the data.
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individuals are geographically immobile to a substantial degree (see the discussion in
Moretti 2011). On the other hand, it reveals what the average person values more:
her residence location, and thus a significant part of her private life, or her job? More
precisely, the coefficient on the tax break change in the regressions on the likeliness
to switch jobs or move residence will provide me with the fraction of individuals
for whom the difference in the value of the current job or residence over the best
alternative job or residence is less than a constant (prob(u(w, r) − u(w′, r) < c)
and prob(u(w, r) − u(w, r′)) < c).17 Note that the differences u(w, r) − u(w′, r)
and u(w, r)− u(w, r′) are actually rents. Thus, I can examine whether the average
individual has a higher valuation of her current house or her job over the best
alternative, or, equivalently, whether she is more job- or residentially mobile.
I construct outcome variables to analyze the predictions on the individual level:
four indicators which assume the value of one if, from the previous to the current
year, the individual concerned changes her location of workplace (Work Switch),18
her location of residence (Residence Switch), either of those (Any Switch), or she
switches such that she ends up with a shorter commute (Closer Switch). Moreover,
I construct the change in cardistance from the previous to the current year (Cardis-
tance Ch). If individuals behave like hypothesized in equation (3.1) and figure 3.2,
and if moving costs are not prohibitively high compared to the money value of the
tax break change, I would expect that the tax break changes make it more likely
that the indicator variables assume the value of one. Moreover, the average change
in cardistance should turn out more negative.
Table 3.7 provides the means per worker for the indicator outcome variables in
the year 2002, while tables 3.4, 3.5, and 3.6 describe the distribution of the change
in cardistance in general and conditioning on a change occurring for the years 2002,
2004, and 2007. We see that, per year, almost 14.9% of individuals change their job
location and 12.1% change residence location. Overall, they switch 18.4% of times
17In fact, as I argue below, it provides me with a lower bound on that fraction.
18If I were interested in job mobility without the geographical component, it would be preferable
to examine the effect of the tax break changes on whether individuals change the establishments
they work instead of looking at whether they change their municipality of workplace. I don’t
report these alternative regressions here because I am indeed focusing on the locational impacts.
Nonetheless, the direction of the effect on establishment switches is the same as the ones for the
work (location) switch, though the magnitude is somewhat lower.
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while they switch closer only 5.6% of times.1920 Tables 3.4, 3.5, and 3.6 support this
last point, showing that most of the switches are resulting in longer cardistances.
3.3.2 Macro-Level Predictions
The previous section has shown that, ceteris paribus, the reduction in commuter tax
breaks should make every employee weakly prefer a shorter work-residence combina-
tion. According to standard theory in urban economics and in economic geography,
this shift in aggregate demand for a short commute should lead to increased con-
centration of population and economic activity.
First, the Alonso-Mills model in the urban economics literature (e.g., see Brueckner
1987, Fujita 1989) focuses on the spatial equilibrium for one city with a central
business district in which all firms are exogenously concentrated and around which
consumers locate. If commuting costs rise, demand for more central locations of res-
idence increases, which drives up their relative price and the rent gradient (the ratio
between rents in the urban center and the periphery) becomes steeper. Further, if
housing supply is not completely inelastic, either because of variable lot sizes or the
possibility of construction of new houses, the population density close to the center
will increase (concentration).
Second, classic economic geography a la Rosen-Roback (see Roback 1982, Moretti
2011) shifts the focus from locational decisions within cities to between cities. Again,
there exists a spatial equilibrium in which the marginal consumer-worker is indif-
ferent between locations. Transport costs, which are the equivalent to commuting
costs in urban economics, are only introduced explicitly in the new economic ge-
ography literature. For example, Helpman (1998) proposes a general equilibrium
model in which different cities are characterized by an exogenously given amenity
(i.e. housing stock), and firms and individuals optimally locate under agglomeration
19These numbers seem quite high and I can only speculate why this is the case. One potential
reason may be mis-recording postcodes for work or residence municipalities in some years which is
corrected in other years and thus increases the measured job and residence turnover. Whatever the
reason, if the upward-bias in measurement of the switches variables is unrelated to the explanatory
variables in the regressions below, this should not be a problem.
20There also seem to be more changes in job- and work locations in 2005 than in other years. I
have searched for explanations for this myself and I enquired about it at the Institute for Employ-
ment Research. I found that in 2005 the distinction between East- and West Berlin was abolished
and thus municipality assignments have changes. Also, there might have been some updating of
employee information from part of employers because there were administrative changes in the
pension insurance system. At this stage, there is no reason for me to believe that these changes
should be systematically and substantially correlated with the tax break changes of individuals.
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economies and transport costs. If transport costs increase, the new equilibrium is
characterized by a stronger concentration of individuals and firms in the locations
which have more housing stock. Redding and Sturm (2008) generalize this model
by endogenizing the housing stock, but the concentration implication remains.
Yet, there exists a convincing alternative hypothesis to the concentration pre-
diction on how the adjustment to a rise in commuting costs may look like. Assume
individuals are heterogeneous in terms of their residential preferences and in their
productivity in different jobs. It may then be the case that some of them live in
municipality A and work in B, while others work in A and live in B. If commuting
costs rise, it becomes more attractive to live and work in either A or B and some
(pairs of) individuals who were sufficiently close to indifference initially may now
find it optimal to re-match in order to reduce their commuting distance. I term this
the “re-matching” hypothesis.
A key feature of the re-matching hypothesis is that existing residential units
and jobs are occupied in a different way but their relative supply or utilization is
unchanged. It also requires sufficient heterogeneity in individuals’ locational pref-
erences - maybe because they strongly value the place where they grew up - and
in job match quality. This further implies that there exist rents for the current
job-residence match and not every worker-consumer is exactly indifferent between
locations or the distance that she lives from the urban center as in the homogeneous
version of the spatial equilibrium.21
I expect the existence and the relative strength of the concentration and the
re-matching effect to depend on several key factors. First, if housing supply or
occupation rates of the existing housing stock (lot sizes in the terminology of urban
economics) are elastic, many individuals will be able to move to urban centers where
jobs are disproportionately located.22 This leads to a strong effect on population
concentration and we may also see more concentration of jobs in urban centers.23
Second, if housing supply or lot sizes are inelastic, the higher demand for more
21In his survey paper, Moretti (2011) argues that heterogeneity and rents are an economically
important feature of reality and he incorporates them into his generalized spatial equilibrium
model.
22Occupation rates may also adjust if there are search frictions in the housing market and thus
there exists a natural rate of vacancies which is affected by the change in demand.
23Employers might however be located in the center already so that no further adjustment on this
margin is possible. Moreover, an employer’s commuting distance minimization problem is much
more complicated than the one of an employee, because the employer has to take into account the
commuting distances of all of her employees.
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central locations will be absorbed into prices, and property prices in urban areas
will rise while concentration will hardly be affected. In terms of the re-matching
hypothesis, I expect to see a lot of it if jobs are located in diverse municipalities and
if individuals are sufficiently heterogeneous such that there is a lot of scope for re-
matching while not being too heterogeneous such that rents are not unsurpassably
high. Finally, the concentration hypothesis is an implication from long run general
equilibrium models, while the time frame of adjustment that can be considered in
this paper is only two years. Re-matching may be much easier during a short period
because, by definition, it does not need the housing stock or lot sizes to adjust.
I construct variables that take the value of one if an individual changes job or
residence location from a non-urban municipality to one of the 80 cities with more
than 100,000 inhabitants, i.e. Work Switch Urban and Residence Switch Urban, and
the value of minus one if they do the opposite switch, i.e. Work Switch Rural and
Residence Switch Rural.24 If the hypothesized concentration effect is at work in
my dataset, I would expect positive coefficients on the tax break change regressor
for the Work Switch Urban and Residence Switch Urban outcome variables and less
positive, or negative, coefficients on Work Switch Rural and Residence Switch Rural.
Table 3.7 reports that only a small fraction of overall job switches or house moves
are switches from a rural to an urban municipality or vice versa.
3.3.3 Empirical Strategy
In order to examine the causal impact of changes in tax breaks on individuals’
locational decisions, and thereby assess the empirical value of the two hypotheses, I
run the following general regression:
location change = β ∗ tax break change + γ ∗ controls +  (3.2)
A unit of observation in this regression is an individual in a given year. Location
change on the left hand side of the equation refers to the different outcome variables
defined above, while tax break change refers to the change in tax breaks for an
individual’s work-residence combination.
One important feature that I have to control for in the regression is the cardis-
24The list of cities with more than 100,000 inhabitants is fromWikipedia http://en.wikipedia.
org/wiki/List_of_cities_in_Germany_with_more_than_100,000_inhabitants (last accessed
2013-03-11).
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tance of last year’s work-residence combination. This is because individuals who
have a high value of commuting distance are generally more likely to change lo-
cation and the commuting distance is mechanically related to the change in tax
breaks, since the latter is calculated using the former. In my main regressions I
prefer to be conservative and to include municipality combination fixed effects to
account for this.25 I also include year fixed effects to account for general differ-
ences in the likeliness to change location between different years. My identification
thus relies on a systematically different likeliness to change location for individuals
in far-distance municipality combinations relative to individuals in short-distance
municipality combinations around the tax break change years.
In some of the regressions I even include an interaction of individual fixed effects
together with the municipality fixed effects so that the identification relies solely on
individuals who do move or switch from the respective municipality. This is because
those individuals who don’t change location during the sample period are absorbed
by the individual-municipality-combination fixed effect. Hence, I can separately
examine the tax break changes’ effect on the direction and timing of existing moves.
In order for regression (3.2) to identify the average treatment effect of the tax
break change on an individidual’s location change,26 the following assumption needs
to hold: There is no other factor than the tax break change that affects the rela-
tive likeliness of location changes for far-distance municipalities compared to short-
distance municipalities over different years. One such factor may be gasoline prices,
which I control for explicitly in the regressions. Other control variables that are
less central for claiming causality of the regression coefficient, but are nonetheless
included in the regression, are dummies for age quartiles, income quartiles, plant
size quartiles and the individual’s position in the job.
One concern for the causal interpretation of the estimates themselves may be
that it is not clear how far in advance individuals expect the tax break changes to
happen. The regression results in the next section show that some of them anticipate
tax break reductions by moving in the preceding year - even before the contemplated
changes were finally decided. However, the optimal response in terms of minimizing
25This is only possible because my dataset is truly large so that I have enough realized munici-
pality combinations for statistical inference.
26In fact, this is potentially a short run general equilibrium effect because many individuals are
hit by the tax break decrease which may systematically affect fuel prices and wages even in the
short run. For simplicity and because the overall size of changes are not large enough to impose
it, I abstract from general equilibrium effects in this paper.
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the negative impact is to a first degree independent of the information release about
the policy change: ideally, one would want to move at the 31st of December before
the new rules come into effect. Therefore, the timing of information release should
not constitute a major problem for the causal interpretation of the estimated effects.
Before getting to the presentation of the empirical results, it is important to ex-
plain the construction and the timing of the outcome and the explanatory variables:
In terms of the outcome variables, I consider every individual’s work-residence com-
bination in the fourth quarter of each year and compare it to the combination in the
fourth quarter of last year to calculate the switches and the change in cardistance.
In terms of the regressors, unless a switch took place, I do not know which specific
work-residence combination an individual considered an attractive alternative to the
prevailing work-residence combination last year. Therefore, I cannot calculate the
relative money worth change between the two combinations as a regressor. Instead,
I rely on calculating the change in the tax break worth of last year’s combination
that occurred at the last turn of the year (“TB Ch”) and that occurs at the next
turn of the year (“TB Ch (Next Yr)”) just after the fourth quarter that the obser-
vation refers to. The coefficient on the “TB Ch” regessor captures the effect of the
tax break change last year on location change between last year and this year while
the coefficient on “TB Ch (Next Yr)” captures the effect of the tax break change
this year, i.e. on an anticipatory move. Figure 3.3 illustrates using a timeline when
the respective regressors may assume values different than zero (they are negative
then, as tax breaks only decline during the sample period).
3.4 Regression Results
In this section I first present the results from the individual-level regressions and
then discuss their implications in light of the concentration and the re-matching
hypothesis.
3.4.1 Individual-Level Results
I start by estimating regression equation (3.2) for the likeliness to switch jobs, switch
residence, switch either, and to switch closer using a linear probability model. The
results of my preferred specification with municipality combination fixed effects are
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displayed in table 3.8. The change in gasoline cost for the cardistance this year and
next year as well as dummies for years, age quartiles, income quartiles, plant size
quartiles, and the individual’s position in the job are included as control variables
throughout. Standard errors are clustered on the municipality combination level.
We see from the table that the tax break change for last year’s cardistance
between this year and last year has a statistically significant and positive effect
on the likeliness to switch or move this year as well as last year. Individuals are
also more likely to switch closer. This is all in accordance with the individual-level
predictions from section 3.3.1: individuals are supposed to be more likely to move
and switch jobs when tax breaks change and they are more likely to do so in order
for the resulting cardistance to be shorter. They also engage in anticipatory moves
and switches in the sense that some of them switch already in the run up to a tax
break change at the turn of the year.
Moreover, the effect on switching closer in column four is stronger than the overall
effect on switching in column three. This is as one would expect because increases in
commuting costs should encourage switches that lead to a shorter cardistance while
at the same time discouraging switches that lead to a longer cardistance. Thus, when
tax breaks for commuting fall, the number of shortening switches should increase
more than the overall number of switches.27
Next, I examine the magnitude of the effect. A tax break change of 1000 euros -
the net equivalent of this for an average individual is about 300 euros - increases the
likeliness of switching jobs, moving house, switching either, and switching closer by
about 0.4, 0.2, 0.5, and 0.5 percentage points, respectively. Given that the averages
of these variables are 14.9, 12.1, 18.4, and 5.6 percent, a 1000 euros tax break change
increases the likeliness to switch jobs, move house, switch either, and switch closer by
2.7, 1.7, 2.7, and 8.9 percent, respectively. Thus, the effect of the tax break change
is significant statistically and in magnitude, and it is strongest for the likeliness to
switch closer as we should expect.
Tables 3.9 and 3.10 rerun the main regressions replacing the municipality com-
bination fixed effects by individuals within municipality combination fixed effects
and last year’s cardistance as the main controls, respectively. The results are quite
27It also suggest that the following general equilibrium effect, though plausible, is not of great
empirical importance: some long-cardistance combinations become more attractive (possibly be-
cause of lower rents or house prices) for people who are not affected very much by the tax break
change (possibly because of a low marginal tax rate).
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similar but somewhat stronger. As mentioned above, in the case of individual mu-
nicipality combination fixed effects, the variation exploited only comes from individ-
uals who do move or switch from the respective municipality. Thus, the tax breaks
not only induce new switches or prevent distance-increasing moves that otherwise
would have happened, but they also influence the direction or the timing of existing
switches. We also see that the coefficient on either work or residence switches is
now strictly smaller than the coefficient on the closer switches. This implies that
the tax break changes prevent or postpone some longer-distance switches on top of
encouraging additional shorter-distance switches.
The effect of changes in fuel prices on switching decisions turns out very inconclu-
sive in the tables. This may not be very surprising. First, individuals continuously
change their expectations about future fuel prices and price changes affect them im-
mediately, contrary to tax break changes. Thus, when new information is revealed,
they may find it optimal to move right away. Such an adjustment process can hardly
be fully captured by the yearly average gasoline price changes included in my regres-
sions. Second, individuals have different margins of adjustment to a gasoline price
change - such as driving less, changing transport mode, or engaging in car sharing -
that are not available in the case of a tax break change and that may be preferred
to moving or switching job. In fact, the recent literature in transport economics and
in environmental economics finds strong effects of gasoline price changes on driving
behavior, new car purchases, and vehicle scrappage decisions (see Li, von Haefen,
and Timmins 2008, Bento, Goulder, Jacobsen, and von Haefen 2009, Knittel and
Sandler 2010).
From table 3.8 we see that the number of individuals who switch jobs in response
to a tax break change is higher than the number who move residence. As mentioned
above, the likeliness that the average person’s flow valuation of her job over the
next best alternative is below 300 euros (tax breaks of 1000 euros) is about 0.4
percent while the corresponding likeliness for her residence is about 0.2 percent.28
Thus, there are much less individuals who derive a relatively low utility rent from
their current house than there are individuals who derive a relatively low utility rent
from their current job. I interpret this as evidence that the average person values
28These numbers are strictly lower bounds because in fact only the relative attractiveness of
combinations with a shorter cardistance increases in response to the tax break reduction. Moreover,
the relative attractiveness of combinations that feature a non-zero cardistance does not rise by the
full 300 euros because tax breaks for these combinations themselves fall.
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her residence (location) more than her job (location).
In principle, one could use this information to try to determine the distribution
of- or the average rents from existing work places and residences in the population.
However, this would require strong functional form assumptions and strong assump-
tions about which alternative work-residence combinations individuals are aware of
or, equivalently, the combinations’ arrival rates in a search model. I thus refrain
from such an exercise in this paper.
I conclude from this discussion that the tax break changes for some individuals
are substantial enough to change their preferred job-residence combination and to
raise the utility differential between the old and the new combination above potential
fixed costs of moving house or switching job. Moreover, the direction of the effect
turns out as expected. Finally, the average individual seems much more likely to be
willing to switch jobs rather than to move house in response to a fixed change in the
value of her current combination, which can be interpreted as a higher valuation of
her private life than her job.
3.4.2 Concentration Versus Re-matching
In order to understand how much of the overall adjustment to the tax break changes
stems from concentration versus re-matching, I need to examine to what extent the
effect leads to rural-to-urban and urban-to-rural moves.
Table 3.11 reports the results of the regressions that address this question.29
We see that individuals are significantly more likely to switch their jobs and their
residences from a rural to an urban location. They are equally likely to switch
jobs from an urban to a rural location whereas the tax break reduction leads to a
much weaker increase in urban-to-rural relocations of residence. Furthermore, the
magnitude of each of the effects is a fraction of the overall adjustment reported in
table 3.8.
The last observation indicates that the re-matching effect in terms of job as
well as residence relocation is much stronger than potential concentration effects.
Indeed, the concentration effect for jobs seems to be non-existent because there are
as many induced urban-to-rural moves as there are rural-to-urban moves. As the
overall distribution of jobs between rural and urban locations remains unchanged,
29The results are again similar but somewhat stronger when using individual-municipality com-
bination fixed effects or cardistance as controls instead of municipality combination fixed effects.
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these switches should therefore be considered as rematches. In terms of residential
relocations, there seems to be a concentration effect, since more individuals are
induced to move into cities than are induced to switch in the opposite direction.
What does this imply about the empirical validity of the urban and the economic
geography models in the short run? First of all, jobs do not get more concentrated,
potentially because they are already to a great degree located in urban centers or
because minimizing the overall commuting distance of their employees is simply
too complicated and costly for employers.30 Therefore, the assumption of the vast
majority of models that firms are exogenously located in the central business district
seems to be harmless.
A stronger concentration effect on residential switches may be restrained either
because the demand for relocating toward urban areas is not strongly affected by the
tax break changes or because the supply of housing stock and the occupation rates
are not very flexible in cities. According to the standard theory, the latter reason
would imply a substantial increase in the relative price of existing urban housing
stock. I examine this.
Figure 3.4 plots the relative property price index for big and medium-sized cities
compared to the overall property price index for old and new flats and houses.31
There seems to be a general upward trend in the relative price of flats in cities and
a u-shape for houses in cities, but it is hard to see any effect on prices around the
time of the tax break changes, 2003/04 and 2006/07. A set of formal regression
analyses with different specifications in order to account for the time trend also fail
to discover a relationship.32 I abstain from reporting these regressions in the paper
for conciseness.33
30It seems that the latter explanation might be the more relevant one since we do observe
individuals switch their jobs from urban to rural locations.
31The data were downloaded from the Bank for International Settlements website http://www.
bis.org/statistics/pp.htm on 17 November 2010. Property prices seem to be a better measure
of the effect on the housing market than rental rates because of two reasons. First, rent increases
within a short time frame (like one or two years) are restricted by law for privately used properties
in order to protect tenants. Second, property prices should factor in the whole net present value
of the effect, including the short as well as the long run.
32The non-findings of an effect of the tax break changes in property prices are also robust to
using property price indices for big cities instead of big and medium-sized cities and for rural areas
instead of an overall price index.
33Given that I find hardly any effect of the tax break changes on relative property prices, the
tiny effect on moving residence from an urban to a rural location should stem from re-matching:
either because the employer is located in the rural area that the person is moving to, or the rural
area is better connected to the urban area where the employer is located than the previous urban
area.
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Although there may be other reasons why urban versus rural property prices do
not visibly react to the tax break changes,34 the overall message from the results
above seems to be that the relative demand for urban locations is not very strongly
affected. This implies that re-matching is much more important as a channel of
adjustment to increased commuting costs than concentration. It further implies
that the assumptions underlying the re-matching hypothesis seem to be economically
meaningful: individuals are substantially heterogeneous in terms of their locational
preferences as well as how productive they are in different jobs. Moreover, there
exist rents for the currently occupied job-residence combinations.
So far this analysis has not focused on the dynamics of the adjustment because
it only considers the overall switches in the years before and after the tax break
changes take effect. Yet, it is interesting to understand better how fast people react
and in how much their movements precede or follow the changes. Further, the
dynamics of the adjustment might inform us on the long run effect of changes in
commuting costs or transport costs more generally. Unfortunately, in this data, I
cannot analyze longer time periods than two years, because there is a new policy
change coming up in 2006/07 for the 2003/04 change and the available data end in
2007. Moreover, even if it were possible to observe a longer time series of the data,
it is unclear if this by itself were much more informative. The reason is because the
effects of the tax break changes might be contaminated by other substantial long
run shifts that affect land use and urban shape.
Therefore, I separate the available time periods into smaller units instead of of
looking at longer horizons. Table 3.12 reports the regression results for the effect on
the switches for quarters around the tax break changes.35
We see that individuals react already in the first quarter of the year of the change
by moving house or switching jobs indicated by the coefficient on “TB Ch Q1 (Next
Yr)”. The effect then grows until the 5th or 6th quarter (“TB Ch Q1 (Last Yr)” and
“TB Ch Q2 (Last Yr)”) after the tax break change before it drops back to zero.36
34Foremost, there might be institutional reasons which prevent prices to reflect supply and
demand in the German property market in the short run. For example, rental rate adjustment
is very constrained due to laws that protect (private) tenants from high raises. If property prices
reflect the net present value of rental income, this should dampen the adjustment to a tax break
change. In general, it is a widely held point of view that the German property market is not very
free.
35The results are again similar but somewhat stronger when using individual-municipality com-
bination fixed effects or cardistance as controls instead of municipality combination fixed effects.
36Note that the coefficients for the tax break change last year, i.e. quarters five to eight, are
based solely on the 2003/04 change and might therefore not reflect the average adjustment to both
120
This seems to indicate that most of the adjustment happens in the short term
already. Alternatively, it may simply take very long for housing supply to change,
but the change might be continuous and small in the subsequent periods, so that
we have a strong and visible effect of mostly re-matching and some concentration
in the short term and a continuous and small per quarter effect on concentration
via new housing supply in the medium and the long term. The lack of an effect on
property prices casts doubt on this second explanation, however.37
3.5 Implications for Public Policy
Up to this point, the discussion has ignored the effect of the tax break reduction
on the average distance commuted. The reason for this neglect was that estimation
of equation (3.2) with (the change in) cardistance on the left-hand side is in fact
biased in panels with a short time dimension and fixed effects (Nickell 1981), and
the focus of the analysis was on the causal identification of the treatment effect of
the tax break change.38
However, in this section I want to focus on the implications that the tax break
change has for policy-relevant variables such as fuel consumption, CO2 emmissions,
and tax payments and revenues. Therefore, I need its effect on the commuting
distance in the first place. Table 3.13 reports this information. The first column
reports the preferred regression with municipality fixed effects as controls. On aver-
age, a one thousand euro decrease in tax breaks leads to an overall decrease on the
commuting distance of about 0.79 kilometers (summing the coefficients on “TB Ch”
and “TB Ch (Next Yr)”). This is about a decrease of one thirtieth of the average
cardistance in the sample according to tables 4-6.
Compared to column (1) in table 3.13, the second column distinguishes between
the tax break changes in 2003/4 and those in 2006/7 and the third and fourth
column examine the change in cardistance conditioning on the event that a switch
takes place. We see that the 2006/7 tax break changes seem to have had more than
double the impact on the commuting distance than the 2003/4 tax break changes.
events.
37Yet, Moretti (2011), in his survey paper, quotes studies that find that the adjustment to local
demand shocks take around 10 years.
38Nickell’s result is that in short panels with lagged dependent variables and individual fixed
effects the lagged dependent variables are correlated with the component of the observation’s error
term that is constant over time.
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Moreover, conditioning on the event that a switch takes place, the impact on the
distance is (unsurprisingly) very high: a 1,000 euro tax break change makes the
switch lead to a more than four kilometer lower commuting distance.
I want to consider the effect on the commuting distance and fuel usage in three
scenarios of tax break changes: the actual reductions of 2003/4 and 2006/7 as well
as a hypothetical complete abolition of tax breaks in 2003/04. Table 3.14 lists the
preferred coefficient of 0.79 kilometers lower cardistance for a 1,000 tax break change
together with further information that is used and the respective sources. Using the
average tax break changes of 0.5 thousand euros in 2003/4 and 0.6 thousand euros in
2006/7 as well as the average overall tax break in 2003 of 2.3 thousand euros, I arrive
at an overall effect of the three scenarios of a decline in the average annual commute
of 0.40, 0.47, and 1.82 kilometers, respectively. This is displayed in the first row
of table 3.15.39 Using the average number of workdays per year, the fact that the
above distance is just oneway, and the total number of employees, the effect of the
three scenarios of tax break changes on the overall cardistance commuted becomes
6,714, 8,124, and 30,886 million kilometers, respectively. These are 0.98, 1.18, and
4.53 percent of the 690 billion kilometers traveled in the country overall per annum.
In order to compute the estimated fuel savings for the whole economy in terms
of liters and money value, I assume that every commuter goes to work by (gasoline
engine) car by herself. The estimates in the following should thus be interpreted
as an upper bound, since going by car is known to be the most fuel-intensive and
CO2 emitting transport mode.40 Using the data on the average fuel consumption
and the fuel price in the respective years from table 3.14, the amount of fuel saved
becomes 537, 626, and 2,471 million liters, and 577, 793, and 2,654 million euros,
respectively (see table 3.15). Overall, the country-wide fuel usage in the transport
sector is 48 billion liters per year, hence a full abolition of commuter tax breaks in
2003/04 would have reduced fuel usage in the transport sector by up to 5.2%.
These savings in fuel consumption also have an effect on the emission of green-
house gases, notably CO2. Burning one liter of gasoline generates about 2.32 kilo-
gram of carbon dioxide, hence the tax break changes reduce emissions by an esti-
39Note that there is no incentive for an “intensive margin” of adjustment (apart from an income
effect), since the tax breaks are independent of transport modes, car sharing, or the actual distance
traveled per journey.
40Yet, note that this assumption is in fact not very extreme since about two thirds of all com-
muters use the car (Grau 2009).
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mated 1.25, 1.45, and 5.73 tonnes. Using data on European Union emission rights
trading between firms, the market would price this at “only” 12.96, 9.36, and 59.62
Mio euros of environmental savings.41 In terms of overall emissions in passenger
traffic, the tax breaks lead to an emission reduction of 0.74, 0.94, and 3.39 percent,
respectively.
While the impact of the tax break change on kilometers traveled, fuel burnt, and
greenhouse gases emitted seems unambiguously positive, its expansionary effect on
the tax base may be good news for the exchequer but not for the taxpayer. Using
the respective formulae to calculate the tax breaks before and after the changes in
2003/04 and 2006/07, the first row in table 3.16 provides the average per person
reduction for the old cardistance, i.e. without taking into account individuals’ re-
action to the change. As individuals switch their workplace and residence closer
together, the claimable tax breaks decrease even further or, to put it from the ex-
chequer’s perspective, the tax base rises even further. Row two of the table displays
this effect.42 Overall, the tax base per year increases by 21, 26, and 98 billion euros,
respectively, helped by individuals’ behavioral responses of moving residence and
job location in order to reduce commuting distances. This is a substantial amount
and assuming that the average marginal income tax rate is around 30 percent, it
provides the government with additional tax revenues of 6.3, 7.8, and 27 billion
euros, respectively.43
Conservative commentators and politicians have argued for a long time that the
commuter tax breaks serve the purpose of supporting and preserving life on the
countryside. Indeed, the results in table 3.11 show that the tax break changes make
individuals more likely to move from rural areas to urban areas more than they make
them engage in the opposite move. Yet, the concentration effect is only 0.1 percent
per 1000 euros tax break change. Thus, even tax breaks’ hypothetical full abolition
in 2003/04 would have increased the likeliness to move from the countryside to a
city of more than 100,000 inhabitants by just 0.23 percentage points temporarily.
41There is widespread criticism claiming that the practice of allocating a large number of emission
rights to firms for free leads to a too low price for the emission rights. Therefore, the above numbers
might severely underestimate the true social benefits from the carbon emissions reduction.
42In order not to have to deal with the exact distribution of cardistances for the 2006/07 change,
I assume that all the individuals are in fact able to claim positive tax breaks for every kilometer, i.e.
I ignore the 20km with zero tax breaks. Therefore, the estimated effect again should be considered
an upper bound of the true effect.
43In addition to the changing commuting distances, wages might respond to in general equilib-
rium which would affect tax revenues. The direction and the extent of such an effect is hard to
assess without putting a lot of specific structure on the problem, however, and from which I refrain.
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This effect can hardly be termed as “landflight”.
Despite all the positive effects on the environment and travel expenses that
the reduction in tax breaks seemed to have, I cannot make a normative statement
whether it was “beneficial”. In fact there is a sound economic justification for the
commuter tax breaks:
Suppose that one can split up the overall utility u(r, w) from a each job-residence
match into all other benefits b(r, w) and commuting costs c(r, w). It is then efficient
for every individual to choose
u(r∗, w∗) = b(r∗, w∗)− c(r∗, w∗) = max{u(rj, wk)}
for all j, k. If proportional income taxation is used, in order not to distort the choice
of efficient job-residence matches, the tax rate should be applied to the commuting
costs as well, i.e. (1 − t)[b(r, w) − c(r, w)]. Individuals should thus be allowed to
deduct the exact commuting costs from their gross taxable income. More generally,
in order to preserve efficient matches, proportional income taxation should only be
applied to the “rent” from these matches.
If it is very costly and subject to fraud to have each individual prove their
exact commuting costs to the tax authorities, a tax break that reflects the average
costs per kilometer traveled may be a second best solution to this problem, i.e.
TB(rw) = avg[c(r, w)].44 This is the rationale for the introduction of the commuting
tax breaks in the first place. The full abolition of commuting tax breaks in 2003/04
might therefore seem attractive from an environmental, travel expenses, and tax
revenues point of view, but it might have distorted efficient matching in the housing
and the labor market.4546
44Although Knittel and Sandler (2013)’s results suggest that using such a proxy is fraught with
error.
45Note that if the individual’s costs c(r, w) do not reflect society’s cost from commuting - which
is likely the case - there is a rationale for bringing c(r, w) to its efficient level trough taxation.
46There exists a crude test whether the original tax breaks were higher than the actual commuting
costs per kilometer: if TB(rw) > avg[c(r, w)], the chosen distances would have been inefficiently
long. Hence, a reduction in tax breaks would increase b(r∗, w∗)− c(r∗, w∗). If we think of b(r∗, w∗)
as mainly the wage and note that −c(r∗, w∗) always increases because of the decreasing commuting
distance, an increasing wage as a response to an increase in tax breaks would constitute evidence
that the tax breaks were too high initially. In unreported regressions I find that there is no clear
effect on wages. Thus there is no strong evidence for too high commuter tax breaks in the first
place.
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3.6 Conclusion
This paper has shown that individuals switch job or move residence in order to
reduce their commuting distance when the costs of commuting rise. It has also pro-
vided strong evidence that higher commuting costs strengthen forces of population
concentration, which is a core result from standard theory in urban economics and
in economic geography. However, concentration is just a small part of the overall ad-
justment in terms of individuals’ residence location and there is no evidence for job
concentration. This is interesting because another margin of adjustment that has
not received much attention in the urban and geography literature seems to account
for the majority of the reaction - namely that individuals change the occupation
of existing jobs and houses to reduce commuting distances. I term this margin of
adjustment “re-matching”.
The analysis has ignored some potentially important factors that were beyond
the scope of the paper. Most importantly, no broadly encompassing general equi-
librium notion of the effects was developed apart from a preliminary analysis of the
effect on relative housing supply and property prices. For example, one could have
argued that the tax break changes and the resulting lower cardistances might also
have an effect on fuel prices and even wage rates, which in turn affects individuals’
location decisions. Moreover, in the theoretical part I focused entirely on the substi-
tution effect of increases in relative prices whereas the policy change may also have
heterogeneous income effects for every individual in the data.47
Naturally, the question arises whether results from the specific experiment ex-
ploited in this paper can be generalized to other contexts. Germany is a decentral-
ized and densely populated country.48 The fact that many employees can choose
between jobs in different employment centers may favor the re-matching effect over
the concentration effect - compared to centralized countries like France or the United
Kingdom. It may also favor the re-matching effect compared to a large country like
the United States, where switching employment between different urban areas while
residing at the same place seems less feasible. For cultural and institutional reasons,
Germans are generally less mobile than Americans in the labor market as well as
47For example, the Fujita (1989) book assumes positive income effects on commuting distance,
i.e. that wealthier households prefer to locate farther away from the urban center.
48When comparing it with other developed countries it also seems to have an efficient public and
private transport infrastructure but an underdeveloped housing market.
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in the housing market. Therefore, and because of the greater distances involved,
one might expect the overall adjustment to a given change in commuting costs on
distances between home and work to be even larger in the United States than in
Germany.
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Figure 3.1: The Commuter Tax Break Distribution Over the Years
Note.—The figure depicts the median, mean, 90th, and 95th percentile of the tax break distribution
in thousand euros over the sample years.
Figure 3.2: Tax Break Reductions and the Resulting Changes in the Relative At-
tractiveness of Commuting Distances
(a) Policy change in 2003/4 (b) Policy change in 2006/7
Note.—The figures illustrate the decline in the tax breaks by cardistance rw for the 2003/4 (left)
and the 2006/7 (right) change.
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Figure 3.3: The Timing of the Explanatory Variables
Note.—The figure depicts when the explanatory variables TB Ch and TB Ch (Next Yr) may assume
values different from zero. TB Ch is negative for individuals observed in the fourth quarter of 2004
and 2007 who had work-residence combinations in the fourth quarter of 2003 and 2006, respectively,
that featured a non-zero commuting distance. TB Ch (Next Yr) is negative for individuals observed
in the fourth quarter of 2003 and 2006 who had work-residence combinations in the fourth quarter
of 2002 and 2005, respectively, that featured a non-zero commuting distance.
Figure 3.4: Relative Property Prices over Time
Note.—The figures depicts the time series of relative price indices for new and old flats (left) and
houses (right) in big and medium cities versus the overall index.
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Table 3.1: Summary Statistics per Individual
count mean p10 p25 p50 p75 p90
Years in Sample 942746 7.0 2.0 4.0 8.0 10.0 10.0
Work Switch 942746 0.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 3.0
Residence Switch 942746 0.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 2.0
Age (Years) 930122 38.5 20.0 27.0 38.0 48.9 57.5
Female 942746 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 1.0
Monthly Wage (euro) 914878 1703.8 297.0 660.5 1488.4 2475.1 3505.7
Cardistance (km) 911373 28.2 0.0 0.0 9.0 23.7 64.0
Urban Workplace 930122 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.3 1.0 1.0
Urban Residence 925221 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 1.0
Observations 942746
Note.—The table reports means and quantiles for the number of years individuals are in the
sample and the number of work- and residence switches they made during that time (the first
three variables). For the remainder of the variables it reports means and quantiles in the
fourth quarter of each person-year in the sample (1999-2007).
Table 3.2: Summary of Municipalities by Residence Numbers
count mean p10 p25 p50 p75 p90
Number of Residents 12585 53.6 2.0 4.0 11.0 33.0 92.0
Number of Connections 12585 48.1 2.0 4.0 11.0 33.0 92.0
Observations 12585
Note.—The table summarizes the distribution of the number of residents in the
dataset (i.e. about two percent of the actual number of residents) for municipalities
that report at least one resident in the year 2002. It also provides the distribution
of the number of different employment municipalities in the data that these persons
commute to.
Table 3.3: Summary of Municipalities by Employment Numbers
count mean p10 p25 p50 p75 p90
Number of Employees 10451 64.5 1.0 2.0 8.0 29.0 92.0
Number of Connections 10451 58.0 1.0 2.0 8.0 28.0 92.0
Observations 10451
Note.—The table summarizes the distribution of the number of employees in the
dataset (i.e. about two percent of the actual number of employees) for munici-
palities that report at least one employee in the year 2002. It also provides the
distribution of the number of different residence municipalities in the data that
these persons commute from.
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Table 3.4: Summary of Cardistance and Tax Breaks in 2002
count mean p25 p50 p75 p90 p95
Cardistance (Last Year) 545486 25.8 0.0 6.4 19.6 45.4 105.0
Tax Break (Last Year) 545486 2.2 0.0 0.5 1.6 3.9 9.1
Tax Break (Change) 545486 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Cardistance (Change) 516699 -0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 7.0
Cardistance (Change) if Switch 61698 -1.5 -16.8 1.5 18.6 73.1 197.2
Observations 545486
Note.—(Last Year) refers to the fourth quarter of the previous year, i.e. approximately the
beginning of the year considered. (Change) refers to the change during the considered year,
i.e. between the fourth quarter of the previous year and the fourth quarter in the current year.
Cardistances are in kilometers and tax breaks in thousand euros.
Table 3.5: Summary of Cardistance and Tax Breaks in 2004
count mean p25 p50 p75 p90 p95
Cardistance (Last Year) 544465 26.2 0.0 7.0 20.6 46.5 105.0
Tax Break (Last Year) 544465 2.3 0.0 0.6 1.7 4.0 9.1
Tax Break (Change) 544465 0.5 0.0 0.1 0.4 0.9 2.2
Cardistance (Change) 516456 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.7
Cardistance (Change) if Switch 56299 2.9 -15.9 2.8 20.3 80.2 217.5
Observations 544465
Note.—(Last Year) refers to the fourth quarter of the previous year, i.e. approximately the
beginning of the year considered. (Change) refers to the change during the considered year,
i.e. between the fourth quarter of the previous year and the fourth quarter in the current year.
Cardistances are in kilometers and tax breaks in thousand euros.
Table 3.6: Summary of Cardistance and Tax Breaks in 2007
count mean p25 p50 p75 p90 p95
Cardistance (Last Year) 552369 27.9 0.0 7.6 21.8 49.9 116.6
Tax Break (Last Year) 552369 1.8 0.0 0.5 1.4 3.3 7.7
Tax Break (Change) 552369 0.6 0.0 0.5 1.3 1.3 1.3
Cardistance (Change) 533305 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 7.4
Cardistance (Change) if Switch 63302 3.0 -18.1 1.6 20.8 86.0 235.3
Observations 552369
Note.—(Last Year) refers to the fourth quarter of the previous year, i.e. approximately the
beginning of the year considered. (Change) refers to the change during the considered year,
i.e. between the fourth quarter of the previous year and the fourth quarter in the current year.
Cardistances are in kilometers and tax breaks in thousand euros.
130
Table 3.7: Summary of Switches in 2002.
count mean
Work Switch 622461 0.149
Residence Switch 622461 0.121
Any Switch 622461 0.184
Closer Switch 516699 0.056
Work Switch Urban 544112 0.014
Work Switch Rural 544112 0.014
Residence Switch Urban 540988 0.008
Residence Switch Rural 540988 0.008
Observations 622461
Table 3.8: Main Regressions using Municipality Combination Fixed Effects as Con-
trols
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Work Res Work or Res Closer
TB Ch (Next Yr) 0.004∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
TB Ch 0.003∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Petrol Cost Ch (Next Yr) 0.019∗ -0.028∗∗∗ 0.000 0.002
(0.011) (0.005) (0.013) (0.015)
Petrol Cost Ch 0.027∗∗ -0.001 0.032∗∗ 0.033∗∗
(0.011) (0.006) (0.013) (0.014)
Main Control Munic FE Munic FE Munic FE Munic FE
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 4504185 4504185 4504185 4498019
Note.—The table reports regression results of the Work Switch, the Residence Switch, the Any
Switch, and the Closer Switch indicators in columns 1-4, respectively, on tax break changes
that apply to last year’s work-residence combination at the last turn of the year (“TB Ch”)
and the coming turn of the year (“TB Ch (Next Yr)”). Controls are average petrol cost changes
between these years and not reported dummies for age quartiles, income quartiles, plant size
quartiles, and the individual’s position in the job. Moreover, year fixed effects and municipality
combination fixed effects are included. Standard errors in parentheses: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05,
*** p<0.01.
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Table 3.9: Main Regr. using Individual-Municipality Combination FE as Controls
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Work Res Work or Res Closer
TB Ch (Next Yr) 0.003∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
TB Ch 0.007∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Petrol Cost Ch (Next Yr) -0.047∗∗∗ -0.028∗∗∗ -0.062∗∗∗ -0.046∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.014)
Petrol Cost Ch -0.013∗ -0.009 -0.011 0.004
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.013)
Main Control Mu*Ind FE Mu*Ind FE Mu*Ind FE Mu*Ind FE
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 4504185 4504185 4504185 4498019
Note.—The table reports regression results of the Work Switch, the Residence Switch, the Any
Switch, and the Closer Switch indicators in columns 1-4, respectively, on tax break changes that
apply to last year’s work-residence combination at the last turn of the year (“TB Ch”) and the
coming turn of the year (“TB Ch (Next Yr)”). Controls are average petrol cost changes between
these years and not reported dummies for age quartiles, income quartiles, plant size quartiles, and the
individual’s position in the job. Moreover, year fixed effects and individual-municipality combination
fixed effects are included. Standard errors in parentheses: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
Table 3.10: Main Regressions using the Cardistance as Control
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Work Res Work or Res Closer
TB Ch (Next Yr) 0.005∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
TB Ch 0.003∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Petrol Cost Ch (Next Yr) 0.016∗∗∗ -0.051∗∗∗ -0.021∗∗∗ -0.031∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
Petrol Cost Ch 0.014∗∗∗ -0.012∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗ 0.006∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002)
Main Control Cardist Cardist Cardist Cardist
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 4504185 4504185 4504185 4498019
Note.—The table reports regression results of theWork Switch, the Residence Switch, the
Any Switch, and the Closer Switch indicators in columns 1-4, respectively, on tax break
changes that apply to last year’s work-residence combination at the last turn of the year
(“TB Ch”) and the coming turn of the year (“TB Ch (Next Yr)”). Controls are average
petrol cost changes between these years and not reported dummies for age quartiles,
income quartiles, plant size quartiles, and the individual’s position in the job. Moreover,
year fixed effects and the cardistance are included. Standard errors in parentheses: *
p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table 3.11: Urban-Rural Switch Regressions using Municipality-Combination Fixed
Effects as Controls
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Work Urb Work Rur Res Urb Res Rur
TB Ch (Next Yr) 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
TB Ch 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Petrol Cost Ch (Next Yr) 0.002 0.007∗∗ -0.005∗∗∗ -0.005∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001)
Petrol Cost Ch 0.005∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.001 -0.001
(0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001)
Main Control Munic FE Munic FE Munic FE Munic FE
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 4504175 4504175 4502743 4502743
Note.—The table reports regression results of the Work Switch Urban, the Work Switch
Rural, the Residence Switch Urban, and the Residence Switch Rural indicators in columns 1-
4, respectively, on tax break changes that apply to last year’s work-residence combination at
the last turn of the year (“TB Ch”) and the coming turn of the year (“TB Ch (Next Yr)”).
Controls are average petrol cost changes between these years and not reported dummies
for age quartiles, income quartiles, plant size quartiles, and the individual’s position in the
job. Moreover, year fixed effects and municipality combination fixed effects are included.
Standard errors in parentheses: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table 3.12: Quarterly Regressions using Municipality-Combination Fixed Effects as
Controls
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Work Res Work or Res Closer
TB Ch Q1 (Next Yr) 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
TB Ch Q2 (Next Yr) -0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
TB Ch Q3 (Next Yr) 0.002∗∗∗ 0.000∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
TB Ch Q4 (Next Yr) 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
TB Ch Q1 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
TB Ch Q2 -0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ -0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
TB Ch Q3 0.003∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
TB Ch Q4 0.000∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
TB Ch Q1 (Last Yr) 0.000 0.002∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
TB Ch Q2 (Last Yr) 0.003∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗ 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
TB Ch Q3 (Last Yr) -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
TB Ch Q4 (Last Yr) -0.002∗∗ -0.001 -0.002 -0.001∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
Petrol Cost Ch (Next Yr) 0.002 -0.009∗∗∗ -0.006 -0.003
(0.003) (0.002) (0.005) (0.005)
Petrol Cost Ch 0.005∗ -0.004∗∗∗ 0.001 0.003
(0.003) (0.001) (0.004) (0.004)
Main Control Munic FE Munic FE Munic FE Munic FE
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 18327603 18327603 18327603 18319705
Note.—The table reports regression results of the Work Switch, the Residence Switch, the Any
Switch, and the Closer Switch indicators at a quarterly frequency in columns 1-4, respectively,
on tax break changes that apply to last quarter’s work-residence combination at the last turn
of the year (“TB Ch”), the previous to last turn of the year, and the coming turn of the year
(“TB Ch (Next Yr)”). Controls are average petrol cost changes between the years and not
reported dummies for age quartiles, income quartiles, plant size quartiles, and the individual’s
position in the job. Moreover, year fixed effects and municipality combination fixed effects are
included. Standard errors in parentheses: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table 3.13: Regr. on Cardistance using Municipality-Combination FE as Controls
(1) (2) (3) (4)
TB Ch (Next Yr) -0.294 -0.236 -4.647∗∗∗ -4.159∗∗∗
(0.206) (0.224) (1.052) (0.970)
TB Ch -0.494∗∗ -0.373∗ -4.472∗∗∗ -4.323∗∗∗
(0.203) (0.222) (0.897) (0.884)
Petrol Cost Ch (Next Yr) 8.861∗∗∗ 8.905∗∗∗ -20.340∗∗ -19.512∗∗
(1.560) (1.554) (9.304) (9.055)
Petrol Cost Ch -0.287 -0.111 -18.950∗∗ -18.088∗∗
(1.431) (1.417) (8.307) (7.944)
TB Ch 0607 (Next Yr) -0.558∗∗ -7.140∗∗∗
(0.242) (2.590)
TB Ch 0607 -1.074∗∗∗ -3.228
(0.245) (2.974)
Main Control Munic FE Munic FE Munic FE Munic FE
Sample Full Full Only Switches Only Switches
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 4498019 4498019 535783 535783
Note.—The table reports regression results of the cardistance on tax break changes that apply to last
year’s work-residence combination at the last turn of the year (“TB Ch”) and the coming turn of the
year (“TB Ch (Next Yr)”). Compared to the first column, the second column distinguishes between
the tax break changes in 2003/4 and those in 2006/7 while the third and fourth column examine the
change in cardistance conditioning on the event that a switch takes place. Controls are as in the
previous tables and standard errors in parentheses: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
Table 3.14: Information and Sources for the Policy Effect Calculations
Variable 2003/04 2006/07 Source
Employees (in mio) 38.63 39.00 destatis.de
Workdays per year 220 220 Schulze (2009)
Avg fuel usage (liters per km) 0.080 0.077 autopresse.de
Fuel price (euro per liter, yearly average) 1.07 1.27 mwv.de
CO2 emissions (in kg per liter of petrol) 2.32 2.32 de.wikipedia.org
CO2 price (in euro per tonne) 10.40 6.45 eex.com
Overall CO2 emissions (in mio tonnes p.a.) 889 867 umweltbundesamt.de
Fraction of CO2 emission in traffic 0.19 0.18 umweltbundesamt.de
Overall fuel usage in traffic (bio liters p.a.) 48 47 umweltbundesamt.de
Overall person road travel (bio km p.a.) 682 687 umweltbundesamt.de
Avg cardist 26.20 27.90 iab data
Tax break rate before 0.40 0.30 iab data
Tax break rate after (<20km) 0.30 0.00 iab data
Tax break rate after (>20km) 0.30 0.30 iab data
Avg tax break (tsd euro p.a.) 2.30 1.80 iab data
Avg tax break change (tsd euro p.a.) -0.50 -0.60 iab data
Estimated effect of tax break change on cardist (in km) 0.79 0.79 iab data
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Table 3.15: Estimated Effect on Cardistance, Fuel Usage, and CO2 Emissions
2003/04 2006/07 full abolition
p.p. cardistance reduction (in km) 0.40 0.47 1.82
Reduction overall distance (mio km) 6,714 8,124 30,886
Reduction overall distance (in % of person road travel) 0.98 1.18 4.53
Fuel savings (in mio liters) 537 626 2,471
Fuel cost savings (in mio euro) 577 793 2,654
Fuel savings (in % of fuel usage) 1.12 1.33 5.15
CO2 emissions reduction (in mio tonnes) 1.25 1.45 5.73
CO2 emissions reduction (in mio euro) 12.96 9.36 59.62
CO2 emissions reduction (in % of traffic emissions) 0.74 0.94 3.39
Table 3.16: Estimated Effect on the Tax Base
2003/04 2006/07 full abolition
Avg tax break reduction for original cardist (tsd euro p.a.) 0.50 0.60 2.30
Tax break reduction due to cardist change (tsd euro p.a.) 0.052 0.062 0.240
Overall increase in tax base (bio euro p.a.) 21 26 98
136
Chapter 4
Bibliography
Abowd, J. M., and D. Card (1989): “On the Covariance Structure of Earnings
and Hours Changes,” Econometrica, 57(2), 411–45.
Acemoglu, D., and D. Autor (2010): “Skills, Tasks and Technologies: Implica-
tions for Employment and Earnings,” Working Paper 16082, National Bureau of
Economic Research.
Ahlfeldt, G. M., and A. Feddersen (2010): “From periphery to core:
economic adjustments to high speed rail,” Working Papers 2010/38, Institut
d’Economia de Barcelona (IEB).
Altonji, J. G., P. Bharadwaj, and F. Lange (2008): “Changes in the Char-
acteristics of American Youth: Implications for Adult Outcomes,” Working Paper
13883, National Bureau of Economic Research.
Altonji, J. G., and L. M. Segal (1996): “Small-Sample Bias in GMM Estima-
tion of Covariance Structures,” Journal of Business & Economic Statistics, 14(3),
353–66.
Aughinbaugh, A., and R. M. Gardecki (2007): “Attrition in the National
Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1997,” Mimeo.
Autor, D. H., and D. Dorn (2012): “The Growth of Low Skill Service Jobs and
the Polarization of the U.S. Labor Market,” MIT Working Papers 15150, MIT.
Autor, D. H., D. Dorn, and G. H. Hanson (2012): “The China Syndrome:
Local Labor Market Effects of Import Competition in the United States,” Working
Paper 18054, National Bureau of Economic Research.
137
Autor, D. H., and M. J. Handel (2012): “Putting Tasks to the Test: Human
Capital, Job Tasks and Wages,” Journal of Labor Economics, forthcoming 15116.
Autor, D. H., L. F. Katz, and M. S. Kearney (2006): “The Polarization of
the U.S. Labor Market,” American Economic Review, 96(2), 189–194.
Autor, D. H., L. F. Katz, and A. B. Krueger (1998): “Computing Inequal-
ity: Have Computers Changed The Labor Market?,” The Quarterly Journal of
Economics, 113(4), 1169–1213.
Autor, D. H., F. Levy, and R. J. Murnane (2003): “The Skill Content of
Recent Technological Change: An Empirical Exploration,” The Quarterly Journal
of Economics, 118(4), 1279–1333.
Autor, D. H., A. Manning, and C. L. Smith (2010): “The Contribution of the
Minimum Wage to U.S. Wage Inequality over Three Decades: A Reassessment,”
Working Paper 16533, National Bureau of Economic Research.
Bartel, A. P. (1979): “The Migration Decision: What Role Does Job Mobility
Play?,” American Economic Review, 69(5), 775–86.
Becker, S. O., K. Ekholm, and M.-A. Muendler (2009): “Offshoring and
the Onshore Composition of Tasks and Skills,” CEPR Discussion Papers 7391,
C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
Bedard, K., and D. A. Herman (2008): “Who goes to graduate/professional
school? The importance of economic fluctuations, undergraduate field, and abil-
ity,” Economics of Education Review, 27(2), 197–210.
Bento, A. M., M. L. Cropper, A. M. Mobarak, and K. Vinha (2005):
“The Effects of Urban Spatial Structure on Travel Demand in the United States,”
Review of Economics and Statistics, 87(3), 466–478.
Bento, A. M., L. H. Goulder, M. R. Jacobsen, and R. H. von Haefen
(2009): “Distributional and Efficiency Impacts of Increased US Gasoline Taxes,”
American Economic Review, 99(3), 667–99.
Black, S. E., and A. Sufi (2002): “Who Goes to College? Differential Enroll-
ment by Race and Family Background,” Working Paper 9310, National Bureau
of Economic Research.
138
Blau, F. D., and L. M. Kahn (2005): “Do Cognitive Test Scores Explain Higher
U.S Wage Inequality?,” The Review of Economics and Statistics, 87(1), pp. 184–
193.
Blinder, A. S. (2009): “How Many US Jobs Might be Offshorable?,” World Eco-
nomics, 10(2), 41–78.
Borck, R., and M. Wrede (2009): “Subsidies for intracity and intercity com-
muting,” Journal of Urban Economics, 66(1), 25 – 32.
Borjas, G. J. (2006): “Immigration in High-Skill Labor Markets: The Impact of
Foreign Students on the Earnings of Doctorates,” Working Paper 12085, National
Bureau of Economic Research.
Borjas, G. J., and K. B. Doran (2012): “The Collapse of the Soviet Union and
the Productivity of American Mathematicians,” Working Paper 17800, National
Bureau of Economic Research.
Bound, J., and G. Johnson (1992): “Changes in the Structure of Wages in the
1980’s: An Evaluation of Alternative Explanations,” The American Economic
Review, 82(3), pp. 371–392.
Brueckner, J. K. (1987): “The structure of urban equilibria: A unified treatment
of the muth-mills model,” Handbook of Regional and Urban Economics, 2, 821–
845.
Busse, M. R., C. R. Knittel, and F. Zettelmeyer (2009): “Pain at the
Pump: The Differential Effect of Gasoline Prices on New and Used Automobile
Markets,” Working Paper 15590, National Bureau of Economic Research.
Cameron, A., and P. Trivedi (2005): Microeconometrics: methods and applica-
tions. Cambridge University Press.
Card, D., and T. Lemieux (2001): “Can Falling Supply Explain The Rising
Return To College For Younger Men? A Cohort-Based Analysis,” The Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 116(2), 705–746.
Cortes, G. M. (2012): “Where Have the Middle-Wage Workers Gone? A Study
of Polarization Using Panel Data,” Working Paper.
139
Crinò, R. (2010): “Service Offshoring and White-Collar Employment,” The Review
of Economic Studies, 77(2), 595–632.
Devereux, P. (2002a): “The Importance of Obtaining a High-Paying Job,”
Mimeo.
(2002b): “Occupational Upgrading and the Business Cycle,” Labour, 16(3),
423–452.
Distelkamp, M., C. Lutz, U. Petschow, and T. Zimmermann (2008):
“Wirkungen fiskalischer Steuerungsinstrumente auf Siedlungsstrukturen und Per-
sonenverkehr vor dem Hintergrund der Nachhaltigkeitsziele der Bundesregierung,”
Final Report for the Federal Institute for Research on Building, Urban Affairs and
Spatial Development.
Ebenstein, A., A. Harrison, M. McMillan, and S. Phillips (2011): “Es-
timating the impact of trade and offshoring on American workers using the cur-
rent population surveys,” Policy Research Working Paper Series 5750, The World
Bank.
Einig, K., and T. Puetz (2007): “Regionale Dynamik der Pendlergesellschaft:
Entwicklung von Verflechtungsmustern und Pendeldistanzen,” Informationen zur
Raumentwicklung, 2/3.
Ellison, G. (2002a): “Evolving Standards for Academic Publishing: A q-r The-
ory,” Journal of Political Economy, 110(5), 994–1034.
(2002b): “The Slowdown of the Economics Publishing Process,” Journal
of Political Economy, 110(5), 947–993.
Firpo, S., N. M. Fortin, and T. Lemieux (2011): “Occupational Tasks and
Changes in the Wage Structure,” IZA Discussion Papers 5542, Institute for the
Study of Labor (IZA).
Fitzgerald, J., P. Gottschalk, and R. Moffitt (1998): “An Analysis of
Sample Attrition in Panel Data: The Michigan Panel Study of Income Dynamics,”
Journal of Human Resources, 33(2), 251–299.
Freeland, C. (2012): “A U.S. Campaign Fixated on Another Era,” Editorial from
August 30, International Herald Tribune, Global Edition of the New York Times.
140
Freeman, R. B., and J. van Reenen (2009): “What if Congress Doubled R&D
Spending on the Physical Sciences?,” Mimeo.
Fujita, M. (1989): Urban Economic Theory: Land Use and City Size. Cambridge
University Press.
Gabaix, X., and A. Landier (2008): “Why has CEO Pay Increased So Much?,”
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 123(1), 49–100.
Garicano, L., and E. Rossi-Hansberg (2004): “Inequality and the Organiza-
tion of Knowledge,” The American Economic Review, 94(2), pp. 197–202.
Genda, Y., A. Kondo, and S. Ohta (2010): “Long-Term Effects of a Recession
at Labor Market Entry in Japan and the United States,” Journal of Human
Resources, 45(1).
Goldin, C. D., and L. F. Katz (2008): The race between education and tech-
nology / Claudia Goldin, Lawrence F. Katz. Belknap Press of Harvard University
Press, Cambridge, Mass. :.
Goolsbee, A. (1998): “Does Government R&D Policy Mainly Benefit Scientists
and Engineers?,” The American Economic Review, 88(2), 298–302.
Goos, M., and A. Manning (2007): “Lousy and Lovely Jobs: The Rising Po-
larization of Work in Britain,” The Review of Economics and Statistics, 89(1),
118–133.
Gould, E. D. (2002): “Rising Wage Inequality, Comparative Advantage, and the
Growing Importance of General Skills in the United States,” Journal of Labor
Economics, 20(1), 105–147.
Graeb, C., and D. Vorgrimler (2005): “Zur steuerlichen Bedeutung der Ent-
fernungspauschale,” Wirtschaftsdienst, 85.
Grau, A. (2009): “Commuters: Majority Still Going by Car,” STATmagazin, Fed-
eral Statistics Office Germany, 30 October 2009.
Groes, F., P. Kircher, and I. Manovskii (2010): “The U-Shapes of Occupa-
tional Mobility,” Working Paper.
141
Gronau, R. (1974): “Wage Comparisons-A Selectivity Bias,” Journal of Political
Economy, 82(6), 1119–43.
Gustman, A. L., and T. L. Steinmeier (1981): “The Impact of Wages and Un-
employment on Youth Enrollment and Labor Supply,” The Review of Economics
and Statistics, 63(4), pp. 553–560.
Hansen, W. L. (1991): “The Education and Training of Economics Doctorates:
Major Findings of the Executive Secretary of the American Economic Associa-
tion’s Commission on Graduate Education in Economics,” Journal of Economic
Literature, 29(3), 1054–1087.
Hasselback, J. (2001): “US Faculty Directories for Economics, Finance and Man-
agement,” last accessed 2010-10-25, CET 3:58 pm.
Heckman, J. (1974): “Shadow Prices, Market Wages, and Labor Supply,” Econo-
metrica, 42(4), pp. 679–694.
Heckman, J. J., and B. E. Honore (1990): “The Empirical Content of the Roy
Model,” Econometrica, 58(5), pp. 1121–1149.
Heckman, J. J., and G. Sedlacek (1985): “Heterogeneity, Aggregation, and
Market Wage Functions: An Empirical Model of Self-Selection in the Labor Mar-
ket,” Journal of Political Economy, 93(6), pp. 1077–1125.
Helpman, E. (1998): “The Size of Regions,” in Topics in Public Economics (New
York: Cambridge University Press), pp. 33–54.
Hsieh, C.-T., E. Hurst, C. I. Jones, and P. J. Klenow (2012): “The Allo-
cation of Talent and U.S. Economic Growth,” Working paper, Working Paper.
Jaimovich, N., and H. E. Siu (2012): “The Trend is the Cycle: Job Polarization
and Jobless Recoveries,” Working Paper 18334, National Bureau of Economic
Research.
Kahn, L. B. (2010): “The long-term labor market consequences of graduating from
college in a bad economy,” Labour Economics, 17(2), 303–316.
Kalaitzidakis, P., T. P. Mamuneas, and T. Stengos (2003): “Rankings
of Academic Journals and Institutions in Economics,” Journal of the European
Economic Association, 1(6), 1346–1366.
142
Kim, E. H., A. Morse, and L. Zingales (2006): “What Has Mattered to Eco-
nomics since 1970,” The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 20(4), 189–202.
Kloas, J., and H. Kuhfeld (2003): “Entfernungspauschale: Bezieher ho-
her Einkommen begünstigt (Aktuelle Ergebnisse zum Verkehrsverhalten privater
Haushalte),” Wochenbericht des DIW Berlin, 42/03.
Knittel, C. R., and R. Sandler (2010): “Carbon Prices and Automobile Green-
house Gas Emissions: The Extensive and Intensive Margins,” Working Paper
16482, National Bureau of Economic Research.
(2013): “The Welfare Impact of Indirect Pigouvian Taxation: Evidence
from Transportation,” Working Paper 18849, National Bureau of Economic Re-
search.
Krugman, P. (2008): “Stranded in Suburbia,” http://www.nytimes.com/2008/
05/19/opinion/19krugman.html.
Laband, D. N., and M. J. Piette (1994): “The Relative Impacts of Economics
Journals: 1970-1990,” Journal of Economic Literature, 32(2), 640–666.
Lemieux, T. (2006): “Increasing Residual Wage Inequality: Composition Effects,
Noisy Data, or Rising Demand for Skill?,” American Economic Review, 96(3),
461–498.
Li, S., R. von Haefen, and C. Timmins (2008): “How Do Gasoline Prices
Affect Fleet Fuel Economy?,” Working Paper 14450, National Bureau of Economic
Research.
Liu, R., and D. Trefler (2011): “A Sorted Tale of Globalization: White Collar
Jobs and the Rise of Service Offshoring,” Working Paper 17559, National Bureau
of Economic Research.
Machin, S., and J. Van Reenen (2008): “wage inequality, changes in,” in The
New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, ed. by S. N. Durlauf, and L. E. Blume.
Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke.
MaCurdy, T., T. Mroz, and R. M. Gritz (1998): “An Evaluation of the
National Longitudinal Survey on Youth,” Journal of Human Resources, 33(2),
345–436.
143
McLaughlin, K. J., and M. Bils (2001): “Interindustry Mobility and the Cycli-
cal Upgrading of Labor,” Journal of Labor Economics, 19(1), pp. 94–135.
Michaels, G., A. Natraj, and J. Van Reenen (2010): “Has ICT Polarized
Skill Demand? Evidence from Eleven Countries over 25 years,” Working Paper
16138, National Bureau of Economic Research.
Michel, P., A. Perrot, and J.-F. Thisse (1996): “Interregional equilibrium
with heterogeneous labor,” Journal of Population Economics, 9, 95–113.
Molloy, R., and H. Shan (2010): “The effect of gasoline prices on household
location,” Working Papers 2010/28, Institut d’Economia de Barcelona (IEB).
Moretti, E. (2011): “Local labor markets,” Handbook of Labor Economics, 4,
1237–1313.
Mulligan, C. B., and Y. Rubinstein (2008): “Selection, Investment, and
Women’s Relative Wages Over Time,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
123(3), 1061–1110.
Murnane, R. J., J. B. Willett, and F. Levy (1995): “The Growing Impor-
tance of Cognitive Skills in Wage Determination,” The Review of Economics and
Statistics, 77(2), pp. 251–266.
Murphy, K. M., and R. H. Topel (1985): “Estimation and Inference in Two-
Step Econometric Models,” Journal of Business & Economic Statistics, 3(4), pp.
370–379.
Nickell, S. J. (1981): “Biases in Dynamic Models with Fixed Effects,” Econo-
metrica, 49(6), 1417–26.
Okun, A. M. (1973): “Upward Mobility in a High-Pressure Economy,” Brookings
Papers on Economic Activity, 1973(1), pp. 207–261.
Oreopoulos, P., T. von Wachter, and A. Heisz (2012): “The Short- and
Long-Term Career Effects of Graduating in a Recession,” American Economic
Journal: Applied Economics, 4(1), 1–29.
Ottaviano, G. I., G. Peri, and G. C. Wright (2010): “Immigration, Off-
shoring and American Jobs,” Working Paper 16439, National Bureau of Economic
Research.
144
Oyer, P. (2006): “Initial Labor Market Conditions and Long-Term Outcomes for
Economists,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 20(3), 143-160.
(2008): “The Making of an Investment Banker: Stock Market Shocks,
Career Choice, and Lifetime Income,” The Journal of Finance, 63(6), 2601–2628.
Philippon, T., and A. Reshef (2009): “Wages and Human Capital in the U.S.
Financial Industry: 1909-2006,” Working Paper 14644, National Bureau of Eco-
nomic Research.
Pischke, J.-S. (1995): “Measurement Error and Earnings Dynamics: Some Esti-
mates from the PSID Validation Study,” Journal of Business & Economic Statis-
tics, 13(3), 305–14.
Raaum, O., and K. Røed (2006): “Do Business Cycle Conditions at the Time
of Labor Market Entry Affect Future Employment Prospects?,” The Review of
Economics and Statistics, 88(2), 193–210.
Redding, S. J., and D. M. Sturm (2008): “The Costs of Remoteness: Evidence
from German Division and Reunification,” American Economic Review, 98(5),
1766–97.
Roback, J. (1982): “Wages, Rents, and the Quality of Life,” Journal of Political
Economy, 90(6), 1257–78.
Roy, A. D. (1951): “Some Thoughts on the Distribution of Earnings,” Oxford
Economic Papers, 3(2), 135–146.
Sattinger, M. (1993): “Assignment Models of the Distribution of Earnings,”
Journal of Economic Literature, 31(2), pp. 831–880.
Schulze, S. (2009): “Einige Beobachtungen zum Pendlerverhalten in Deutsch-
land,” HWWI Policy Paper, 1-19.
Shu, P. (2012): “The Long-term Impact of Business Cycles on Innovation: Evidence
from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology,” MIT Job Market Paper.
Solon, G., R. Barsky, and J. A. Parker (1994): “Measuring the Cyclicality
of Real Wages: How Important is Composition Bias,” The Quarterly Journal of
Economics, 109(1), 1–25.
145
Spitz-Oener, A. (2006): “Technical Change, Job Tasks, and Rising Educational
Demands: Looking outside the Wage Structure,” Journal of Labor Economics,
24(2), 235–270.
Stern, S. (2004): “Do Scientists Pay to Be Scientists?,” Management Science,
50(6), 835–853.
Stock, W. A., and J. J. Siegfried (2006): “Time-to-Degree for the Economics
Ph.D. Class of 2001-2002,” The American Economic Review, 96(2), 467–474.
Stock, W. A., J. J. Siegfried, and T. A. Finegan (2011): “Completion
Rates and Time-to-Degree in Economics PhD Programs (with comments by David
Colander, N. Gregory Mankiw, Melissa P. McInerney, James M. Poterba),” Amer-
ican Economic Review, 101(3), 176–88.
Sullivan, D., and T. von Wachter (2009): “Job Displacement and Mortality:
An Analysis Using Administrative Data,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
124(3), 1265–1306.
Tervio, M. (2008): “The Difference That CEOs Make: An Assignment Model
Approach,” American Economic Review, 98(3), 642–68.
Topel, R. H., and M. P. Ward (1992): “Job Mobility and the Careers of Young
Men,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 107(2), 439–79.
Vroman, W., and M. Wachter (1977): “Worker Upgrading and the Business
Cycle,” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1977(1), pp. 229–252.
Yamaguchi, S. (2012): “Changes in Returns to Task-Specific Skills and Gender
Wage Gap,” SSRN Working Paper.
146
Appendices
147
Appendix A
Has Job Polarization Squeezed the
Middle Class? Evidence from the
Allocation of Talents
148
A.1 Detailed Sample Construction
I use data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY) cohort of 1979
and 1997. The individuals in these surveys are born between 1956 and 1964 and
between 1980 and 1984, respectively. As is necessary for this paper, the NLSY
studies provide detailed information about individuals’ background, education, and
labor market outcomes. Moreover, the two cohorts are specifically designed to to be
comparable to one another.
Consistent with many papers on the NLSY and in the literature on polariza-
tion and wage inequality, I restrict my attention to males (e.g. Firpo, Fortin, and
Lemieux 2011, Cortes 2012). There are several reasons for doing this. Firstly, polar-
ization seems to have had the most dire effect on males (Acemoglu and Autor 2010).
Secondly, female hours worked and thus the type of selection of females into the la-
bor market (see Mulligan and Rubinstein 2008) changed substantially over the two
NLSYs. In addition, females made strides in educational attainment, their wages
rose across the whole distribution, and attitudes towards them and discrimination
against them in the labor market seem to have changed drastically. Thus, there are
diverse changes in (the structure of) female labor supply and demand that are likely
to work aside from the forces of polarization. Restricting the analysis to males pro-
vides a cleaner comparison of workers across the two decades between the NLSY79
and the NLSY97.
I evaluate individuals’ labor market outcomes at age 27. This is because, on
the one hand, at younger ages the polarization facts that the paper sets out to
analyze are not very pronounced in the NLSY as well as CPS data, which I use
for comparison. On the other hand, at older ages than 27, I would loose too many
observations from the NLSY97 as, at the time of writing, data is only available until
the survey year of 2009. With the age 27 restriction, I already have to drop about
two fifth of the NLSY97 sample (birth years 1983 and 1984 are dropped).
Table 1.1 summarizes how the sample restrictions, attrition, and labor market
participation for males reduce my sample size from 6,403 to 3,054 and from 4,599
to 1,207 males in the NLSY79 and the NLSY97, respectively. I restrict the sample
to individuals who participated in the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery
of tests (ASVAB) in the first survey year. This restriction is necessary because
ASVAB will provide me with measures of different dimensions of talent for each
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individual that are comparable over the two cohorts. Moreover, I argue that the
subtests from ASVAB are proxies of individuals’ fundamental talents that do not
react as elastically to changes in market returns as late skill determinants, such as
education, which have been used in existing studies.
The participation in ASVAB is substantially lower in the NLSY97 than the
NLSY79 where almost everyone participated. Moreover, sample attrition at age
27 is higher in the NLSY97 than the NLSY79 and overall only 63 percent of the
NLSY79 participated in ASVAB and are also present at age 27. This problem is well
known for the NLSY (e.g. Altonji, Bharadwaj, and Lange 2008, Aughinbaugh and
Gardecki 2007). More generally, attrition rates in several panel surveys in the United
States increased substantially during the 1990s (see also Fitzgerald, Gottschalk,
and Moffitt 1998, MaCurdy, Mroz, and Gritz 1998). The attrition and non-test-
participation rates in my data closely line up with those reported in the study by
Altonji, Bharadwaj, and Lange (henceforth ABL). The only difference is that ABL
consider outcomes at the younger age of 22 and thus have slightly lower attrition
rates.
In their paper, ABL note that the higher attrition rate in the NLSY97 may be
partly due to NLSY97 respondents being first interviewed at ages 12-16 versus ages
14-21 for the NLSY79 and thus had more time to attrit. ABL further extensively
examine the potential non-randomness of attrition and non-test-participation and
its likely impact in biasing important labor market outcomes. Aughinbaugh and
Gardecki (2007) do a similar exercise but focus on social and educational outcomes.
Both studies find evidence that attrition is not random with respect to youths’ out-
comes and their backgrounds. However, Aughinbaugh and Gardecki (2007) conclude
that attrition from the NLSY97 does not appear to affect inference when estimating
the three outcomes at age 20 that they are considering and ABL decide that the
differences between non-attriters and the whole sample are not forbidding.
Moreover, ABL carefully select the samples of NLSY79 and NLSY97 to make
them comparable to one another and compute weights that adjust for attrition and
non-test-participation on observable characteristics. I closely follow their procedures
for constructing my own sample. Thus, for even more information on the sample
construction and statistics on the effects of attrition, please refer to ABL in addition
to the description provided here.1 First, I follow ABL in excluding from the NLSY79
1I am extremely grateful to Prashant Bharadwaj for providing me with their data and do-files.
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immigrants who arrived in the United States after age 16. This is done because the
scope of the NLSY97 (age 12-16) also doesn’t include older than age 16 arrivals.
Second, I exclude the economically disadvantaged whites and military supplemental
samples from the NLSY79 because they were discontinued early on in the survey
and thus don’t provide labor market outcomes at age 27 (or for ABL’s purposes).
Table 1.1 reports that 1,818 observations are dropped by making these restrictions
to the sample. For each individual I retain the observation that is closest to 27 years
and 6 months of age and then measure labor market and final educational outcomes
from this observation.
ABL use a probit model to adjust the NLSY79 and NLSY97 base year sam-
ple weights to account for attrition and non-test-participation according to several
observable characteristics, such as parental education, parental presence at age 14,
indicators by birth-year, urban and SMSA residence status, indicator variables for
race and gender, and an interviewer coded variable describing the attitude of the
respondent during the interview. I also employ a probit model to adjust weights
for attrition and non-test-participation and use the same specification and variables
as ABL apart from leaving out parental presence at age 14. Alternatively, a fully
stratified set of indicators for birthyear, year, sex, and race, as employed by the
Bureau of Labor Statistics for weighting, yields very similar results.2 As ABL do
in their paper, I proceed from this point with the assumption that, after attrition
weighting, my two NLSY samples are representative of the population of young
Americans that they are supposed to cover. These samples have the size of 3,939
and 1,737 individuals in the NLSY79 and the NLSY97, respectively.
I follow Lemieux (2006), who uses CPS May Outgoing Rotation Group data,
in how I compute wages and in defining the sample of working individuals (hence-
forth labor supply). First, I use hourly wages reported for the current main job
instead of imputing hourly wages from last year’s income and total hours worked.
Lemieux (2006) convincingly argues that the current main job measure is substan-
tially more accurate because it better measures the wages of workers paid by the
hour. Moreover, the reporting of weeks and hours per year worked in the NLSY
seems somewhat inconsistent over the two cohorts. I normalize all wages to 1979
real values by adjusting with the PCE deflator provided by the St.Louis Federal
2I thank Steve McClaskie and Jay Zagorsky for providing me with the official attrition-adjusted
sample weighting program for the NLSY.
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Reserve Bank.3 While Lemieux (2006) removes outliers with 1979 real wages below
$1 and above $100, I remove the high wages from $40 onward because my NLSY
wage data is very inaccurate for values above this threshold.
Finally, in order to condition on the sample of working individuals, I keep all
individuals who report not to be self-employed, and who are employed in a non-farm,
non-fishing and non-forestry occupation according to the Census 1990 three-digit
occupation classification. This leaves me with an analysis sample of 3,054 and 1,207
males in the NLSY79 and NLSY97, respectively (compare table 1.1 again). I weight
all of those individuals by the number of hours that they work per week on top of the
sample weights that are adjusted for test-participation and attrition. Lemieux (2006)
argues that weighting by weekly hours can be viewed as a reasonable compromise
between concentrating on full-time workers only and looking at all workers including
part-time workers. An additional advantage from this is that I am not losing any
more observations from a full-time work restriction.
A.2 Generalization of Results to the Three Occu-
pation Case
In the following I derive predictions (1.7) and (1.8) for the three-occupation case.
For ease of exposition, wages in occupations (1.3) are reproduced here:
wKit = piKt + βK0 + βK1x1it + ...+ βKJxJit + uKit.
Note from equation (1.2) and the wages in occupations that:
wit =

wHit = piHt + βH0 + βH1x1it + ...+ βHJxJit + uHit if Hit = 1
wMit = piMt + βM0 + βM1x1it + ...+ βMJxJit + uMit if Mit = 1
wLit = piLt + βL0 + βL1x1it + ...+ βLJxJit + uLit if Lit = 1
When occupational wage rates change, by the envelope theorem, the marginal change
3Source: “Personal Consumption Expenditures: Chain-type Price Index (PCECTPI)”, accessed
2012-8-14, http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/PCECTPI
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in worker i’s wage becomes
dwit =

dpiH if Hit = 1
dpiM if Mit = 1
dpiL if Lit = 1.
Thanks to its linearity, the change in the expectation can be written as
E(dwit|xit, pit) = pH(xit, pit)dpiH + pM(xit, pit)dpiM + pL(xit, pit)dpiL,
where pK(xit, pit) is the propensity for an individual of talent vector xit to enter
occupation K under prices pit. Exploiting that the three probabilities sum to one
gives prediction (1.13):
dE(wit|xit, pit) = dpiMt + pH(xit, p˜iHMt, p˜iLMt)dp˜iHMt + pL(xit, p˜iHMt, p˜iLMt)dp˜iLMt,
where p˜iKMt ≡ piKt − piMt for K{H,L},
pH(xit, p˜iHMt, p˜iLMt) = Pr[uHi − uMi > −(piHt − piMt + (βH − βM)′xit),
uHi − uLi > −(piHt − piLt + (βH − βL)′xit)],
and similarly for pL(xit, p˜iHMt, p˜iLMt).
For convenience, omit the dependence on xit from now on. Holding constant
p˜iHMt and p˜iLMt at t = 0 and integrating equation (1.13) with respect to piMt we get
E(wi|piM1, p˜iHM0, p˜iLM0)− E(wi|piM0, p˜iHM0, p˜iLM0) = 4piM .
Similarly,
E(wi|piM1, p˜iHM1, p˜iLM0)− E(wi|piM1, p˜iHM0, p˜iLM0) =
∫ p˜iHM1
p˜iHM0
pH(p˜iHMt, p˜iLM0)dp˜iHMt
E(wi|piM1, p˜iHM1, p˜iLM1)− E(wi|piM1, p˜iHM1, p˜iLM0) =
∫ p˜iLM1
p˜iLM0
pL(p˜iHM1, p˜iLMt)dp˜iLMt.
Summing these three expressions gives equation (1.14):
E(wi|pi1)−E(wi|pi0) = 4piM+
∫ p˜iHM1
p˜iHM0
pH(p˜iHMt, p˜iLM0)dp˜iHMt+
∫ p˜iLM1
p˜iLM0
pL(p˜iHM1, p˜iLMt)dp˜iLMt
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Finally, since we do not know the choice probabilities on the adjustment path,
these have to be approximated analogously to equation (1.9) and figure 1.5
pH(p˜iHMt, p˜iLM0) ≈ pH(p˜iHM0, p˜iLM0) + pH(p˜iHM1, p˜iLM1)− pH(p˜iHM0, p˜iLM0)
p˜iHM1 − p˜iHM0 (p˜iHMt − p˜iHM0)
pL(p˜iHM1, p˜iLMt) ≈ pL(p˜iHM0, p˜iLM0) + pL(p˜iHM1, p˜iLM1)− pL(p˜iHM0, p˜iLM0)
p˜iLM1 − p˜iLM0 (p˜iLMt − p˜iLM0),
which gives equation (1.16). Note that one might prefer using pH(p˜iHM1, p˜iLM0) in-
stead of pH(p˜iHM1, p˜iLM1) in the first approximation and pL(p˜iHM1, p˜iLM0) instead of
pL(p˜iHM0, p˜iLM0) in the second, which are not observable in the data. Yet, pH(p˜iHM1, p˜iLM0) >
pH(p˜iHM1, p˜iLM1) while pL(p˜iHM1, p˜iLM0) < pL(p˜iHM0, p˜iLM0), so this additional approx-
imation error should not be too large.
A.3 Details of the Minimum Distance Estimation
and Test
The methods applied in the following can be found in the statistical appendix of
Abowd and Card (1989) or chapter 6.7 of Cameron and Trivedi (2005). I explain
them step by step.
First, I run seemingly unrelated wage and allocation regressions on the individual
level in both points in time to obtain estimates δˆHt, δˆLt, and γˆt as well as an estimate
of their joint covariance matrix. Second, I combine the wage rates 4p˜iH ≡ 4(piH −
piM), 4p˜iL ≡ 4(piL − piM), and 4p˜i = [4p˜iH ,4p˜iL]. I also define the J × 1 vectors
4ˆγ, ˆ¯δK ≡ δˆK0+δˆK12 for K{H,L}, and m(4p˜i) = 4ˆγ − ˆ¯δH4p˜iH − ˆ¯δL4p˜iL.
The minimum distance estimator minimizes the quadratic form
Q(4p˜i) = m(4p˜i)′Wm(4p˜i),
with W being a J × J weighting matrix. Under some regularity conditions we can
apply a central limit theorem to the OLS estimates δˆHt, δˆLt, and γˆt as well as to
m(4p˜i):
√
Nm(4p˜i) a∼ N (Em(4p˜i), NV ar(m(4p˜i)))
Under the polarization hypothesis, Em(4p˜i) = 0 and the variance of m(4p˜i)
can be derived up to the parameter vector 4p˜i from the covariance matrix of the
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reduced form estimates:
ˆV ar(m(4p˜i)) = ˆV ar(4ˆγ) +4p˜i2H ˆV ar(ˆ¯δH) +4p˜i2L ˆV ar(ˆ¯δL) + 24p˜iH4p˜iL ˆCov(ˆ¯δH , ˆ¯δL)−
− 24p˜iH ˆCov(4ˆγ, ˆ¯δH)− 24p˜iL ˆCov(4ˆγ, ˆ¯δL)
Since 4p˜i is unknown in ˆV ar(m(4p˜i)), I run two step feasible GLS with the first
stage being OLS using W = I and plugging the resulting 4ˆp˜iOLS into the weighting
matrixW = ˆV ar(m(4p˜i)) for the second step. The minimized value of the objective
function can be shown to be chi-squared distributed asymptotically
m(4ˆp˜iFGLS)′[ ˆV ar(m(4ˆp˜iFGLS))]−1m(4ˆp˜iFGLS) a∼ χ2(J − 2),
which provides the specification test.
Since there are concerns about small sample bias of 4ˆp˜iFGLS (in particular Altonji
and Segal 1996, Pischke 1995), results for 4ˆp˜iOLS and 4ˆp˜iWLS are also reported. In
this case, the test statistic for the model test has to be adjusted (see Abowd and
Card 1989).
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Appendix B
The Allocation of Talent over the
Business Cycle and its Long-Term
Effect on Sectoral Productivity
B.1 Formal Results and Proofs
Without loss of generality, we define the density function of academic and business
skills on the unit square, i.e. f(α, β) ≥ 0 for α, β ∈ [0, 1] and zero otherwise.
Furthermore, rather than treating N as the absolute number of PhD places like in the
main text, it is convenient here to redefine it to be the number of places in the PhD
programs as a fraction of the whole population. As in the main text, we compare
a generic boom to a generic recession cohort, i.e. yBoom > yRec. Furthermore, a
person applies for a PhD if he has skills such that α > β + y.
In order to facilitate the proofs in the following, we do three more things: First,
we define different sets of applicants to keep our notation concise in the rest of this
section. Second, we define conditional probabilities to be able to compare different
sets with each other. Third, we show that the least able (in terms of academic
skills) individual admitted into academia in a recession is academically more able
than the least able individual admitted in a boom. This result is used repeatedly in
the proofs of the propositions.
1. The following distinct sets of applicants are used in the proofs and illustrated
in Figure B.1:
• C(onstant) applicants, who enter academia no matter what happens in
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the business cycle.
C = {(α, β)|α ≥ αRec ∧ α > β + yBoom}
• B(usiness inclined), who only select themselves into academia if the busi-
ness climate necessitates it.
B = {(α, β)|α ≥ αRec ∧ β + yRec < α ≤ β + yBoom}
• A(cademically inclined), who want to go into academia but only have the
chance to if the group B members don’t apply.
A = {(α, β)|αBoom ≤ α < αRec ∧ α > β + yBoom}
• E(xternals), who never go into academia.
Figure B.1: Example with a U(0,1) distribution of both skills
Note that A∪C is the boom cohort and B ∪C the recession cohort. Further-
more, from our assumption that there are always more people applying for a
PhD-program than there are spaces, it follows that y has an upper bound.
2. We introduce the following notation for the probability of being a member of
the set X (or fulfilling the condition X) conditionally on being a member of
the set Y:
PY (X) =
P (X ∩ Y )
P (Y ) .
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This conditional probability is always within [0,1] and can be interpreted as
the fraction of members of Y who are also members of X. If the subscript Y
is dropped, we refer to the fraction X compared to all potential applicants.
As mentioned above, N is the fraction of individuals actually entering the
academic sector, i.e. in a recessionN = P (C∪B) and in a boomN = P (C∪A).
3. We show that the cut-off value αs is weakly higher in recession than in boom.
A higher cut-off value implies that the least able (in terms of academic skills)
individual admitted into academia in a recession is academically more able
than the least able individual admitted in a boom.
Lemma B.1.1 αBoom ≤ αRec.
Proof of lemma B.1.1: Let gy(α) :=
∫ α−y
0 f(α, β) dβ be the percentage of
students with academic skill α who will apply to the PhD-program. Obviously
yBoom > yRec ⇒ gyBoom ≤ gyRec as f ≥ 0 for all (α, β). Therefore αRec ≥ αBoom
as the equality
∫ 1
αRec gyRec dα = N =
∫ 1
αBoom gyBoom dα has to hold.
Proof of proposition 2.2.1: : First, note that by the definition of A and B,
PA(x ≥ α) = 0 if α > αRec and PB(x ≥ α) = 1 if α ≤ αRec. Second, as
P (A) = P (B) = N − P (C) it follows that PA∪C(x ≥ α) ≤ PB∪C(x ≥ α), which is
the definition of first order stochastic dominance. As the argumentation holds anal-
ogously for the business skills, this implies a joint stochastic dominance of academic
and business skills of the recession cohort compared to the boom cohort.
Proof of proposition 2.2.2: In case of ygrad < yBoom some or no people in set B
leave the recession cohort and nothing changes in the boom cohort. If ygrad ≥ yBoom,
all people in B leave. All remaining members of the recession cohort (who are
member of set C and may or may not leave) are a subset of the boom cohort and
therefore behave alike. Note that, as P(B) = P(A) and all members of B, but
potentially only some members of A, leave for ygrad ≥ yBoom, there are always more
leavers in the recession than in the boom cohort.
Proof of proposition 2.2.3: Let B′ be a subset of B. We show that C ∪ B′ first
order stochastically dominates C ∪ A in the partial distribution of academic skill,
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which is the proposition for ygrad < yBoom. It follows for all α that
PC∪B′(x ≥ α) = PC∪B′(C)PC(x ≥ α) + PC∪B′(B′)PB′(x ≥ α),
and analogously PC∪A(x ≥ α) = PC∪A(C)PC(x ≥ α) + PC∪A(A)PA(x ≥ α). This
means that the percentage of members in C and B′ who have an academic skill
larger than some arbitrary α is the weighted sum of the percentage of members in
C and of the percentage of members in B′ who have at least such a high academic
skill. The respective weights are the percentage of members of C in C ∪B′ and the
percentage of B′ in C∪B′. (Remember that PC∪B′(C) is the percentage of members
of C in the union of C and B′.)
Now one can show as in Proposition 2.2 :
• PC∪B′(x ≥ α) ≥ PC∪B′(C)PC(x ≥ α) ≥ PC∪A(C)PC(x ≥ α) = PC∪A(x ≥ α)
for α ≥ αRec.
The first inequality holds by the decomposition of PC∪B′(x ≥ α) above, the
second inequality holds because P (A) = P (B) and the equality holds because
PA(x ≥ α) = 0 for α ≥ αRec by definition of the set A.
• PC∪B′(x ≥ α) = 1 ≥ PC∪A(C)PC(x ≥ α)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=1
+PC∪A(A)PA(x ≥ α) = PC∪A(x ≥
α) for α < αRec. The first equality holds by the definition of C and B′, the
first inequality by the definition of probability measures (it cannot exceed one)
and the second equality holds by the definition above.
These two statements taken together prove the first order stochastic dominance in
the partial distribution of the academic skill for the recession cohort compared to
the boom cohort.
Note, that the same argument can be made if ygrad ≥ yBoom with A′ and C ′
being subsets of A and C, respectively, and B′ = ∅. This completes the proof.
For the proof of the last proposition we require one further piece of notation:
Let yBoomgrad denote the business cycle variable if there is a boom at graduation and
yRecgrad if there is a recession at graduation. Note that yBoomgrad >yRecgrad and therefore
wBBoom = β + yBoomgrad > wBRec = β + yRecgrad.
Proof of proposition 2.2.4 with unlimited academic jobs: The PhD students
with {α, β)|β+yRecgrad < α ≤ β+yBoomgrad } leave academia when there is a boom instead
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of a recession at graduation. As this set can be non-empty, weakly more students
leave in a boom than in a recession.
Proof of proposition 2.2.4 with a fixed number of jobs: Note that the de-
cision to enter academia with a fixed number of jobs, Ngrad, is very similar to the
decision to enter the PhD program with a fixed number of PhD spaces. By applying
the proof of lemma B.1.1 analogously, it is easy to show that the minimum academic
skill to enter academia is higher for the recession-at-graduation cohort than for the
boom cohort:
Let hygrad(α) :=
∫ α−ygrad
0 f(α, β) dβ be the percentage of students with academic
skill α who will apply to the academic job market. Obviously yBoomgrad > yRecgrad ⇒
hyBoom
grad
≤ hyRec
grad
as h ≥ 0 for all (α, β). Therefore αRecgrad ≥ αBoom because the equality∫ 1
αRec hyRecgrad dα = Ngrad =
∫ 1
αBoom gyBoomgrad dα has to hold.
By applying the proof of proposition 2.2.1 analogously, the academic skill of
the recession-at-graduation cohort first order stochastically dominate the academic
skills of the boom-at-graduation cohort.
B.2 Cyclicality of Academia versus Business
In our theory section we assume that compensation in the academic sector is less
cyclical than in the business sector. In this section we provide evidence that this is a
reasonable assumption. We focus on the cyclicality in the attractiveness of academia
versus business only at graduation from the PhD. At application, graduate school
seems to be clearly less cyclical than business—as was illustrated by the flood of
applications to masters and PhD programs during the crisis of 2008/09 (see also
Bedard and Herman 2008, Gustman and Steinmeier 1981, Black and Sufi 2002).
Ideally, we would like to compare the variability of the total expected lifetime
compensation (consisting of pecuniary and non-pecuniary benefits) for the two sec-
tors over the business cycle. Unfortunately, this is not possible for two reasons:
First, (variabilities in) non-pecuniary benefits are hard to observe and difficult to
compare across jobs. Second, even the monetary component of compensation is
difficult to obtain or to approximate. Wage data for the business sector is not con-
sistently available on a yearly basis over longer time periods for economics PhDs.1
1We do not have access to any employer-employee matched dataset as in Oreopoulos, von
Wachter, and Heisz (2012).
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Furthermore, even if wages were available, they are a result of the selection process
we are trying to explain (e.g. Solon, Barsky, and Parker 1994). Consequently, it
would be sensible to focus on wage offers in both sectors as used by Scott Stern in
a similar setting (Stern 2004). Unfortunately we are unable to find such data.
In the following we approximate the relative attractiveness of the academic sector
by comparing the number of academic versus non-academic job offers for economists
over the business cycle.2 The underlying assumption is that an additional vacancy
(weakly) increases a sector’s relative attractiveness. The number of new jobs is pub-
lished annually in the Job Openings for Economists (JOE) director’s report in the
American Economic Review’s Papers and Proceedings issue in May. The academic
and non-academic openings are broken up by new and total jobs and listings (em-
ployers). Since we want to approximate the decision situation of a graduate in year
t during his job market year, we focus on the sum of new job offers from August in
year t− 1 to July in year t.3,4
Figure B.2 plots the yearly sums of job offers over the years from 1977 to 2010.
Academic jobs are displayed in the upper-left panel and non-academic jobs in the
upper right panel. In the lower panel the overall number of job offers is plotted
together with the number of academic per non-academic jobs. Academic and non-
academic jobs move together in lockstep, which shows that the academic sector is in
fact quite cyclical. However, the relative number of academic jobs to non-academic
jobs appears to be countercyclical: even when the number of academic jobs rise, the
number of non-academic jobs rises relatively more. The reverse is true in recessions.
Therefore, graduates have relatively more business jobs (compared to academic jobs)
to choose from in booms than in recessions.
To formally test if business jobs are indeed more pro-cyclical than academic jobs,
we estimate the following system of equations
log(# Academic jobs)t = βAcademic · yt + δ · controls + t (B.1)
log(# Non-Academic jobs)t = βNon−Academic · yt + δ · controls + t (B.2)
2Oyer (2006) uses the academic job offers as a measure of demand for economists in academia.
3The seasonality of job offers within a given year follows the job market for each cohort, espe-
cially for academic jobs. Job offers reach their trough in June after which they start rising. They
literally jump up in October and stay high during the fall after which they decline. We therefore
define each yearly sum of job offers according to job market years instead of calender years.
4We do not use total jobs as we do not know if these jobs are double counted in several months.
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Figure B.2: Academic and non-academic job offers over time
(a) Academic job offers (b) Non-academic job offers
(c) Overall job and relative Academic Job Of-
fers
where the dependent variables are the log of the number of new academic and non-
academic jobs, respectively, and yt is a measure of the business cycle. Then we
test if the business cycle has a larger influence on the number of non-academic jobs
than on the number of academic jobs, i.e. if βNon−Academic is larger than βAcademic in
absolute values.
The regressor yt is one of four business cycle measures: recession indicators,
unemployment levels and changes, and the log of GDP. The business cycle variables
are measured in October of the year before graduation when the mode of job offers
for each cohort comes in. The controls include dummies for the switch from seven to
ten monthly reports of job offers in 1999 and the JOE going online in 1995 interacted
with a linear time trend. We estimate the outlined specification in levels with a time
trend and in first differences. We do this to control for the potential trend or the
non-stationarity of dependent and independent variables.
Table B.1 and Table B.2 report the results of these regressions in levels and
in first differences. Unemployment and GDP are significantly related to academic
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Table B.1: Differing Cyclicality of Academic and Non-Academic Jobs—Levels
log(# Academic Jobs) log(# Non-Academic Jobs) z-Value
Unemployment -0.05∗∗∗ -0.09∗∗∗ 2.23**
(0.01) (0.02)
GDP 1.96∗∗∗ 4.06∗∗∗ -2.32***
(0.62) (1.08)
Recession 0.02 -0.08 1.57*
(0.05) (0.09)
Note.—Standard errors in parentheses. The z-Value is the test statistic of a one-sided test.
for |βNon−Academic| > |βAcademic|. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Table B.2: Differing Cyclicality of Academic and Non-Academic Jobs—First Dif-
ferences
FD log(# Academic Jobs) FD log(# Non-Academic Jobs) z-Value
Unempl Change -0.05∗∗∗ -0.06∗∗ 0.58
(0.01) (0.03)
GDP Growth 2.57∗∗∗ 3.09∗∗ -0.39
(0.62) (1.34)
FD Recession -0.00 -0.09 1.66**
(0.03) (0.06)
Note.—Standard errors in parentheses. The z-Value is the test statistic for a one-sided test.
for |βNon−Academic| > |βAcademic|. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
and non-academic job offers in the way that we would have expected from Figure
B.2. Moreover, in levels, the relationship is significantly stronger for non-academic
than for academic jobs. For example, a one percentage point increase in unemploy-
ment is approximately associated with a nine percent decrease in the number of
non-academic jobs and “only” a five percent decrease in academic jobs. Recession
indicators do not work that well. Although they are significantly different from each
other in the right direction, the estimated coefficients are not significantly different
from zero on their own. These results are qualitatively robust to using total job
openings instead of focusing on new ones, variations in the control variables (e.g.
including quadratic time trends), and a sensible alternative timing of the business
cycle variables.
Overall, we would state that we find reasonable support for the assumption that
the academic sector is less cyclical than the non-academic sector in the job openings
for economists. We think this is some prima facie evidence for our assumption that in
downturns the academic sector becomes relatively more attractive as an employer
compared to the business sector. Moreover, we think that the above exercise is
conservative because of the following reason: the (variation in the) number of job
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offers is unlikely to approximate well the (variation in) non-pecuniary benefits, which
are substantial and probably stable in research related jobs (see Stern 2004). Thus,
total compensation in the academic sector might be less cyclical than indicated by
the number of job openings.
B.3 Cohort Sizes and Timing of Graduation
This section addresses potential concerns about factors that might confound our
results and analyzes possible impacts on our estimates. In the following we address
concerns about the size of the entry and exit cohort and the timing of graduation.
Lastly, we address a potential correlation of the business cycle at application and
graduation.
In order to do this, we calculate the number of graduates from our dataset (in the
following listed as “# of Graduates (AEA)”) and match it with the business cycle at
application and at graduation. For conciseness, we focus on unemployment change as
our preferred measure for the business cycle. Then, we supplement this data with
data from the National Science Foundation’s “Survey of Earned Doctorates” and
the “Survey of Graduate Students and Postdoctorates in Science and Engineering”.5
From there we obtain the number of full-time, first-time graduate students (“# of
Entrants (NSF)”) and awarded doctorates (“# of Graduates (NSF)”) for our top 30
universities since 1977.6,7
We report the partial correlation coefficient of unemployment change at applica-
tion and at graduation with application and graduation numbers in Table B.3. In
order to obtain the correct standard errors we aggregate the data to yearly averages.
To keep this section concise, we only report for unemployment change and not for
all four business cycle measures. These correlation tables are available upon request
from the authors.
One might have the concern that the number of students admitted to the PhD
5These surveys are publicly available through the WebCASPAR Interface: “WebCASPAR
Integrated Science and Engineering Resource Data System — NSF Survey of Earned Doctor-
ates/Doctorate Records File,” National Science Foundation, last accessed 2012-03-16, https:
//webcaspar.nsf.gov/.
6The number of full-time, first-time graduate students is only an imperfect proxy for the number
of students entering a PhD, because it also includes master students.
7In previous versions we erroneously used NSF data on full-time, first-time graduate students
and doctorates for all universities in the NSF sample.
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Table B.3: Correlation of Unemployment Change with the Number of Entrants and
Graduates
Unempl
Change
(Grad.)
Unempl
Change
(App.)
# Graduates
(AEA)
# Graduates
(NSF)
# Entrants
(NSF)
Unempl Change (Grad.) 1.00
Unempl Change (App.) -0.13 1.00
(0.42)
# Graduates (AEA) 0.02 -0.17 1.00
(0.91) (0.30)
# Graduates (NSF) 0.16 -0.12 0.35∗ 1.00
(0.41) (0.52) (0.06)
# Entrants (NSF) 0.03 0.09 0.02 0.22 1.00
(0.86) (0.62) (0.91) (0.15)
Observations 56
p-values in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
systematically increases (decreases) in recessions.8 Within the framework of our
model, this would weaken (strengthen) the selection effect at application. However,
according to the NSF data, the business cycle at application is not related to the
number of full-time, first-time graduate students (compare row five, column two in
Table B.3). This supports our assumption in the main text. Moreover, the number
of graduates in the NSF data and our data (AEA) is unrelated to unemployment
change at application to the PhD (compare row three and four, column two in Table
B.3 and Figure B.3).
Figure B.3: Number of graduates and unemployment change at application
Another concern is that PhDs might time their graduation in order to circum-
8For example, an increase in PhD entrants during recessions may even happen if universities
do not intend to increase their intake but more of the successful applicants take up their offers.
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vent entering the private or the academic job market during a time of recession.9
The effect of such graduation timing on our parameter estimates would depend on
whether the high- or the low skilled delay their graduation date: If it is the academ-
ically strong students who delay their graduation during recession, this would lead
to a downward-bias of our estimates at graduation on productivity and vice versa
if it is the academically weak students who delay. In both cases, we only add mea-
surement error to our results at application biasing our estimates towards zero, as
long as the business cycle at application and graduation are not related. In general,
since it is unlikely that either group has an incentive to graduate during recession,
graduation timing should lead to procyclical cohort sizes. We do not find a relation
between unemployment change and graduation numbers according to the NSF data
and the AEA doctoral listings (compare row three and four, column one in Table
B.3), which suggests that graduation timing is not much of an issue. This supports
our results in the main text as well as the assumption of no graduation timing in
Oyer (2006).
Finally, a last concern might be that, contrary to our assumption in the model,
the business cycle is systematically correlated with itself in the six years between a
cohort’s application and graduation. Table B.4 reports this and the contemporane-
ous correlation exemplary for unemployment change and GDP growth. The corre-
lation table with unemployment levels and recession indicators are available upon
request from the authors. Unsurprisingly both measures are strongly contemporane-
ously related. However, there is no significant correlation, neither of unemployment
change nor GDP change, between the time of application and graduation. If at all,
there may be a very slightly reversing relationship over the six years. This could
imply that we potentially underestimate the effect of the business cycle on academic
performance because a recession cohort at graduation is more likely a boom cohort
at application (and thus is inherently not as able) and vice versa for a boom cohort
at graduation. For the same reason we might in this case overestimate the effect of
the business cycle on the career decision (i.e. the academic variable) at application
and at graduation.
9In Appendix B.2 we document that also academic job offers decline during recession.
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Table B.4: Correlation of Unemployment Change and GDP Change at Application
and at Graduation
Unempl
Change
(App.)
Unempl
Change
(Grad.)
GDP
Growth
(App.)
GDP
Growth
(Grad.)
Unempl Change (App.) 1.00
Unempl Change (Grad.) -0.15 1.00
(0.27)
GDP Growth (App.) -0.79∗∗∗ 0.16 1.00
(0.00) (0.25)
GDP Growth (Grad.) 0.13 -0.86∗∗∗ -0.11 1.00
(0.34) (0.00) (0.41)
Observations 57
p-values in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
B.4 Robustness
B.4.1 Alternative Measures for Productivity
In this section we consider three alternative measures of academic productivity in
Table B.5: the number of top five articles, the h-value and the raw number of
articles.10
The h-index (Hirsch index or Hirsch number) is a measure based on citations and
number of articles. The last measure is the raw number of articles written as recorded
in JSTOR. In Table B.5 we report the results for these three alternative productivity
measures for the full and the academic subsample. All mean estimates for every
business cycle measure point in the same direction as the dynamic performance
measure in the main text and as the selection theory predicts.
B.4.2 The Tier 1 Subsample
Next, we repeat our main regression for individuals who graduated from the elite Tier
1 schools. According to Table B.6, the magnitude of the effects appears to be larger
in all considered dimensions. The estimated coefficients are in some specifications
more, and in some specifications less, significant than in the main text. Taken
together, the results for the Tier 1 graduates support our findings in the main text.
10We classify articles in “Econometrica”, “The American Economic Review”, “The Quarterly
Journal of Economics”, “The Review of Economic Studies”, “The Journal of Political Economy”
and “The Journal of Finance” as top journal articles.
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Table B.5: Alternative Productivity Measures
Top Five h-index # of Articles Top Five h-index # of Articles
Unempl Change (App.) 1.51 1.14 1.21 3.48∗∗ 3.11∗ 5.65
(1.02) (1.13) (3.24) (1.39) (1.59) (4.81)
Unempl Change (Grad.) 3.93∗∗∗ 3.97∗∗∗ 5.01∗∗ 4.91∗∗∗ 4.81∗∗∗ 4.62
(0.91) (0.87) (2.17) (1.37) (1.54) (4.40)
Unemployment (App.) 0.62 0.97 3.36 1.94 2.54 7.75
(1.08) (1.14) (2.78) (1.74) (1.90) (4.96)
Unemployment (Grad.) 0.78 1.27 2.28 1.65 2.49 5.45
(1.13) (1.15) (2.65) (1.66) (1.74) (4.29)
GDP Growth (App.) -0.59 -0.46 -0.46 -1.49∗∗ -1.36∗ -2.64
(0.45) (0.49) (1.41) (0.62) (0.70) (2.18)
GDP Growth (Grad.) -1.26∗∗ -1.24∗∗ -1.21 -1.51∗∗ -1.36∗ -0.80
(0.49) (0.49) (1.17) (0.72) (0.79) (2.12)
Recession (App.) -0.62 -0.70 -1.47 1.77 1.99 5.44
(3.47) (3.54) (8.70) (5.03) (5.11) (12.69)
Recession (Grad.) 6.20∗∗ 6.50∗∗ 6.97 6.87 7.08 4.22
(2.84) (2.82) (6.11) (4.45) (4.82) (11.18)
Subsample All All All Academic Academic Academic
Univ-Decade Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1068 1068 1068 1047 1047 1047
Note.—Standard errors clustered on graduation year in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Table B.6: Main Regression Results (Tier 1)
Productivity Academic Productivity
Unempl Change (Application) 5.39∗∗ -1.72∗∗∗ 9.84∗∗∗
(2.14) (0.58) (2.96)
Unempl Change (Graduation) 4.34∗ 2.87∗∗∗ 3.94
(2.39) (0.94) (3.45)
Unemployment (Application) 3.16 -1.23 5.87∗
(2.04) (1.03) (3.15)
Unemployment (Graduation) 2.55 -0.07 3.72
(2.46) (0.92) (3.96)
GDP Growth (Application) -1.99∗∗ 0.75∗∗ -3.68∗∗∗
(0.90) (0.29) (1.24)
GDP Growth (Graduation) -1.25 -1.25∗∗∗ -0.83
(1.10) (0.36) (1.57)
Recession (Application) 7.48 -5.73∗∗∗ 16.83∗
(6.15) (1.73) (8.49)
Recession (Graduation) 5.38 3.95∗∗ 4.08
(6.91) (1.67) (9.93)
Subsample Tier 1 Tier 1 Tier 1 Academic
University-Decade Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Observations 234 234 232
Note.—Standard errors clustered on graduation year in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
B.4.3 Length of the PhD
In our main analysis we subtract six years, the median duration of a PhD, from
the graduation date and then use our measure of the business cycle at this date as
macroeconomic variation at entry. The median duration of a PhD stayed almost
constant at around five to six years since the 1970s according to the data assembled
in Table B.7.
Using the median duration of the PhD might be questionable, because there
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Table B.7: Duration of a PhD
Year 1977 1986 1996 1997 2001
5.7 6.3 5.3 5.25 5.5
Median years
of registered
time to PhD
Median years
of registered
time to PhD
Time-to-
degree
Median time-
to-degree
Time-to-
degree
Source Hansen (1991) Hansen (1991) NSF* Stock,
Siegfried,
and Finegan
(2011)
NSF*
Note.—*NSF duration data includes masters degrees, therefore we subtract 1.5 years.
might be substantial variability in the duration of a PhD. Therefore we repeat our
main analysis with a weighted average of the respective business cycle measure at
application according to the distribution of completion times for the year 1997 de-
scribed in Stock, Siegfried, and Finegan (2011). The results are reported in Table
B.8. Note that the regressors have a much lower variation because we compute mov-
ing averages here. Thus, if we want to compare the results in Table B.8 to our main
regressions in Table 2.5, we need to divide the point estimates for unemployment
levels by about 1.2 and for the other regressors by about 2.6. Nonetheless, the mean
estimates in Table B.8 are larger and more significant than in the main text. This
suggests that the latter might be downward biased due to measurement error.
Table B.8: The Regression Results Using “Weighted Average” of PhD Entry
Productivity Academic Productivity
Unempl Change (Application) 3.99∗∗ -6.00∗∗∗ 10.01∗∗∗
(1.71) (1.52) (2.90)
Unempl Change (Graduation) 2.33∗∗∗ 1.27∗∗∗ 2.92∗∗
(0.65) (0.45) (1.20)
Unemployment (Application) 2.33∗∗ -1.17 4.48∗∗∗
(0.96) (1.44) (1.65)
Unemployment (Graduation) 1.89∗∗∗ -0.35 3.39∗∗∗
(0.67) (0.67) (1.18)
GDP Growth (Application) -1.31 2.55∗∗∗ -3.35∗∗
(0.86) (0.58) (1.29)
GDP Growth (Graduation) -0.70∗∗ -0.38 -0.80
(0.34) (0.25) (0.60)
Recession (Application) 14.92∗∗ -14.48∗∗ 33.86∗∗∗
(6.43) (6.03) (10.41)
Recession (Graduation) 5.25∗∗∗ 1.34 6.89∗∗
(1.86) (1.24) (3.01)
Subsample All All Academic
University-Decade Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1023 1023 1005
Note.—Standard errors clustered on graduation year in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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B.4.4 Foreign Students
One concern that was expressed to us is that foreign students may go back to their
home country after the PhD. For example, Borjas (2006) shows that the share of
foreign doctoral students has more than doubled since the 1970s. If hiring in the
academic sector in the US is cyclical too, one might imagine that, in recessions,
more foreign students go back to academic jobs in their respective home countries.
We do not have information about whether students are natives or foreigners in our
dataset. In terms of our model, if there are foreign academic programs whose hiring
is less correlated with the US business cycle than US schools’ hiring, this makes
demand for economists more inelastic. If those graduates who take the option to go
back more often in recessions appear in the faculty listings, the AEA listings, or if
they publish in ranked journals, they are counted as academics. This fits our story.
If they are not counted as academics, our estimates in Table 2.5 will understate the
effect of the business cycle at graduation on the propensity to become an academic
and, depending on whether it is the high-α or the low-α PhDs who react more to this,
our estimates will under- or overstate the effect on the publications per graduate.
Note that our model does not make predictions on the latter effect.
Another possible effect involving foreign students may be at PhD entry. For
example, a recession in a big foreign sending country and a simultaneous boom in
the US might lead to a higher proportion of foreign students starting a US PhD
program. Since foreigners are more likely to go back to (academic positions in)
their home countries after the PhD—and listed publications and AEA membership
are less likely abroad—we might mistake them for having left academia. This may
downward-bias our effect of the business cycle at PhD application on the likelihood
to become an academic. In unreported robustness checks we therefore assemble data
from the “Survey of Earned Doctorates” and examine how the fraction of foreign
PhD entrants and graduates is correlated with the business cycle. We do not find
a relationship between those variables. Furthermore if we control for the fraction of
foreigners in a graduation cohort in our main regression, all our results remain the
same.
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B.4.5 Time Trend as Control
One concern might be that our graduation decade dummies inadequately control for
the general trends in academia over time. In Table B.9 we therefore report the main
regression with university dummies and a linear, quadratic and cubic time trend
instead. The results of the main section on productivity are largely robust. Only
the productivity of academics at graduation is not significant anymore, but theory
made no prediction for the signs of this parameter in the first place. The results
on the propensity to become an academic have the right sign (except at graduation
when using unemployment levels) and at application they are significant at the 10%
level.
Table B.9: Alternative controls: Time Trend
Productivity Academic Productivity
Unempl Change (Application) 0.90∗ -0.57 3.03∗∗∗
(0.51) (0.35) (0.99)
Unempl Change (Graduation) 0.65 0.39 1.44
(0.46) (0.39) (1.20)
Unemployment (Application) 1.47∗∗∗ 0.05 2.83∗∗∗
(0.39) (0.33) (0.94)
Unemployment (Graduation) 0.57 -0.45 2.10∗
(0.42) (0.34) (1.21)
GDP Growth (Application) -0.45∗ 0.25 -1.40∗∗∗
(0.22) (0.16) (0.46)
GDP Growth (Graduation) -0.19 -0.07 -0.45
(0.24) (0.18) (0.55)
Recession (Application) 2.11 -1.93∗ 6.56∗∗
(1.69) (1.15) (3.06)
Recession (Graduation) 1.74 -0.11 3.11
(1.45) (0.70) (3.59)
Subsample All All Academic
Time trend Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3195 3195 1455
Note.—Standard errors clustered on graduation year in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
B.4.6 Controlling for Subfields
In our main regression we might bias our estimates by not controlling for the subfield
of the considered PhD student. For example, if (hypothetically) during a recession
more students chose macroeconomics and macroeconomic papers are published bet-
ter on average, our result might be driven by a change in subfield choices. To address
this concern we collect from the AEA listings the subfield for each considered PhD
graduate. The considered subfields are Microeconomics, Macroeconomics, Econo-
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metrics/Statistics, Labor Economics, Industrial Organization, Public Economics,
International Economics, Development Economics and History.
In an unreported regression we only find very weak evidence, that students
change their subfield if they apply or graduate in a recession.11 Nevertheless, in
Table B.10 we repeat our main regressions with additional subfield fixed effects.
Our main results are both, quantitatively and qualitatively robust to the inclusion
of these additional fixed effects.
Table B.10: Alternative controls: Subfields
Productivity Academic Productivity
Unempl Change (Application) 1.59∗∗ -1.00∗ 3.52∗∗∗
(0.60) (0.56) (0.98)
Unempl Change (Graduation) 2.16∗∗∗ 1.31∗ 2.52∗∗
(0.62) (0.68) (1.14)
Unemployment (Application) 1.67∗∗ -0.60 3.11∗∗
(0.66) (0.72) (1.27)
Unemployment (Graduation) 1.65∗∗ -0.30 2.77∗∗
(0.62) (0.59) (1.17)
GDP Growth (Application) -0.66∗∗ 0.56∗∗ -1.57∗∗∗
(0.26) (0.24) (0.42)
GDP Growth (Graduation) -0.62∗ -0.39 -0.62
(0.31) (0.27) (0.53)
Recession (Application) 2.19 -3.23∗∗ 5.51∗
(1.89) (1.46) (3.06)
Recession (Graduation) 4.43∗∗ 1.86 4.91
(1.81) (1.44) (3.27)
Subsample All All Academic
University-Decade Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Subfield-Decade Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Observations 5612 5608 4487
Note.—Standard errors clustered on graduation year in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
B.4.7 Placement Bias at Graduation
As noted in the main text, the estimated coefficients for the business cycle at grad-
uation may measure the combined impact of the selection effect described in our
theory section and the placement effect. In contrast, the estimated influence of the
business cycle at application measures cleanly the selection effect because we con-
trol in all regressions for the degree-granting university, i.e. for the placement to
different PhD programs. In this subsection we aim to sign the direction of the bias
at graduation.
According to Oyer (2006), the first placements of graduates are on average worse
11These results are left out for conciseness and available from the authors on request.
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in a recession. This leads in turn to fewer publications, as assistant professors
publish significantly less at lower ranked institutions. It should therefore induce a
bias towards zero in our estimates at graduation. In our study, we cannot estimate
the exact size of the bias because we do not have comprehensive placement data
for the last 50 years for the universe of US PhD students. Even if this data were
available, controlling for quality of the first job is not straightforward since the
first placement is influenced by the ability of the PhD graduate and therefore is an
outcome of the selection process described in this article. Oyer (2006) tackles this
problem by using the aggregated demand for PhD graduates as an instrument for
first placements.
To get a sense of the direction of the placement bias, we substitute in the following
our business cycle measure at graduation with the total number of new academic and
non-academic jobs for economists from the “Job Openings for Economists” published
by the American Economics Association. This data is only available for the shorter
time-span from 1977 to 1994 and is also used in Appendix B.2. More academic
job offers influence the placement according to Oyer (2006) but may also increase
the number of graduates entering academia. In contrast, more non-academic job
offers only influence the number of economists entering academia - if more jobs are
available in the private sector more graduates want to go into business.
In the following we estimate our main specification, controlling for the number of
non-academic job offers in the first specification, and controlling for both, academic
and non-academic job offers, in the second specification. In the first specification the
coefficient on non-academic job offers is a combination combination of selection and
placement effect because non-academic job offers are correlated with the omitted
academic job offers (see Appendix B.2). Our estimate should be biased towards
zero. If we control for both types of job offers, then the estimated coefficient on
non-academic jobs gives us the pure selection effect induced by an increase in the
business sector’s attractiveness at graduation, while the estimated coefficient for
academic job offers remains a combination of the placement and the selection effect.
Therefore academic job offers act as an imperfect proxy for placements and academic
demand, and thus mitigate the bias on the coefficient for non-academic job offers.
We report the results of this exercise in Table B.11. More non-academic jobs
lead to fewer graduates staying in academia supporting the idea that the available
outside options drive the selection into academia. The reported coefficients are
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Table B.11: Controlling for the Demand for Economists
Academic Academic Academic Productivity Productivity Productivity
Unempl Change (Application) -1.48 -1.39∗ -1.23∗ 2.82∗ 2.80∗ 2.95∗
(1.02) (0.78) (0.67) (1.43) (1.42) (1.43)
log(Non-Academic Jobs) -13.24∗∗ -18.97∗ 1.88 -3.75
(5.42) (9.94) (10.97) (13.38)
log(Academic Jobs) 12.42 12.16
(10.36) (15.97)
Unemployment (Application) -0.56 -0.02 -0.18 1.29 1.33 1.30
(0.91) (0.83) (0.77) (1.35) (1.42) (1.45)
log(Non-Academic Jobs) -13.79∗∗ -20.44∗∗ -0.94 -2.13
(5.18) (9.26) (11.70) (11.65)
log(Academic Jobs) 15.65 2.81
(10.71) (15.81)
GDP Growth (Application) 0.74∗∗ 0.67∗∗ 0.61∗∗ -1.46∗ -1.46∗ -1.50∗∗
(0.30) (0.26) (0.23) (0.70) (0.71) (0.69)
log(Non-Academic Jobs) -12.71∗∗ -18.85∗ 0.80 -3.99
(5.12) (9.11) (10.82) (13.73)
log(Academic Jobs) 13.28 10.33
(9.40) (16.32)
Recession (Application) -2.66 -2.62∗ -2.26 0.64 0.62 0.77
(2.17) (1.33) (1.32) (3.89) (3.87) (3.85)
log(Non-Academic Jobs) -13.79∗∗∗ -20.08∗∗ 3.20 0.50
(4.51) (8.98) (11.32) (12.11)
log(Academic Jobs) 13.79 5.91
(10.56) (15.37)
Subsample All All All Academic Academic Academic
University-Decade Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 500 500 500 490 490 490
Note.—Standard errors clustered on graduation year in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
significantly different from zero at least on the 10% level. The mean estimate of the
number of academic jobs is positive, but not significantly different from zero. In
the productivity regressions, all coefficients are imprecisely estimated and therefore
not significantly different from zero. If we interpret the mean estimates, we find a
negative impact of non-academic jobs on productivity but only if we control for the
number of academic jobs. For all business cycle measures the estimated coefficient
for non-academic jobs is consistently more positive if we leave out the number of
academic job offers. This points to the expected upward bias due to the placement
effect of Oyer (2006).
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